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Abstract	  
	  Policy	  failure	  is	  a	  recurring	  theme	  in	  large	  government	  technology	  projects.	  The	  Ontario	  Electronic	  Health	  Record	  (EHR)	  project	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  recent,	  and	  high	  profile,	  Canadian	  examples.	  	  The	  EHR	  project	  had	  two	  main	  phases	  –	  the	  design	  phase	  (in	  which	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  system	  was	  determined)	  and	  an	  implementation	  phase	  (in	  which	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  system	  was	  carried	  out).	  This	  study	  has	  two	  objectives:	  first,	  to	  develop	  a	  set	  of	  frameworks	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  the	  design	  phase	  and	  the	  implementation	  phases;	  and	  second,	  to	  use	  these	  frameworks	  to	  describe	  and	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  EHR	  initiative	  was	  so	  unsuccessful.	  	  To	  facilitate	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  a	  project,	  a	  game	  theoretic	  framework	  is	  employed	  that	  classifies	  technology	  solutions	  as	  either	  independent	  or	  interdependent.	  When	  solutions	  are	  interdependent,	  the	  framework	  suggests	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  the	  greatest	  value,	  the	  government	  should	  exert	  its	  authority	  to	  ensure	  the	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  system.	  	  To	  understand	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  a	  project,	  a	  framework	  is	  developed	  that	  links	  together	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  type	  of	  organization	  best	  suited	  to	  solving	  the	  problem.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  complexity,	  or	  decomposability,	  of	  a	  problem	  directly	  affects	  the	  optimal	  method	  of	  a	  search	  for	  solutions,	  and	  the	  optimal	  means	  of	  organizing	  that	  search.	  	  	  These	  two	  frameworks	  are	  then	  applied	  to	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  project	  to	  analyze	  why	  the	  EHR	  project	  was	  so	  unsuccessful.	  I	  conclude	  that	  decision	  makers	  failed	  to	  consider	  the	  interdependent	  nature	  of	  EHR	  solutions;	  instead,	  they	  encouraged	  independent	  actors	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  ehealth	  solutions,	  effectively	  undermining	  the	  provincial	  goal	  of	  an	  interoperable	  system.	  I	  also	  conclude	  that	  decision	  makers	  misdiagnosed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  EHR	  problem,	  resulting	  in	  an	  ineffective	  search	  
	   iii	  
procedure	  to	  locate	  an	  EHR	  solution.	  These	  two	  errors	  resulted	  in	  a	  policy	  fiasco	  that	  was	  manifested	  in	  almost	  total	  project	  failure	  and	  a	  resulting	  high	  degree	  of	  public	  outrage.	  We	  also	  speculate	  on	  why	  these	  errors	  were	  made.	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  In	  many	  respects,	  the	  new	  millennium	  has	  reinvigorated	  an	  old	  debate	  regarding	  public	  policy	  failure,	  and	  the	  role,	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	  public	  governance.	  The	  great	  financial	  debacle	  of	  2008	  has	  led	  academics,	  practitioners,	  and	  public	  writ	  large	  to	  question	  the	  capacity	  of	  government	  to	  respond	  to	  public	  problems	  and	  effectively	  govern	  in	  an	  increasingly	  complex	  world.	  The	  ubiquity	  of	  government	  failure,	  both	  real	  and	  imagined,	  has	  created	  a	  sense	  of	  malaise	  amongst	  the	  general	  public	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  governments.	  Policy	  scientists,	  students	  of	  public	  administration,	  and	  policy	  makers	  are	  in	  many	  ways	  facing	  a	  test	  of	  their	  legitimacy.	  Despite	  decades	  of	  progress	  in	  analyzing	  and	  explaining	  policy	  failure,	  and	  developing	  a	  series	  of	  prescriptive	  solutions	  to	  mitigate	  disaster,	  the	  negative	  media	  headlines	  keep	  coming.	  Commentators	  readily	  decry	  the	  numerous	  cases	  of	  government	  incompetence,	  fraud,	  waste	  and	  abuse.	  Moreover,	  unlike	  the	  1980s,	  when	  the	  war	  between	  conservatives	  and	  liberals	  over	  the	  role	  and	  capacity	  of	  government	  was	  waged,	  the	  general	  public	  today	  appears	  increasingly	  convinced	  that	  government	  can	  simply	  not	  get	  it	  right.	  Indeed,	  we	  live	  in	  era	  where	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  our	  public	  institutions	  is	  under	  threat.	  For	  policy	  scientists,	  who	  are	  often	  predisposed	  to	  understand	  and	  help	  improve	  the	  practice	  of	  government,	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fundamental	  questions	  are	  (re)emerging:	  Are	  we	  facing	  problems	  of	  knowledge	  dissemination?	  Do	  we	  have	  the	  necessary	  analytical	  tools	  to	  understand	  policy	  failure?	  If	  not,	  what	  does	  this	  imply	  for	  our	  prescriptive	  aims	  and	  ambitions?1	  	  	  	  Policy	  failure,	  in	  its	  many	  guises,	  is	  a	  central	  concern	  of	  public	  policy	  experts.	  This	  author	  is	  centrally	  concerned	  with	  high	  rate	  of	  failure	  in	  large,	  complex,	  government	  information,	  communication,	  and	  technology	  (ICT)	  projects.	  By	  virtually	  any	  standard,	  it	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  government	  ICT	  projects	  are	  notorious	  for	  succumbing	  to	  policy	  failure.	  Government	  led	  ICT	  projects	  are	  infamous	  for	  being	  over	  budget,2	  while	  failing	  to	  deliver	  on	  their	  promise.	  Many	  of	  these	  failures	  have	  been	  popularized	  in	  the	  media,	  and	  gained	  an	  iconic,	  albeit	  negative,	  status	  in	  the	  public	  consciousness.	  Policy	  failures,	  like	  the	  UK	  National	  Health	  Services’	  massive	  $12	  billion	  electronic	  health	  records	  (EHR)	  initiative	  and	  the	  $20	  billlion	  US	  Tax	  Modernization	  Project,3	  have	  led	  many	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  to	  believe	  that	  government	  simply	  can	  not	  handle	  the	  complexity	  of	  large	  ICT	  projects.	  Beyond	  the	  popular	  narrative	  policy	  failure,	  there	  is	  now	  a	  substantial	  body	  of	  empirical	  work	  that	  demonstrates	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  government	  ICT	  projects	  have	  failed,	  at	  least	  on	  the	  budgetary	  level.	  The	  frequently	  cited	  Standish	  Group	  study	  on	  ICT	  procurement	  in	  the	  United	  States	  found	  that	  over	  31	  percent	  of	  projects	  were	  cancelled	  before	  completion,	  while	  53	  percent	  were	  completed	  but	  over	  budget	  by	  an	  average	  of	  189	  percent.4	  Bent	  Flyvbjerg,	  the	  widely	  respected	  Professor	  of	  Management	  at	  Oxford	  University’s	  Saïd	  Business	  School,	  and	  an	  expert	  in	  mega	  projects,	  also	  examined	  the	  budgetary	  performance	  of	  government	  ICT	  projects.	  According	  to	  Flyvbjerg’s	  analysis,	  given	  the	  inaccuracies	  in	  budgeting	  government	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  These	  questions	  regarding	  the	  crisis	  of	  governance	  were	  framed	  by	  Bovens	  and	  ‘t	  Hart	  in	  their	  seminal	  work	  on	  policy	  fiascoes;	  see:	  Mark	  Bovens	  and	  Paul	  't	  Hart,	  Understanding	  Policy	  Fiascoes	  (London:	  Transaction	  Publishing,	  1998),	  p.	  173.	  2	  	  Mark	  Keil	  and	  others,	  "Understanding	  Runaway	  Information	  Technology	  Projects:	  Results	  from	  an	  International	  Research	  Program	  Based	  on	  Escalation	  Theory,"	  Journal	  of	  Management	  Information	  11,	  no.	  3	  (1994/1995),	  p.	  72.	  3	  Oxford	  Analytica	  Daily	  Brief,	  “International:	  E-­‐government	  potential	  is	  misunderstood,”	  Oxford	  
Analytica,	  (May	  7,	  2008).	  	  	  4	  	  Sandford	  Borins,	  "Information	  Technology	  in	  the	  Public	  Sector,"	  in	  The	  Handbook	  of	  Canadian	  
Public	  Administration,	  ed.	  Christopher	  Dunn	  (Toronto:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  Canada,	  2002),	  p.	  457.	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ICT	  projects,	  if	  decision	  makers	  wanted	  to	  have	  80%	  certainty	  that	  their	  projects	  would	  come	  in	  at	  or	  under	  budget,	  they	  would	  have	  to	  revise,	  on	  average,	  their	  initial	  cost	  estimates	  upwards	  of	  200%.5	  The	  ubiquity	  of	  ICT	  project	  failure,	  again,	  in	  budgetary	  terms,	  is	  strongly	  supported	  by	  the	  large	  empirical	  study	  conducted	  by	  Mark	  Keith	  and	  his	  colleagues,	  who	  found	  that	  two	  and	  three-­‐fold	  budget	  overruns	  are	  not	  uncommon	  in	  ICT	  projects.6	  Given	  the	  available	  statistics,	  the	  general	  public	  should	  be	  forgiven	  for	  believing	  that	  government	  always	  gets	  in	  wrong	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  public	  ICT	  projects.	  	  	  Despite	  public	  skepticism	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  government	  to	  effectively	  manage	  complex	  ICT	  projects,	  there	  is	  an	  intuitive	  sense	  amongst	  public	  policy	  and	  technology	  professions	  that	  e-­‐government,	  in	  its	  many	  guises,	  can	  substantially	  improve	  government	  performance.	  Indeed,	  ICT	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  essential	  to	  all	  aspects	  of	  public	  sector	  delivery,	  and	  spending	  on	  ICT	  by	  government	  continues	  to	  increase	  year	  over	  year.7	  The	  challenge	  for	  government,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  new	  developments	  in	  both	  hardware	  and	  software	  capacity	  occur	  briskly,	  and	  technology	  rapidly	  becomes	  obsolete.	  Governments	  are	  continuously	  challenged	  to	  make	  frequent	  spending	  commitments	  simply	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  technological	  change	  in	  society,	  and	  keep	  e-­‐systems	  current.	  Fortunately,	  governments	  in	  Canada	  have	  met	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  e-­‐sophistication	  demanded	  by	  the	  public.	  The	  public	  can	  now	  go	  online	  and	  pay	  their	  taxes,	  apply	  for	  government	  jobs,	  receive	  e-­‐bulletins	  relating	  to	  public	  health,	  or	  look	  up	  the	  parliamentary	  record	  on	  Hansard.	  While	  governments	  have	  increasingly	  moved	  online,	  like	  all	  organizations	  in	  society,	  the	  real	  challenge	  for	  government	  has	  been	  managing	  larger,	  complex	  ICT	  systems,	  which	  require	  significant	  resources	  to	  develop	  and	  deploy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  Bent	  Flyvbjerg,	  "From	  Nobel	  Prize	  to	  Project	  Management:	  Getting	  Risk	  Right,"	  Project	  Management	  
Journal	  37,	  no.	  3	  (2006),	  p.	  11.	  6	  	  Keil	  and	  others,	  Understanding	  Runaway	  Information	  Technology	  Projects:	  Results	  from	  an	  
International	  Research	  Program	  Based	  on	  Escalation	  Theory,	  p.	  74.	  7	  	  Borins,	  Information	  Technology	  in	  the	  Public	  Sector,	  p.	  456.	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There	  is	  a	  significant	  danger	  to	  the	  public	  good	  if	  government	  becomes	  unwilling	  to	  undertake	  large,	  complex	  ICT	  projects.	  Given	  governments’	  unenviable	  success	  record	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  large	  ICT	  projects,	  this	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  serious	  concern.	  With	  each	  successive	  ICT	  failure,	  the	  public	  becomes	  more	  reticent	  to	  accept	  significant	  public	  spending	  on	  large	  future	  projects.	  	  Moreover,	  governments	  become	  increasing	  unwilling	  to	  undertake	  ICT	  projects	  without	  the	  support	  of	  the	  people.	  Given	  the	  promise	  of	  ICT	  projects	  in	  general,	  to	  improve	  efficiency	  and	  the	  public	  welfare,	  it	  is	  critically	  important	  that	  government	  succeed.	  Failure	  breeds	  contempt.	  Success	  breeds	  opportunity	  and	  acceptance.	  Without	  support	  of	  the	  governed,	  political	  decision	  makers	  will	  be	  unwilling	  to	  undertake	  large,	  complex	  ICT	  projects	  irrespective	  of	  the	  potential	  positive	  rate	  of	  return,	  given	  the	  likelihood	  that	  it	  could	  end	  up	  as	  a	  policy	  failure,	  or	  worse,	  as	  a	  fiasco.	  	  	  Perhaps	  nowhere	  is	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  new	  complex	  ICT	  system	  more	  apparent	  than	  in	  the	  development	  of	  electronic	  health	  records	  (EHRs)	  for	  patients	  in	  the	  Canadian	  public	  healthcare	  system.	  Spending	  on	  healthcare	  in	  Canada	  reached	  $191.6	  billion	  in	  2010,	  or	  $5,614	  for	  every	  man	  woman	  and	  child.8	  Despite	  significant	  public	  outlays	  for	  healthcare,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  health	  records	  are	  made	  and	  updated	  as	  they	  were	  100	  years	  ago,	  with	  pen	  and	  paper.	  Each	  year,	  the	  health	  system	  produces	  over	  2000	  healthcare	  transactions	  per	  minute,	  or	  more	  than	  1	  billion	  per	  year,	  which	  includes	  400	  million	  laboratory	  tests,	  382	  million	  drug	  prescriptions,	  332	  million	  visits	  to	  physicians’	  offices	  and	  35	  million	  diagnostic	  images.9	  For	  health	  experts,	  the	  ability	  to	  capture	  this	  information	  in	  an	  individual	  electronic	  health	  record,	  which	  is	  both	  permanent	  and	  transferable,	  has	  tremendous	  promise	  to	  both	  improve	  patient	  care	  and	  reduce	  healthcare	  costs.	  If	  successfully	  implemented,	  an	  EHR	  would,	  for	  example,	  allow	  an	  emergency	  room	  physician	  in	  Toronto,	  who	  is	  treating	  a	  patient,	  to	  instantly	  access	  that	  patient’s	  entire	  medical	  history,	  whether	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Canadian	  Institute	  for	  Health	  Information,	  “National	  Health	  Expenditure	  Trends,	  1975-­‐2010,”	  http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/products/NHEX_Trends_Report_2010_final_ENG_	  web.pdf	  (accessed	  February	  14,	  2011),	  p.	  1-­‐4.	  9	  	  Jim	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  Toronto:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Ontario,	  (2009),	  p.	  5.	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that	  patient	  lives	  around	  the	  block,	  or	  in	  another	  city,	  like	  North	  Bay,	  Ontario.	  With	  healthcare	  costs	  rising	  at	  an	  alarming	  rate,	  well	  above	  the	  cost	  of	  inflation,	  health	  policy	  experts	  have	  viewed	  EHR,	  and	  ehealth,10	  as	  a	  silver	  bullet	  that	  can	  reduce	  costs	  by	  eliminating	  duplicate	  tests,	  increasing	  system	  efficiency,	  and	  improving	  overall	  patient	  care	  through	  information	  consolidation.	  While	  estimates	  of	  the	  annual	  cost	  savings	  from	  the	  introduction	  of	  EHR	  vary,	  from	  $1.1	  billion	  in	  Ontario11	  to	  $6	  billion	  nationally,12	  experts	  agree	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  new	  and	  essential	  tool	  could	  profoundly	  change	  healthcare	  in	  Canada	  for	  the	  better.	  	  	  Beyond	  the	  demand	  for	  EHRs	  by	  health	  professionals	  and	  public	  policy	  makers,	  the	  public	  appears	  genuinely	  enthused	  about	  promise	  of	  bringing	  Canada’s	  healthcare	  system	  into	  the	  electronic	  age.	  	  In	  2007,	  the	  Canadian	  Health	  Infoway	  (Infoway)13	  reported	  that	  almost	  9	  in	  10	  Canadians	  (87%)	  viewed	  timely	  and	  easy	  access	  to	  personal	  health	  information	  as	  integral	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  quality	  care,	  while	  at	  least	  one	  in	  two	  Canadians	  were	  concerned	  about	  serious	  mistakes	  in	  diagnoses	  or	  treatment	  due	  to	  incomplete,	  inaccurate,	  or	  illegible	  patient	  information.14	  	  	  Given	  the	  promise	  of	  EHR	  in	  Canada	  to	  improve	  the	  public	  healthcare	  system,	  governments	  at	  both	  levels,	  federal	  and	  provincial,	  committed	  in	  September	  2000	  to	  develop	  an	  EHR	  for	  all	  Canadians,	  while	  in	  Ontario,	  Canada’s	  largest	  province,	  planning	  for	  EHR	  began	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  The	  headline	  story	  of	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  project	  is	  now	  well	  known	  to	  media	  observers	  and	  the	  general	  public:	  the	  billion	  dollar	  scandal.	  The	  scathing	  October	  2009	  Special	  Report	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Auditor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  A	  brief	  note	  on	  terminology:	  “e-­‐health”	  and	  “ehealth”	  refers	  broadly	  to	  electronic	  health	  care	  initiatives,	  irrespective	  of	  jurisdiction,	  while	  “eHealth”	  refers	  to	  eHealth	  Ontario,	  an	  agency	  established	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  tasked	  with	  developing	  the	  electronic	  health	  records	  (EHR)	  system.	  	  11	  	  Richard	  C.	  Alvarez,	  "The	  Promise	  of	  e-­‐Health	  -­‐	  a	  Canadian	  Perspective,"	  EHealth	  International	  1,	  no.	  4	  (2002),	  pp.	  4,	  5.	  12	  	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  p	  5.	  13	  The	  Canadian	  Health	  Infoway,	  a	  non-­‐profit	  organization,	  was	  established	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  in	  2001	  and	  is	  tasked	  with	  accelerating	  the	  development	  of	  EHR	  systems	  across	  Canada.	  14	  Canada	  Health	  Infoway,	  “Electronic	  Health	  Information	  and	  Privacy	  Survey:	  What	  Canadians	  Think	  –	  2007,	  Final	  Report,”	  http://www2.infoway-­‐inforoute.ca/Documents/EKOS_Final%20report_EN.pdf	  (accessed	  February	  14,	  2011),	  p.	  2.	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General	  of	  Ontario	  confirmed,	  in	  many	  ways,	  what	  opposition	  politicians	  and	  the	  public	  had	  been	  claiming	  for	  years:	  the	  Government	  of	  Ontario	  had	  effectively	  spent	  upwards	  of	  one	  billion	  dollars	  on	  an	  EHR	  initiative,	  and	  had	  little	  to	  show	  for	  its	  efforts.15	  Senior	  officials	  were	  fired,	  a	  minister	  resigned,	  the	  project	  was	  reorganized,	  and	  opposition	  leaders	  at	  Queen’s	  Park	  (the	  provincial	  parliament)	  called	  for	  a	  full	  public	  inquiry	  into	  the	  development	  of	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  system.	  Indeed,	  given	  the	  apparent	  scale	  of	  the	  failure,	  the	  EHR	  project	  in	  Ontario	  has	  unsurprisingly	  become	  a	  popular	  cultural	  reference	  point	  in	  Canada,	  to	  which	  other	  government	  activity	  is	  compared.	  It	  is	  not	  uncommon	  to	  hear,	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  a	  politician	  argue,	  ‘the	  government	  is	  a	  just	  a	  few	  steps	  away	  from	  another	  billion	  dollar	  failure	  like	  eHealth	  in	  Ontario.’16	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  scandal	  appears	  like	  many	  other	  large,	  complex	  ICT	  project	  gone	  wrong	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  government.	  The	  fear,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  governments	  across	  Canada	  will	  be	  reticent	  to	  take	  on	  future	  projects	  of	  similar	  scale	  and	  complexity,	  given	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  legacy.	  At	  question,	  therefore,	  is	  whether	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  was	  truly	  a	  policy	  failure,	  and	  if	  so,	  why	  was	  this	  the	  case,	  and	  what	  lessons	  can	  be	  gleaned	  for	  the	  future.	  First,	  let	  us	  briefly	  address	  some	  conceptual	  considerations	  as	  to	  what	  constitutes	  policy	  failure	  or	  a	  policy	  fiasco.	  	  
POLICY	  FAILURE	  	  Defining	  policy	  failure	  has	  long	  been	  a	  challenge	  for	  public	  policy	  experts.	  In	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  popular	  media,	  labels	  of	  policy	  “failure”	  are	  omnipresent	  and	  applied	  in	  the	  most	  sensational	  forms.	  It	  is	  common	  in	  our	  political	  culture	  to	  regularly	  hear	  of	  “scandals	  and	  failures”,17	  “policy	  fiascoes”,18	  or	  “billion	  dollar	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  p	  5.	  16	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  Committee	  debate	  in	  the	  Canadian	  parliament:	  Hansard,	  House	  of	  Commons,	  
Health	  Committee,	  40:2	  Committee	  Evidence	  –	  HESA	  –	  47,	  (November	  30,	  2009).	  17	  	  Tanya	  Talaga,	  "EHealth	  Scandal	  Reaches	  Premier's	  Inner	  Circle,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  01,	  June	  11,	  2009.	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boondoggles”19	  without	  a	  thorough	  examination	  of	  facts,	  or	  more	  importantly,	  an	  acceptable	  definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  “failure”	  or	  “fiasco”.	  For	  policy	  experts,	  defining	  failure	  appears	  at	  times	  to	  be	  an	  intractable	  problem.	  What	  is	  policy	  failure?	  If	  we	  can	  engineer	  an	  acceptable	  definition	  of	  a	  policy	  failure,	  when	  does	  a	  failure	  become	  a	  fiasco?	  Fortunately,	  there	  is	  some	  agreement	  amongst	  the	  experts	  on	  what	  constitutes	  policy	  failure,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  analytical	  dimensions	  of	  the	  debate	  have	  become	  clear.	  	  Policy	  failure	  has	  both	  a	  normative	  and	  empirical	  dimension.	  The	  empirical	  dimensions	  of	  policy	  failure	  are	  relatively	  straightforward,	  and	  easy	  to	  comprehend.	  For	  positivists,	  who	  tend	  to	  favour	  a	  single	  analytical	  lens,	  policy	  failure	  occurs	  when	  evaluators	  conclude	  that	  a	  program/project	  fails	  to	  meet	  official	  objectives,	  attain	  certain	  performance	  standards,	  or	  comes	  in	  over	  the	  budgeted	  amount.	  For	  strict	  adherents	  to	  positivist	  philosophy	  in	  the	  policy	  sciences,	  the	  empirical	  evaluation	  and	  judgment	  (success	  vs.	  failure)	  must	  occur	  over	  a	  discrete	  period	  of	  time.	  That	  is,	  historical	  revisionism,	  or	  an	  ex	  post	  evaluation	  with	  a	  significant	  time	  lag,	  has	  no	  place	  in	  defining	  policy	  success	  or	  failure.	  	  	  Policy	  failure	  can	  also	  be	  conceptualized	  to	  include	  normative	  considerations,	  which	  by	  definition,	  are	  subject	  to	  change	  over	  time.	  Therefore,	  the	  incorporation	  of	  normative	  considerations	  can	  easily	  alter	  the	  interpretation	  of	  policy	  success	  and	  failure,	  particularly	  with	  an	  ex	  post	  evaluative	  lens.	  We	  can	  examine	  the	  difference	  between	  empirical	  and	  normative	  considerations	  by	  way	  of	  example.	  Consider	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Sydney	  Opera	  House,	  one	  of	  the	  iconic	  architectural	  landmarks	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  Planning	  for	  the	  multi-­‐venue	  performing	  arts	  centre	  began	  in	  the	  late	  1940,	  and	  construction	  began	  in	  the	  late	  1950s,	  with	  a	  project	  budget	  estimated	  at	  $7	  million.	  Ultimately,	  the	  project	  was	  formally	  completed	  in	  1973,	  ten	  years	  late,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  	  Jim	  Coyle,	  "McGuinty's	  Need	  for	  Speed	  Led	  to	  eHealth	  Fiasco,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  10,	  June	  19,	  2009.	  19	  	  Tanya	  Talaga,	  "Critics	  Roast	  Government	  Over	  $647M	  Boondoggle;	  Ontario's	  Abandoned	  Medical	  e-­‐Records	  Plan	  Called	  a	  Waste	  of	  Cash,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  01,	  August	  8,	  2009.	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and	  fourteen	  times	  over	  budget	  ($102	  million).	  In	  Peter	  Hall’s	  seminal	  study	  of	  great	  planning	  disasters,	  the	  Sydney	  Opera	  House	  is	  described	  as	  a	  catastrophe.20	  Indeed,	  a	  strict	  positivist	  interpretation	  of	  the	  project	  suggests	  that	  the	  Opera	  House	  is	  a	  policy	  failure	  par	  excellence.	  However,	  a	  normative	  interpretation	  of	  this	  project	  suggests	  that	  failure	  is	  relative.	  In	  1973,	  the	  Sydney	  Opera	  House	  was	  viewed	  as	  an	  iconic	  failure,	  but	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  has	  converted	  it	  into	  an	  icon	  of	  incalculable	  value	  to	  the	  city.21	  The	  passage	  of	  time,	  and	  normative	  reconsiderations	  of	  the	  project,	  have	  led	  most	  observers	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  Sydney	  Opera	  House	  was	  certainly	  worth	  the	  money,	  and	  most	  definitely,	  an	  ultimate	  success.	  Therefore,	  we	  can	  consider	  the	  Sydney	  Opera	  House	  both	  an	  empirical	  policy	  failure,	  and	  a	  normative	  success.	  	  	  Beyond	  the	  normative	  and	  empirical	  considerations	  of	  what	  constitutes	  policy	  failure,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  issue	  of	  degrees	  of	  failure.	  What	  differentiates	  a	  policy	  failure	  from	  a	  policy	  fiasco?	  The	  most	  common	  working	  definition	  of	  a	  policy	  fiasco	  comes	  from	  Mark	  Bovens	  and	  Paul	  ‘t	  Hart,	  two	  leading	  public	  administration	  experts,	  who	  argue	  that:	  A	  policy	  fiasco	  is	  a	  negative	  event	  that	  is	  perceived	  by	  a	  socially	  and	  politically	  significant	  group	  of	  people	  in	  the	  community	  to	  be	  at	  least	  partially	  caused	  by	  avoidable	  and	  blameworthy	  failures	  of	  public	  policymakers.22	  	  Bovens	  and	  ‘t	  Hart	  also	  differentiate	  between	  what	  constitutes	  a	  policy	  failure	  and	  a	  policy	  fiasco:	  Failure	  therefore	  differs	  from	  fiasco	  in	  that	  the	  former	  refers	  to	  performance	  defects	  of	  any	  size	  or	  seriousness,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  politicized,	  whereas	  fiasco	  only	  refers	  to	  situations	  of:	  (a)	  subjectively	  significant	  social	  damage,	  that	  (b)	  are	  highly	  politicized.23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	  Peter	  Hall,	  Great	  Planning	  Disasters	  (Harmondsworth:	  Penguin,	  1982),	  pp.	  138-­‐51.	  21	  	  Michael	  Moran,	  "Not	  Steering	  but	  Drowning:	  Policy	  Catastrophe	  and	  the	  Regulatory	  State,"	  The	  
Political	  Quarterly	  72,	  no.	  4	  (2001),	  pp.	  415-­‐417.	  22	  	  Bovens	  and	  't	  Hart,	  Understanding	  Policy	  Fiascoes,	  p.	  15.	  23	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  15.	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The	  holistic	  definition	  of	  failure	  provided	  by	  Bovens	  and	  ‘t	  Hart	  includes	  both	  positive	  and	  normative	  considerations	  and	  will	  be	  used	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  exercise,	  with	  the	  caveat	  that	  this	  study	  is	  examining	  an	  event,	  the	  development	  of	  EHRs	  in	  Ontario,	  at	  this	  specific	  point	  in	  time.	  Hence,	  while	  normative	  perceptions	  of	  the	  project	  may	  change,	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  immediate,	  and	  how	  both	  the	  EHR	  project	  has	  been	  managed	  and	  perceived	  by	  the	  public.	  Moreover,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  study,	  we	  will	  ignore	  any	  technical	  distinctions	  which	  may,	  or	  may	  not,	  exist	  between	  a	  “policy	  failure”	  vs.	  “project	  failure”	  and	  “policy	  fiasco”	  vs.	  “project	  fiasco”;	  functionally,	  terms	  “project”	  and	  “policy”	  are	  synonymous	  and	  will	  be	  used	  interchangeably	  in	  this	  study.	  	  To	  parse	  definitions	  here,	  between	  policy	  and	  project,	  invites	  only	  mundane	  debate	  and	  is	  inconsequential	  to	  the	  larger	  considerations	  at	  issue.	  	  	  Employing	  Bovens	  and	  ‘t	  Harts	  definition,	  with	  our	  noted	  caveat,	  the	  EHR	  initiative	  in	  Ontario	  was	  a	  prototypical	  example	  of	  a	  policy	  fiasco.	  As	  we	  will	  examine	  in	  greater	  detail	  later,	  not	  only	  did	  the	  EHR	  initiative	  meet	  the	  looser	  criterion	  of	  a	  policy	  failure	  on	  technical,	  positivist,	  grounds	  (performance	  standards,	  budget	  overruns,	  etc.),	  it	  meets	  the	  stricter	  criteria	  of	  policy	  fiasco.	  The	  Ontario	  EHR	  initiative	  certainly	  caused	  subjectively	  significant	  social	  damage	  in	  at	  least	  three	  discrete	  ways:	  (1)	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  functional	  system	  undoubtedly	  resulted	  in	  less	  than	  optimal	  care	  being	  delivered	  through	  the	  public	  system,	  given	  care	  standards	  available	  in	  jurisdictions	  with	  functional	  EHR	  systems;	  (2)	  the	  cost	  to	  society,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  $1	  billion	  of	  government	  spending;	  and	  (3)	  the	  loss	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  public	  trust	  in	  government,	  by	  the	  people	  of	  Ontario.	  Finally,	  the	  EHR	  scandal	  certainly	  meets	  the	  criteria	  of	  a	  highly	  politicized	  event,	  as	  defined	  in	  a	  policy	  fiasco.	  Through	  the	  2000s,	  no	  other	  political	  issue,	  or	  government	  initiative,	  has	  become	  more	  criticized	  and	  captured	  the	  public	  imagination	  (in	  a	  negative	  way),	  than	  the	  EHR	  initiative	  in	  Ontario.	  	  	  If	  we	  can	  accept	  that	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  project	  does	  constitute	  a	  policy	  fiasco,	  at	  least	  on	  a	  prima	  facie	  basis,	  then	  the	  issue	  certainly	  warrants	  further	  analysis	  and	  attention.	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Certain	  questions	  deserve	  to	  be	  asked	  and	  answered.	  How	  did	  this	  particular	  fiasco	  unfold,	  and	  why?	  Given	  the	  challenges	  of	  implementing	  a	  large-­‐scale	  complex	  ICT	  system,	  did	  the	  government	  avail	  themselves	  of	  appropriate	  strategies	  to	  manage	  the	  project?	  What	  went	  right,	  and	  what	  went	  wrong?	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  given	  the	  high	  failure	  rate	  of	  ICT	  projects	  across	  governments,	  what	  lessons	  can	  be	  gleaned	  from	  this	  particular	  policy	  fiasco?	  Quite	  simply,	  how	  can	  government	  seek	  to	  avoid	  future	  policy	  fiascoes	  when	  designing	  and	  implementing	  large	  ICT	  projects?	  	  The	  failure	  of	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  project	  specifically,	  and	  large-­‐scale	  government	  ICT	  projects	  in	  general,	  raise	  another	  important	  question:	  Do	  policy	  scientists	  have	  the	  necessary	  tools	  to	  understand	  and	  plan	  responses	  to	  complex	  policy	  problems?	  Policy	  problems	  require	  policy	  solutions,	  and	  a	  strategy	  to	  achieve	  those	  ends.	  Unfortunately,	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  project	  and	  policy	  failure	  is	  consumed	  by	  the	  immediate	  considerations	  of	  any	  given	  initiative.	  The	  focus	  and	  analysis	  frequently	  revolves	  around	  leadership,	  strategic	  planning,	  governance,	  and	  agency	  considerations.	  While	  these	  considerations	  are	  undoubtedly	  important,	  questions	  regarding	  strategic	  planning,	  or	  a	  lack	  thereof,	  are	  often	  superficial	  in	  nature.	  A	  coherent	  strategic	  plan,	  at	  its	  core,	  is	  a	  roadmap	  towards	  achieving	  a	  solution	  to	  a	  given	  policy	  problem.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  different	  types	  of	  policy	  problems	  require	  different	  roadmaps,	  or	  search	  solutions.	  	  	  Returning	  to	  the	  question	  above,	  it	  is	  clear,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  this	  author,	  that	  policy	  scientists	  lack	  the	  requisite	  tools	  to	  create	  a	  successful	  strategic	  plan.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  a	  strategic	  plan	  must	  be	  matched,	  in	  a	  discriminating	  manner,	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  policy	  problem.	  The	  first	  building	  block	  of	  successful	  strategic	  planning,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  policy	  problem	  and	  determine	  how	  an	  organization,	  or	  government,	  ought	  to	  conduct	  a	  search	  solution.	  Without	  this	  critical	  first	  step	  and	  analysis,	  decision	  makers	  will	  invariably	  blindly	  follow	  a	  road	  map	  to	  policy	  failure	  or	  worse,	  fiasco.	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RESEARCH	  PROJECT	  OUTLINE	  	  The	  major	  objectives	  of	  this	  research	  project	  are	  twofold:	  first,	  to	  describe	  and	  analyze	  the	  development	  of	  EHRs	  in	  Ontario,	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  insightful	  understanding	  of	  this	  policy	  fiasco;	  and	  second,	  to	  construct	  an	  alternative	  approach	  of	  how	  government	  should	  organize	  a	  solution	  search	  to	  a	  given	  policy	  problem.	  Given	  the	  low	  success	  rate	  of	  government	  ICT	  projects	  in	  general,	  and	  failure	  to	  effectively	  develop	  EHR	  in	  Ontario	  specifically,	  new	  insights	  into	  this	  type	  of	  project	  failure	  must	  be	  brought	  to	  light.	  It	  is	  clear,	  to	  at	  least	  some	  degree,	  that	  policy	  scientists	  lack	  sufficient	  analytical	  tools	  to	  effectively	  understand	  how	  to	  organize	  large	  public	  ICT	  projects.	  It	  is	  a	  central	  argument	  of	  this	  author	  that	  government	  lacks	  both	  the	  framework	  and	  conceptual	  tools	  to	  undertake	  an	  effective	  policy	  solution	  search,	  and	  that	  much	  of	  failure	  in	  large,	  complex	  public	  ICT	  projects	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  this	  fact.	  That	  is,	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  these	  projects,	  at	  the	  policy	  formulation	  stage,	  decision	  makers	  often	  get	  the	  requisite	  basic	  organizational	  structure	  wrong.	  Part	  of	  the	  task	  at	  hand,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  develop	  the	  necessary	  tools,	  or	  frameworks,	  to	  explain	  how	  to	  effectively	  conduct	  a	  policy	  search	  at	  the	  earliest	  stages	  of	  the	  policy	  cycle.	  Once	  this	  model	  is	  developed	  and	  articulated,	  it	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  relevant	  case	  study,	  in	  this	  instance	  the	  development	  of	  EHRs	  in	  Ontario,	  to	  tests	  its	  empirical	  validity	  and	  create	  a	  set	  of	  prescriptive	  recommendations	  to	  ensure	  that	  government	  ICT	  project	  do	  not	  end	  in	  policy	  failure,	  or	  worse,	  as	  a	  policy	  fiasco.	  	  This	  research	  project	  has	  thus	  both	  a	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  component.	  The	  theoretical	  component	  involves	  reconsidering	  how	  government	  ought	  to	  conduct	  a	  policy	  solution	  search,	  by	  developing	  a	  framework	  that	  can	  suggest	  an	  appropriate	  organizational	  structure	  to	  best	  facilitate	  a	  solution	  search,	  given	  the	  specific	  nature	  of	  the	  policy	  problem.	  Moreover,	  this	  model	  must	  be	  able	  to	  incorporate	  and	  account	  for	  the	  realistic	  governance	  challenges	  that	  exist	  when	  managing	  any	  large	  government	  project.	  The	  empirical	  component	  of	  this	  research	  project	  involves	  applying	  the	  model	  to	  Ontario’s	  EHRs	  project	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	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of	  why	  this	  worthwhile	  initiative	  resulted	  in	  a	  policy	  fiasco.	  Taken	  together,	  the	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  component	  of	  this	  research	  project	  will	  suggest	  new	  ways	  to	  improve	  the	  performance	  of	  government	  ICT	  projects	  in	  general,	  resulting	  in	  fewer	  policy	  fiascos,	  and	  hopefully,	  fewer	  policy	  failures.	  To	  this	  end,	  this	  research	  project	  is	  organized	  in	  the	  follow	  manner.	  	  	  The	  second	  chapter	  of	  this	  research	  study	  lays	  the	  foundation	  for	  understanding	  ehealth	  systems.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  by	  defining	  ehealth,	  and	  seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  differences	  between	  Electronic	  Health	  Record	  (EHR)	  and	  Electronic	  Medical	  Record	  (EMR)	  systems.	  The	  chapter	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  briefly	  review	  some	  of	  the	  key	  benefits	  and	  drawbacks	  of	  ehealth	  systems,	  and	  the	  implementation	  experiences	  in	  jurisdictions	  outside	  of	  Ontario.	  Given	  the	  complexity	  of	  ehealth	  systems,	  and	  varied	  use	  of	  terminology	  within	  the	  field,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  create	  a	  common	  level	  of	  understanding	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  our	  examination	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  in	  Ontario.	  	  The	  third	  chapter	  of	  this	  study	  is	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  in	  Ontario.	  It	  is	  designed	  to	  introduce	  the	  reader	  to	  evolution	  of	  the	  project,	  from	  the	  late	  1990s	  until	  2010,	  and	  is	  thus	  largely	  descriptive	  in	  nature.	  The	  objective	  here	  is	  to	  address	  four	  of	  the	  five	  W’s	  (Who,	  What,	  Where,	  and	  When)	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  common	  basis	  of	  understanding	  and	  lay	  out	  the	  facts.	  In	  effect,	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  tell	  the	  EHR	  story	  in	  Ontario.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  review	  current	  interpretations	  of	  “why”	  the	  EHR	  project	  failed.	  Here,	  we	  will	  confine	  the	  review	  to	  the	  interpretations	  of	  Auditor	  General	  of	  Ontario	  and	  other	  select	  commentators.	  	  	  The	  fourth	  chapter	  informs	  the	  theoretical	  component	  of	  this	  study,	  and	  develops	  a	  game	  theoretic	  framework	  to	  theorize	  about	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  the	  EHR	  project.	  As	  will	  be	  argued	  later,	  it	  is	  often	  helpful	  for	  decision	  makers	  to	  employ	  backwards	  induction	  when	  addressing	  technology	  problems.	  By	  thinking	  about	  implementation	  phase	  of	  a	  project	  first,	  decision	  makers	  can	  theorize	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  solution	  that	  is	  required	  for	  any	  given	  problem,	  and	  then	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  tackle	  the	  problem.	  The	  framework	  developed	  in	  the	  chapter	  suggests	  that	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there	  are	  two	  basic	  types	  of	  solutions:	  independent	  and	  interdependent.	  With	  this	  distinction	  in	  mind,	  the	  chapter	  reviews	  a	  highly	  simplified	  example	  of	  two	  organizations	  working	  to	  implement	  an	  EHR	  system.	  As	  the	  example	  demonstrates,	  
coordination	  and	  cooperation	  amongst	  actors	  is	  critically	  important	  to	  develop	  an	  effective	  system	  when	  solutions	  are	  interdependent.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  by	  reviewing	  how	  government	  can	  exercise	  authority	  to	  effectively	  ensure	  actors	  cooperate	  and	  coordinate	  on	  solutions	  during	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  a	  project.	  	  	  The	  fifth	  chapter	  continues	  the	  theoretical	  component	  of	  this	  study,	  and	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  technology	  projects.	  Borrowing	  heavily	  from	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger’s	  model,24	  the	  chapter	  develops	  a	  coherent	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  think	  about	  technology	  problems,	  and	  how	  government	  should	  be	  organized	  to	  develop,	  or	  design,	  technology	  solutions.	  The	  framework	  begins	  with	  the	  problem	  as	  the	  basic	  unit	  of	  analysis,	  and	  argues	  that	  a	  problem’s	  complexity	  dictates	  the	  optimal	  method	  of	  solution	  search,	  and	  critically,	  the	  optimal	  means	  of	  organizing	  that	  search.	  Unique	  to	  this	  framework	  is	  how	  organizational	  alternatives,	  or	  differing	  organizational	  structures,	  resolves	  the	  inherent	  conflicts	  over	  the	  selection	  of	  solution	  search	  trials.	  In	  the	  framework,	  organizational	  structures,	  or	  organizational	  alternatives,	  are	  matched	  in	  a	  discriminating	  manner	  to	  nature	  (or	  complexity)	  of	  a	  problem,	  based	  on	  the	  efficiency	  (or	  optimality)	  of	  discovering	  a	  solution	  to	  given	  problem.	  In	  more	  simplistic	  terms,	  the	  framework	  suggests	  how	  government	  should	  organize	  itself	  during	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  a	  technology	  project,	  given	  the	  strategy	  required	  to	  identity	  workable	  solutions	  to	  various	  types	  of	  problems.	  	  	  The	  sixth	  chapter	  of	  this	  study	  expands	  on	  the	  Auditor	  General’s	  report	  and	  popular	  commentary	  to	  gain	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  why	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  project	  resulted	  in	  a	  policy	  fiasco.	  We	  begin	  by	  briefly	  applying	  the	  policy	  lessons	  gleaned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  	  Jack	  A.	  Nickerson	  and	  Todd	  R.	  Zenger,	  "A	  Knowledge-­‐Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­‐	  the	  Problem-­‐Solving	  Perspective,"	  Organization	  Science	  15,	  no.	  6	  (2004),	  617-­‐632.	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from	  chapter	  two,	  on	  why	  similar	  ehealth	  projects	  have	  failed,	  to	  the	  Ontario	  initiative.	  With	  a	  relatively	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  conventional	  explanations	  on	  offer	  for	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  failure,	  we	  then	  make	  use	  of	  the	  theoretical	  contributions	  of	  this	  study	  developed	  in	  chapters	  four	  and	  five	  to	  analyze	  the	  project.	  The	  objective	  here	  is	  to	  see	  whether	  the	  frameworks	  can	  provide	  any	  additional	  insights,	  or	  alternative	  explanations,	  for	  the	  project	  fiasco.	  By	  employing	  the	  frameworks,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  decision	  makers	  failed	  to	  place	  sufficient	  attention	  on	  the	  form	  of	  organization	  required	  to	  undertake	  the	  initiative	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  project.	  Moreover,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  government	  decision	  makers	  inappropriately	  exerted	  their	  authority,	  and	  provided	  a	  set	  of	  incentives	  to	  actors	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system	  that	  effectively	  undermined	  the	  central	  goal	  of	  the	  EHR	  project.	  Hence,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  government	  decision	  makers	  got	  it	  wrong	  at	  the	  policy	  formulation	  stage	  of	  the	  policy	  cycle.	  Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  this	  chapter	  will	  answer	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  questions:	  what	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  an	  effective	  strategic	  plan,	  and	  organizational	  structure,	  to	  effective	  manage	  this	  complex	  ICT	  project?	  	  The	  seventh	  and	  concluding	  chapter	  returns	  to	  issues	  raised	  earlier	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  study.	  The	  concern	  is	  that	  large	  government	  ICT	  projects,	  like	  the	  EHR	  initiate	  in	  Ontario,	  have	  often	  succumbed	  to	  policy	  failure.	  Given	  the	  high	  failure	  rate	  of	  government	  ICT	  projects,	  what	  lessons	  can	  be	  gleaned	  from	  the	  frameworks	  and	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapter	  six?	  How	  can	  government	  more	  effectively	  manage	  these	  challenging	  ICT	  policy	  problems?	  The	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  highlight	  a	  few	  key	  lessons	  that	  help	  practitioners	  handle	  large,	  complex	  ICT	  projects.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  we	  now	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  understanding	  ehealth	  system.	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EHEALH	  AND	  EHEALTH	  SYSTEMS	  
	  
	  The	  primary	  objective	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  address	  the	  key	  concepts	  and	  terminology	  surrounding	  ehealth	  systems.	  As	  an	  emerging	  set	  of	  technologies,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  establish	  a	  basic	  common	  understanding	  of	  what	  ehealth	  means,	  and	  what	  constitutes	  the	  critical	  components	  of	  ehealth	  systems,	  namely	  Electronic	  Medical	  Record	  (EMR)	  and	  Electronic	  Health	  Record	  (EHR)	  systems.	  Moreover,	  given	  our	  interest	  in	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  project,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  review	  some	  of	  key	  benefits	  and	  drawbacks	  of	  ehealth	  systems,	  and	  the	  experiences	  of	  jurisdictions	  outside	  of	  Ontario	  with	  respect	  to	  implementation.	  	  	  
DEFINING	  eHEALTH,	  EMRs	  &	  EHRs	  	  ehealth	  is	  a	  neologism,25	  a	  newly	  coined	  term	  that	  is	  evolving	  and	  used	  to	  convey	  a	  variety	  of	  activities.26	  In	  a	  2005	  systemic	  study	  of	  the	  literature,	  Hans	  Oh	  and	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  	  Hans	  Oh	  and	  others,	  "What	  is	  eHealth?:	  A	  Systemic	  Review	  of	  Published	  Definitions,"	  Journal	  of	  
Medical	  Internet	  Research	  41,	  no.	  1	  (2005),	  p.	  32.	  26	  	  Vincenzo	  Della	  Mea,	  "What	  is	  e-­‐Health(2):	  The	  Death	  of	  Telemedicine?"	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Internet	  
Research	  3,	  no.	  2	  (2001).	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colleagues	  found	  that	  51	  unique	  definitions	  of	  ehealth	  were	  being	  used,	  of	  which	  the	  most	  frequently	  cited	  belonged	  to	  Gunther	  Eysenbach.27	  According	  to	  Eysenbach’s	  definition:	  e-­‐health	  is	  an	  emerging	  field	  in	  the	  intersection	  of	  medical	  informatics,	  public	  health	  and	  business,	  referring	  to	  health	  services	  and	  information	  delivered	  or	  enhanced	  through	  the	  Internet	  and	  related	  technologies.	  In	  a	  broader	  sense,	  the	  term	  characterizes	  not	  only	  a	  technical	  development,	  but	  also	  a	  state-­‐of-­‐mind,	  a	  way	  of	  thinking,	  an	  attitude,	  and	  a	  commitment	  for	  networked,	  global	  thinking,	  to	  improve	  health	  care	  locally,	  regionally,	  and	  worldwide	  by	  using	  information	  and	  communication	  technology.28	  	  While	  Eysenbach’s	  definition	  of	  ehealth	  is	  certainly	  popular	  and	  helpful,	  it	  lacks	  the	  technical	  precision	  that	  is	  required	  for	  this	  study.	  In	  more	  practically	  applicable	  terms,	  and	  notwithstanding	  Eysenbach’s	  definition,	  ehealth	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  technical	  system,	  of	  which	  there	  are	  different	  levels	  of	  sophistication.	  The	  most	  important	  distinction,	  in	  terms	  of	  sophistication,	  occurs	  between	  Electronic	  Medical	  Records	  (EMRs)	  and	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  (EHRs).	  An	  EMR	  is	  a	  computerized	  health	  information	  system	  where	  providers	  record	  detailed	  encounter	  information	  such	  as	  patient	  demographics,	  encounter	  summaries,	  medical	  history,	  allergies,	  intolerances,	  and	  lab	  test	  histories.	  Some	  [EMRs]	  may	  support	  order	  entry,	  results	  management	  and	  decision	  support.	  Some	  [EMRs]	  may	  also	  contain	  features	  or	  be	  integrated	  with	  software	  that	  can	  schedule	  appointments,	  perform	  billing	  tasks,	  and	  generate	  reports.	  Providers	  use	  this	  system	  to	  record	  encounter,	  medical,	  or	  physician-­‐specific	  information.29	  EMRs	  are	  generally	  geographically	  specific	  ehealth	  systems,	  which	  are	  used	  by	  a	  distinct	  provider	  of	  healthcare.	  With	  EMRs,	  healthcare	  providers	  are	  unable	  to	  communicate	  with	  one	  another,	  and	  their	  systems	  functionally	  operate	  in	  silos.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  an	  Electronic	  Health	  Record	  (EHR)	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  	  Oh	  and	  others,	  What	  is	  eHealth?:	  A	  Systemic	  Review	  of	  Published	  Definitions,	  pp.	  32-­‐39.	  28	  	  G.	  Eysenbach,	  "What	  is	  e-­‐Health?"	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Internet	  Research	  3,	  no.	  2	  (2001).	  29	  	  D.	  A.	  Ludwick	  and	  John	  Doucette,	  "Adopting	  Electronic	  Medial	  Records	  in	  Primary	  Care:	  Lessons	  Learned	  from	  Health	  Information	  Systems	  Implementation	  Experience	  in	  Seven	  Countries,"	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Informatics	  78	  (2009),	  p.	  23.	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a	  patient-­‐orientated,	  aggregated	  longitudinal	  system	  of	  systems	  which	  assembles	  health	  information	  about	  a	  patient	  over	  a	  wide	  area	  network	  from,	  potentially,	  many	  geographically	  dispersed	  data	  sources.	  An	  EHR	  provides	  each	  individual	  with	  an	  aggregate,	  secure	  and	  private	  lifetime	  record	  of	  their	  key	  health	  history	  and	  care	  within	  the	  heath	  system	  and	  shares	  encounter	  information	  available	  electronically	  with	  authorized	  health	  care	  providers	  and	  the	  individual	  anywhere,	  anytime	  in	  support	  of	  high	  quality	  care.	  It	  may	  draw	  on	  health	  information	  from	  sources	  such	  as	  EMRs,	  drug	  repositories,	  centralized	  lab	  data	  sources	  and	  other	  point-­‐of	  service	  applications	  over	  many	  encounters	  to	  assemble	  a	  complete	  health	  record	  about	  the	  patient.	  It	  is	  a	  patient	  centric	  document	  that	  may	  contain	  information	  from	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  providers	  other	  than	  family	  physicians,	  such	  as	  specialists,	  social	  workers,	  pharmacists,	  radiologists,	  dietitians,	  physiotherapists,	  and	  nurses.30	  In	  terms	  of	  ehealth	  sophistication,	  EMR	  systems	  are	  the	  first	  rung	  of	  the	  ladder,	  while	  EHR	  systems	  are	  significantly	  more	  advanced.	  There	  are	  important	  distinctions	  between	  EMRs	  and	  EHRs.	  First,	  EMR	  systems	  are	  ‘provider	  centric’	  while	  EHR	  systems	  are	  ‘patient	  centric’.	  Second,	  while	  EMRs	  are	  geographically	  bounded,	  closed	  systems,	  EHRs	  work	  across	  large	  geographic	  areas,	  and	  are	  open	  access	  systems	  to	  anyone	  with	  appropriate	  clearance.	  Third,	  and	  finally,	  EHR	  systems	  are	  interoperable	  across	  multiple	  EMR	  systems.	  	  	  The	  difference	  between	  EMR	  and	  EHR	  systems	  can	  be	  understood	  visually	  in	  Figures	  1	  and	  2	  (see	  following	  pages),	  respectively.	  In	  Figure	  1,	  we	  have	  many	  different	  providers	  of	  healthcare	  using	  local	  EMR	  systems.	  Here,	  although	  there	  is	  some	  level	  of	  e-­‐sophistication,	  the	  overall	  health	  system	  remains	  complicated,	  and	  functionally	  operates	  in	  silos;	  connections	  between	  different	  health	  providers	  continues	  to	  occur	  through	  phone,	  fax	  and	  courier.	  In	  Figure	  2,	  we	  have	  a	  fully	  functional	  EHR	  system,	  in	  which	  all	  EMR	  systems	  are	  interconnected	  to	  a	  patient	  centric	  record.	  In	  Figure	  2,	  for	  example,	  a	  patient	  could	  see	  a	  radiologist	  in	  location	  X,	  have	  their	  scans	  inputted	  directly	  to	  the	  EHR,	  and	  proceed	  to	  their	  family	  physician	  offices	  in	  location	  Y,	  to	  see	  and	  discuss	  the	  results.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  	  D.	  A.	  Ludwick	  and	  John	  Doucette,	  "Adopting	  Electronic	  Medial	  Records	  in	  Primary	  Care:	  Lessons	  Learned	  from	  Health	  Information	  Systems	  Implementation	  Experience	  in	  Seven	  Countries,"	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Informatics	  78	  (2009),	  p.	  24.	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It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  ultimate	  gold	  standard	  in	  ehealth	  is	  the	  interoperable	  electronic	  health	  record,	  or	  iEHR.	  While	  EHRs	  and	  iEHRs	  are	  similar,	  the	  distinguishing	  characteristic	  is	  the	  level	  of	  interoperability	  across	  organizational	  and	  political	  environments.31	  iEHRs,	  in	  practical	  terms,	  are	  an	  endpoint	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  ehealth	  systems.	  In	  the	  Canadian	  context,	  for	  example,	  we	  could	  envision	  an	  EHR	  system	  for	  all	  Ontarians,	  in	  which	  various	  providers	  (e.g.	  family	  physician,	  radiologist,	  pharmacist,	  etc.)	  can	  both	  input	  and	  output	  information	  with	  the	  system.	  Similarly,	  we	  could	  envision	  an	  EHR	  system	  for	  all	  Quebecors,	  with	  comparable	  capabilities	  for	  providers.	  The	  EHR	  systems	  in	  this	  example	  would	  become	  interoperable	  (hence,	  an	  iEHR)	  when	  a	  provider	  of	  healthcare	  in	  Ontario,	  treating	  a	  visiting	  patient	  from	  Montreal,	  could	  access	  and	  input/output	  information	  with	  the	  Quebec	  based	  system.	  The	  Holy	  Grail	  for	  ehealth,	  therefore,	  is	  not	  just	  an	  iEHR	  system	  for	  Canada,	  but	  rather	  a	  fully	  interconnected	  and	  interoperable	  global	  EHR	  system.	  	  	  As	  Melinda	  Wilkins	  notes,	  “it	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  electronic	  health	  records	  are	  inevitable	  for	  the	  future	  of	  healthcare.”32	  This	  is	  not	  a	  controversial	  statement.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  technology	  is	  not	  progressing	  and	  shaping	  all	  aspects	  of	  healthcare	  delivery.	  What	  is	  unexpected,	  perhaps,	  is	  the	  uniformly	  positive	  sentiment	  that	  ehealth	  invokes	  amongst	  public	  policy	  scholars	  and	  practitioners.	  Returning	  to	  the	  study	  on	  ehealth	  definitions,	  Hans	  Oh	  and	  his	  colleagues	  found	  that	  all	  51	  unique	  published	  definitions	  included	  positive	  connotations,	  including	  language	  such	  as	  benefits,	  improvement,	  efficiency	  and	  enabling.	  They	  go	  on	  to	  state	  “the	  overwhelming	  understanding	  of	  ehealth	  reflects	  an	  attitude	  of	  optimism.”33	  What	  is	  intriguing	  is	  that	  “none	  of	  the	  published	  definitions	  suggest	  that	  ehealth	  may	  have	  any	  adverse,	  negative,	  harmful,	  or	  disadvantageous	  effects.”34,	  35	  While	  we	  will	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  	  Patrick	  Powers,	  "Canada's	  E-­‐Health	  Journey	  and	  HIMSS	  Analytics'	  Canada	  Information	  and	  Communications	  Technology	  Study,"	  Healthcare	  Quarterly	  12,	  no.	  1	  (2008),	  pp.	  120-­‐123.	  32	  	  Melinda	  A.	  Wilkins,	  "Factors	  Influencing	  Acceptance	  of	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  in	  Hospitals,"	  
Perspectives	  in	  Health	  Information	  Management	  Fall	  (2009),	  p.	  5.	  33	  	  Oh	  and	  others,	  What	  is	  eHealth?:	  A	  Systemic	  Review	  of	  Published	  Definitions,	  p.	  36.	  34	  The	  words	  in	  italics	  are	  this	  authors’	  emphasis.	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review	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  and	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  implementing	  ehealth	  systems	  in	  the	  field,	  it	  is	  critically	  important	  to	  emphasize	  the	  universally	  held,	  positive	  view,	  of	  those	  looking	  at	  ehealth	  in	  the	  abstract.	  In	  many	  ways,	  ehealth	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  panacea.36	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  ehealth	  systems,	  and	  EHRs	  in	  particular,	  are	  the	  future	  of	  healthcare,	  with	  some	  going	  so	  far	  as	  to	  claim	  that	  it	  will	  allow	  “patients	  and	  professionals	  to	  do	  the	  previously	  impossible.”37	  It	  is	  with	  this	  in	  mind	  that	  we	  now	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  some	  of	  the	  technical	  details	  in	  play,	  as	  we	  examine	  the	  benefits	  and	  drawbacks	  of	  ehealth	  systems.	  	  	  
BENEFITS	  OF	  IMPLEMENTING	  eHEALTH	  SYSTEMS	  	  Health	  information	  and	  public	  policy	  experts	  intuitively	  sense	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  standardized	  processes	  and	  interoperable	  ehealth	  systems	  are	  a	  positive	  development.38	  Advocates	  of	  ehealth	  systems	  can	  point	  to	  numerous	  benefits.	  Broadly,	  the	  benefits	  tend	  to	  include:39,	  40	  	   (1)	  improved	  care	  delivery	  through	  better	  access	  to	  medical	  information;	  	  (2)	  reducing	  the	  duplication	  and	  redundancy	  of	  tests	  and	  procedures;	  	  (3)	  the	  ability	  to	  diagnose	  patients	  more	  quickly	  and	  accurately;	  (4)	  reducing	  the	  number	  and	  severity	  of	  bureaucratic	  related	  medical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  errors;	  	  (5)	  improved	  ability	  to	  comply	  with	  patients’	  wishes;	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  	  Oh	  and	  others,	  What	  is	  eHealth?:	  A	  Systemic	  Review	  of	  Published	  Definitions,	  p.	  38.	  36	  	  David	  E.	  Trachtenbarg,	  "EHRs	  Fix	  Everything	  -­‐	  and	  Nine	  Other	  Myths,"	  Family	  Practice	  
Management	  13,	  no.	  3	  (2007),	  p.	  26.	  37	  	  Oh	  and	  others,	  What	  is	  eHealth?:	  A	  Systemic	  Review	  of	  Published	  Definitions,	  p.	  38.	  38	  	  Yaron	  Derman	  and	  others,	  "Saving	  Ontario	  Healthcare	  Dollars	  through	  E-­‐Health	  Standardization:	  A	  Quantitative	  Study,"	  Electronic	  Healthcare	  7,	  no.	  2	  (2008),	  pp.	  1-­‐13.	  39	  	  D.	  W.	  Bates	  and	  others,	  "A	  Randomized	  Trial	  of	  a	  Computer-­‐Based	  Intervention	  of	  Reduced	  Utilization	  of	  Redundant	  Laboratory	  Tests,"	  American	  Journal	  of	  Medicine	  106,	  no.	  2	  (1999),	  pp.	  144-­‐50.	  40	  	  K.	  A.	  Weant,	  A.	  M.	  Cook	  and	  J.	  A.	  Armiststead,	  "Medication	  Error	  Reporting	  and	  Pharmacy	  Resident	  Experience	  during	  Implementation	  of	  Computerized	  Prescriber	  Order	  Entry,"	  American	  Journal	  of	  
Health-­System	  Pharmacy	  64,	  no.	  5	  (2007),	  pp.	  526-­‐30.	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(6)	  reduced	  medical	  stays,	  allowing	  patients	  to	  return	  home	  (or	  work)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  more	  quickly;	  and	  (7)	  improving	  medical	  management	  processes,	  through	  data	  and	  trend	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  analysis.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  benefits	  of	  ehealth	  systems	  focuses	  on	  improving	  access	  to,	  and	  use	  of,	  health	  information	  and	  the	  standardized	  processes	  that	  are	  developed	  to	  deploy	  this	  information	  in	  field.	  At	  the	  macro	  level,	  for	  example,	  the	  universal	  application	  of	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization’s	  (WHO)	  International	  Classification	  of	  Diseases	  10	  (ICD-­‐10)	  in	  EHR	  would	  allow	  improved	  global	  tracking	  of	  infectious	  disease,	  and	  likely	  improve	  the	  international	  response	  to	  global	  health	  threats.	  Similarly,	  the	  implementation	  of	  Logical	  Observations	  Identifiers	  Names	  and	  Codes	  (LOINC)	  and	  Systematized	  Nomenclature	  of	  Medicine	  –	  Clinical	  Terms	  (SNOWMED	  CT),	  some	  of	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  and	  used	  health	  informatics	  standards,	  creates	  a	  common	  set	  of	  descriptive	  language	  for	  physicians	  and	  health	  practitioners	  across	  geographic,	  organizational,	  and	  political	  boundaries.41	  ehealth	  systems,	  broadly,	  facilitate	  the	  use	  common	  standards,	  which	  can	  improve	  patient	  care	  and	  improve	  health	  outcomes.	  	  Standardization	  and	  improved	  access	  to	  information	  through	  ICT	  systems	  has	  proven	  successful	  in	  the	  healthcare	  field.	  Fortunately,	  with	  the	  deployment	  of	  ehealth	  systems	  beginning	  in	  the	  1990s,	  we	  now	  have	  some	  data	  that	  can	  illustrate	  the	  benefits	  of	  ehealth	  implementation.	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  Brigham	  and	  Women’s	  Hospital	  in	  Boston,	  Massachusetts	  saw	  a	  55%	  drop	  in	  serious	  medication	  errors,	  and	  an	  83%	  reduction	  in	  overall	  error	  rates,	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  an	  ehealth	  system.	  Similarly,	  Ohio	  State	  University	  Medical	  Centre	  in	  Columbus	  Ohio,	  improved	  turnaround	  for	  pharmacy	  orders	  by	  two	  hours,	  while	  reducing	  overall	  pharmacy	  charges	  by	  $910	  per	  admission,	  while	  the	  Regenstrief	  Institute	  for	  Health	  Care,	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  Derman	  and	  others,	  Saving	  Ontario	  Healthcare	  Dollars	  through	  E-­Health	  Standardization:	  A	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  Study,	  p.	  2.	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Indianapolis,	  Indiana,	  reduced	  average	  length	  of	  long-­‐term	  stay	  by	  0.9	  days,	  while	  reducing	  hospital	  charges	  by	  13%,	  all	  the	  result	  of	  newly	  established	  ehealth	  systems.42	  The	  objective	  here	  is	  not	  to	  catalogue	  all	  the	  ehealth	  success	  stories,	  but	  rather	  to	  indicate	  that	  ehealth	  advocates	  are	  acting	  on	  more	  than	  faith	  and	  faith	  alone.	  The	  evidence	  suggests,	  in	  at	  least	  some	  cases,	  that	  ehealth	  systems	  do	  truly	  produce	  better	  health	  outcomes,	  more	  efficiently.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  ehealth	  systems	  can	  be	  procured	  efficiently.	  In	  Sweden,	  for	  example,	  an	  EHR	  system	  was	  developed	  and	  deployed	  in	  just	  one	  year,	  under	  budget,	  and	  with	  promising	  initial	  results.43	  The	  message,	  therefore,	  is	  that	  ehealth	  systems	  can	  be	  developed	  effectively	  and	  cost	  efficiently.	  	  	  
DRAWBACKS	  OF	  IMPLEMENTING	  eHEALTH	  SYSTEMS	  	  In	  the	  mid	  2000s,	  Randeree	  and	  Rao	  claimed	  that	  “the	  vision	  of	  online	  treatment	  and	  monitoring,	  24-­‐hour	  access	  to	  medical	  information,…	  electronic	  medical	  records,	  and	  online	  appointment	  scheduling	  has	  been	  fruitless.”44	  While	  this	  statement	  is	  certainly	  an	  exaggeration,	  the	  implementation	  of	  ehealth	  systems	  has	  been	  far	  from	  painless.	  Indeed,	  it	  appears	  that	  many	  of	  the	  concerns	  raised	  early	  in	  the	  implementation	  literature	  of	  ICT	  projects	  in	  general,	  remain	  applicable	  to	  ehealth	  systems	  today.45	  Many	  of	  the	  problems	  in	  ICT	  system	  implementation,	  across	  all	  fields,	  revolve	  around	  user	  resistance,	  system	  reliability	  (in	  technical	  terms),	  and	  organizational	  control.46	  What	  becomes	  implicitly	  clear	  throughout	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  M.	  J.	  Ball,	  D.	  E.	  Garets	  and	  T.	  J.	  Handler,	  "Leveraging	  Information	  Technology	  Towards	  Enhancing	  Patient	  Care	  and	  a	  Culture	  of	  Safety	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  the	  US,"	  Methods	  of	  Information	  in	  Medicine	  43,	  no.	  5	  (2003),	  pp.	  503-­‐508.	  43	  	  John	  Ovretveit	  and	  others,	  "Improving	  Quality	  through	  Effective	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  of	  Information	  Technology	  in	  Healthcare,"	  International	  Journal	  of	  Quality	  in	  Health	  Care	  19,	  no.	  5	  (2007),	  pp.	  259-­‐266.	  44	  	  Ebrahim	  Randeree	  and	  H.	  R.	  Rao,	  "E-­‐Health	  and	  Assurance:	  Curing	  Hospital	  Websites,"	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Electronic	  Healthcare	  1,	  no.	  1	  (2004),	  p.	  34.	  45	  	  K.	  Lyytinen	  and	  R.	  Hirshheim,	  "Information	  Systems	  Failures:	  A	  Survey	  and	  Classification	  of	  the	  Empirical	  Literature,"	  Oxford	  Surveys	  in	  Information	  Technology	  4	  (1987),	  pp.	  257-­‐309.	  46	  	  R.	  Hirschheim	  and	  M.	  Newman,	  "Information	  Systems	  and	  User	  Resistance:	  Theory	  and	  Practice,"	  
The	  Computer	  Journal	  31,	  no.	  5	  (1988),	  pp.	  398-­‐408.	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much	  of	  the	  ehealth	  systems	  literature	  is	  that	  individuals	  matter.	  Far	  from	  being	  abstract	  technological	  constructs,	  ehealth	  systems	  have	  both	  a	  technological	  and	  human	  component,	  which	  must	  work	  in	  tandem	  in	  order	  for	  the	  overarching	  benefits	  to	  be	  realized.	  	  	  	  There	  is	  significant	  concern	  amongst	  health	  policy	  experts	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  new	  technology	  by	  practitioners	  in	  the	  field.	  As	  with	  any	  new	  system	  implementation,	  training	  is	  a	  prerequisite,	  and	  users	  require	  time	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  technology.47	  This	  common	  concern,	  which	  is	  frequently	  raised,	  attempts	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  user	  resistance.	  ehealth	  systems,	  by	  definition,	  interact	  with	  a	  varied	  group	  of	  individuals,	  who	  have	  different	  comfort	  levels	  with	  new	  technology.	  Early	  research	  on	  ICT	  implementation	  found	  that	  different	  individuals	  embrace	  new	  technology	  differently,	  with	  some	  users	  refusing	  to	  implement	  at	  all.48	  This	  early	  research	  on	  user	  implementation	  has	  been	  confirmed,	  to	  a	  large	  degree,	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  ehealth	  systems.	  For	  example,	  recent	  studies	  looking	  at	  the	  implementation	  of	  EMR	  medication	  ordering	  systems,49	  and	  image	  ordering	  systems,50	  found	  that	  physician	  resistance	  led	  to	  reduced	  productivity,	  and	  overall	  medical	  office	  efficiency.	  Similarly,	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  more	  comprehensive	  EHR	  systems,	  the	  data	  suggests	  that	  patient	  processing	  times	  might	  slow	  down,	  at	  least	  initially.51	  The	  concerns	  of	  implementation	  and	  user	  resistance	  are	  not	  confined	  to	  productivity	  or	  efficiency.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  resistance	  to	  newly	  introduced	  ehealth	  systems	  has	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  medical	  errors,52,	  53,	  54,	  55	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  Ball,	  Garets	  and	  Handler,	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  Information	  Technology	  Towards	  Enhancing	  Patient	  Care	  and	  
a	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  pp.	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  Kozar,	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  Study,"	  MIS	  Quarterly	  2,	  no.	  2	  (1978),	  pp.	  7-­‐16.	  49	  	  Claus	  Bossen,	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  -­‐	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  Implementation	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  Electronic	  Medication	  Plan,"	  International	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Informatics	  76,	  no.	  1	  (2007),	  pp.	  13-­‐21.	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  David	  M.	  Schuster	  and	  others,	  "Involving	  Users	  in	  the	  Implementation	  of	  an	  Imaging	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  Entry	  System,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Informatics	  Association	  10,	  no.	  4	  (2003),	  pp.	  315-­‐321.	  51	  	  Ovretveit	  and	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  Improving	  Quality	  through	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Technology	  in	  Healthcare,	  pp.	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  52	  	  Ross	  Koppel	  and	  others,	  "Role	  of	  Computerized	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  Entry	  Systems	  in	  Facilitating	  Medication	  Errors,"	  JAMA	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which	  have	  resulted	  in	  increased	  mortality	  rates.56,	  57	  To	  cite	  a	  Canadian	  example,	  the	  province	  of	  Alberta	  experienced	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  adverse	  medical	  events	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  coordination	  in	  its	  EHR	  software	  operations.	  In	  2004,	  and	  again	  in	  2006,	  routine	  upgrades	  to	  the	  EHR	  system	  resulted	  in	  local	  Alberta	  health	  organizations	  making	  medical	  errors,	  illustrating	  the	  importance	  of	  effective	  human	  coordination	  and	  adaptation	  to	  technology	  change.58	  	  	  While	  the	  legitimate	  concern	  of	  user	  resistance	  and	  ehealth	  implementation	  should	  not	  be	  ignored,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  are	  generally	  short	  term,	  negative,	  impacts.59	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  broad	  agreement	  that	  if	  clinicians	  and	  administrative	  staff	  are	  given	  sufficient	  training	  and	  time	  to	  adjust	  to	  new	  ehealth	  systems,	  implementation	  problems,	  and	  user	  resistance,	  will	  subside.60	  As	  a	  result	  of	  user	  resistance	  and	  coordination	  problems,	  many	  experts	  suggest	  a	  stage	  approach	  to	  introducing	  new	  ehealth	  systems.	  While	  the	  exact	  formulation	  for	  unveiling	  a	  new	  ehealth	  system	  vary	  by	  source,	  broad	  strategies	  in	  the	  literature	  tend	  to	  reappear;	  these	  include:61,	  62,	  63,	  64,	  65	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  	  Robert	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  "Computer	  Technology	  and	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  JAMA	  -­	  the	  Journal	  of	  
the	  American	  Medical	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  no.	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  (2005),	  pp.	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  Implementation	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  Entry,	  pp.	  526-­‐30.	  55	  	  Tim	  Scott	  and	  others,	  "Kaiser	  Permanente's	  Experience	  of	  Implementing	  an	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  Medical	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  A	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  Study,"	  BMJ	  -­	  British	  Medical	  Journal	  331	  (2003),	  pp.	  1313-­‐1316.	  56	  	  Yong	  Y.	  Han	  and	  others,	  "Unexpected	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  of	  a	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  Entry	  System,"	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  116,	  no.	  6	  (2005),	  pp.	  1506-­‐1512.	  57	  	  E.	  Ammenwerth	  and	  others,	  "Impact	  of	  CPOE	  on	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  Rates	  -­‐	  Contradictory	  Findings,	  Important	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  Methods	  of	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  in	  Medicine	  45	  (2006),	  pp.	  568-­‐593.	  58	  	  Dave	  A.	  Ludwick	  and	  John	  Doucette,	  "The	  Implementation	  of	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  for	  the	  Alberta	  Electronic	  Health	  Record:	  Lessons	  for	  Electronic	  Medical	  Record	  Adoption	  in	  Primary	  Care,"	  
Healthcare	  Quarterly	  12,	  no.	  2	  (2009),	  p.	  104.	  59	  	  J.	  R.	  Pilling,	  "Lessons	  Learned	  from	  a	  Whole	  Hospital	  PACS	  Installation.	  Picture	  Archiving	  and	  Communication	  System,"	  Clinical	  Radiology	  57,	  no.	  9	  (2002),	  pp.	  784-­‐788.	  60	  	  Wears	  and	  Berg,	  Computer	  Technology	  and	  Clinical	  Work,	  pp.	  1261-­‐1263.	  61	  	  Schuster	  and	  others,	  Involving	  Users	  in	  the	  Implementation	  of	  an	  Imaging	  Order	  Entry	  System,	  pp.	  315-­‐321.	  62	  	  Pilling,	  Lessons	  Learned	  from	  a	  Whole	  Hospital	  PACS	  Installation.	  Picture	  Archiving	  and	  
Communication	  System,	  pp.	  784-­‐788.	  63	  	  Scott	  and	  others,	  Kaiser	  Permanente's	  Experience	  of	  Implementing	  an	  Electronic	  Medical	  Record:	  A	  
Qualitative	  Study,	  pp.	  1313-­‐1316.	  64	  	  Wears	  and	  Berg,	  Computer	  Technology	  and	  Clinical	  Work,	  pp.	  1261-­‐1263.	  65	  	  Wilkins,	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  Electronic	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  in	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   (1)	  indentifying	  key	  personnel	  to	  lead	  the	  transition;	  	  (2)	  creating	  a	  space	  of	  open	  dialogue	  amongst	  institutional	  users	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  technology;	  (3)	  deploying	  a	  minimum	  of	  technology	  interfaces	  and	  minimizing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  system	  upgrades;	  (4)	  developing	  technology	  acceptance	  through	  gradual	  user	  use;	  (5)	  providing	  targeted	  training	  to	  relevant	  users;	  (6)	  allowing	  users	  space	  for	  technology	  feedback	  and	  improvement;	  and	  (7)	  slow	  and	  methodical	  deployment	  of	  ehealth	  systems	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  workplace.	  	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  user	  resistance	  analysis,	  and	  the	  prescriptive	  solutions	  that	  follow,	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  healthcare	  actors	  are	  more	  than	  just	  intellectual	  abstractions.	  Healthcare	  actors	  are	  human,	  they	  are	  fallible,	  they	  are	  emotional,	  and	  they	  require	  time	  to	  adjust	  to	  new	  circumstances	  and	  electronic	  systems	  in	  their	  workplaces.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  ehealth	  users	  in	  the	  field	  will	  be	  reticent	  to	  change,	  and	  unsupportive	  of	  rapid	  technology	  change.	  	  	  ehealth	  systems,	  by	  their	  nature,	  change	  the	  practice	  of	  healthcare	  delivery.	  As	  Ammenwerth	  and	  his	  colleagues	  have	  noted,	  ehealth	  systems	  change	  the	  way	  health	  organizations	  interact	  and	  communicate	  internally.66	  It	  is	  not	  uncommon,	  for	  example,	  for	  ehealth	  technology	  to	  redefine	  job	  responsibilities.	  With	  ehealth	  systems,	  physicians	  are	  often	  concerned	  that	  they	  absorb	  clerical	  duties,	  inputting	  medical	  orders	  directly	  into	  the	  new	  electronic	  interface	  system.67	  Changes,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  technology,	  create	  implementation	  challenges	  between	  clinicians	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  	  Ammenwerth	  and	  others,	  Impact	  of	  CPOE	  on	  Mortality	  Rates	  -­	  Contradictory	  Findings,	  Important	  
Messages,	  pp.	  568-­‐593.	  67	  	  Schuster	  and	  others,	  Involving	  Users	  in	  the	  Implementation	  of	  an	  Imaging	  Order	  Entry	  System,	  pp.	  315-­‐321.	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administrative	  staff	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  overcome.68	  New	  ehealth	  systems	  often	  require	  the	  redefinition	  of	  clinical	  roles	  and	  responsibilities,	  which	  necessitate	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  different	  employee	  groups	  during	  implementation.69	  The	  overarching	  challenge	  of	  ehealth	  implementation,	  therefore,	  is	  one	  of	  governance	  and	  organization.	  Self	  interested	  actors	  are	  both	  resistant	  to	  change,	  and	  protective	  of	  their	  established	  roles	  within	  the	  health	  system.	  While	  large	  surveys	  of	  healthcare	  workers	  have	  found	  a	  noticeable	  difference	  in	  perceived	  usefulness	  of	  ehealth	  systems	  between	  those	  that	  have	  adopted	  new	  technology	  and	  those	  who	  have	  not,70	  user	  and	  organizational	  resistance	  remains	  an	  ongoing	  challenge	  in	  the	  deployment	  of	  new	  technology	  in	  the	  healthcare	  field.	  The	  goal,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  get	  the	  technology	  right	  at	  the	  outset,	  in	  order	  to	  engender	  a	  climate	  of	  participation	  and	  acceptance.	  	  	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  technical	  concerns	  with	  ehealth	  systems	  that	  deserve	  some	  brief	  attention.	  As	  with	  all	  software	  system	  that	  have	  a	  user	  interface,	  EHR	  systems	  can	  be	  limiting	  for	  healthcare	  professionals.	  For	  example,	  an	  EHR	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  include	  only	  discrete	  data	  input	  choices.	  A	  clinician	  treating	  a	  patient	  with	  eye	  pain	  might	  be	  faced	  with	  a	  YES/NO	  input	  choice	  on	  the	  EHR,	  and	  be	  unable	  to	  enter	  more	  appropriate	  information.71	  Minimizing	  the	  type	  of	  the	  information	  that	  can	  be	  inputted	  through	  a	  standardized	  EHR	  can	  create	  serious	  medical	  problems.	  Ross	  Koppel	  and	  his	  colleague	  identified	  22	  potential	  causes	  of	  medical	  errors	  in	  a	  study	  of	  a	  relatively	  simple	  Physician	  Order	  Entry	  (POE)	  System.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  difficulty	  of	  creating	  an	  effective,	  albeit	  simple,	  EMR	  system,	  the	  authors	  noted	  that	  medical	  errors	  could	  occur	  for	  rather	  simple	  reasons,	  such	  as	  unclear	  “Log	  On/Log	  Off”	  procedures,	  through	  which	  information	  gets	  allocated	  to	  the	  wrong	  patient	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  and	  Berg,	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  and	  Clinical	  Work,	  pp.	  1261-­‐1263.	  69	  	  Scott	  and	  others,	  Kaiser	  Permanente's	  Experience	  of	  Implementing	  an	  Electronic	  Medical	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  A	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  Study,	  pp.	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  70	  	  Wilkins,	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  Influencing	  Acceptance	  of	  Electronic	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  Records	  in	  Hospitals	  71	  	  Trachtenbarg,	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  Fix	  Everything	  -­	  and	  Nine	  Other	  Myths,	  pp.	  26-­‐30.	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record.72,	  73	  In	  one	  of	  the	  few	  studies	  of	  fully	  implemented	  ehealth	  systems	  in	  a	  large	  and	  complex	  organizational	  setting,	  Tim	  Scott	  and	  his	  colleagues	  looked	  at	  the	  experience	  of	  Kaiser	  Permanente,	  the	  largest	  non-­‐profit	  healthcare	  system	  in	  the	  United	  States	  with	  8.2	  million	  members,	  and	  how	  they	  implemented	  an	  EHR	  system.	  In	  this	  qualitative	  study,	  the	  authors	  found	  that	  software	  design	  choices	  created	  serious	  implementation	  problems	  for	  physicians,	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  medical	  errors,	  and	  resulted	  in	  an	  organizational	  perception	  that	  the	  ehealth	  system	  was	  fundamentally	  flawed.74	  The	  presentation	  of	  health	  information,	  a	  software	  design	  choice,	  has	  also	  raised	  concerns	  that	  EHRs	  can	  capture	  unnecessary	  data	  and	  result	  in	  information	  overload	  for	  physicians.	  This	  concern	  has	  led	  some	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  pen	  and	  paper	  record	  system,	  in	  which	  physicians	  have	  freedom	  to	  present	  information	  in	  the	  style	  of	  their	  choosing,	  can	  deliver	  superior	  care	  for	  patients.75	  	  	  The	  other	  chief	  technical	  concerns	  regarding	  ehealth	  systems	  revolve	  around	  interoperability	  and	  reliability.	  	  Interoperability	  with	  EMR	  systems	  is	  a	  serious	  concern.	  With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  EMR	  systems,	  and	  their	  multiple	  customized	  interfaces,	  physicians	  are	  rightly	  concerned	  that	  health	  information	  might	  be	  lost	  or	  unable	  to	  be	  used	  effectively.	  Without	  ehealth	  standardization,	  a	  patchwork	  of	  point-­‐to-­‐point	  EMR	  systems	  can	  decrease	  the	  capacity	  of	  physicians	  to	  access	  clinical	  notes,	  test	  results,	  and	  old	  procedures,	  resulting	  in	  increased	  delays	  and	  reduced	  patient	  care.76	  The	  reliability	  of	  ehealth	  systems	  in	  general	  is	  also	  a	  frequently	  cited	  concern	  of	  health	  professionals.77	  System	  crashes,	  for	  example,	  have	  resulted	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  patient	  data	  with	  serious	  repercussions.	  Without	  a	  real-­‐time	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  record	  was	  a	  problem	  in	  Alberta,	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  their	  EHR	  system.	  See:	  Ludwick	  and	  Doucette,	  The	  Implementation	  
of	  Operational	  Processes	  for	  the	  Alberta	  Electronic	  Health	  Record:	  Lessons	  for	  Electronic	  Medical	  
Record	  Adoption	  in	  Primary	  Care,	  pp.	  103-­‐107.	  74	  	  Scott	  and	  others,	  Kaiser	  Permanente's	  Experience	  of	  Implementing	  an	  Electronic	  Medical	  Record:	  A	  
Qualitative	  Study,	  pp.	  1313-­‐1316.	  75	  	  Trachtenbarg,	  EHRs	  Fix	  Everything	  -­	  and	  Nine	  Other	  Myths,	  pp.	  26-­‐30.	  76	  	  Derman	  and	  others,	  Saving	  Ontario	  Healthcare	  Dollars	  through	  E-­Health	  Standardization:	  A	  
Quantitative	  Study,	  pp.	  1-­‐13.	  77	  	  Trachtenbarg,	  EHRs	  Fix	  Everything	  -­	  and	  Nine	  Other	  Myths,	  pp.	  26-­‐30.	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backup,	  orders	  can	  be	  lost,	  and	  not	  reentered,	  until	  the	  system	  is	  restarted.78	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  envision	  a	  scenario	  where	  a	  system	  goes	  offline,	  and	  a	  treatment	  team	  in	  an	  Intensive	  Care	  Unit	  (ICU)	  would	  instantly	  become	  blind	  to	  the	  drugs	  that	  have	  already	  been	  prescribed	  to	  a	  patient.	  Therefore,	  while	  benefits	  of	  bringing	  healthcare	  into	  the	  digital	  age	  are	  certainly	  pronounced,	  public	  policy	  practitioners	  and	  health	  professionals	  must	  be	  mindful	  of	  the	  technical	  complications	  that	  may	  arise	  with	  the	  delivery	  of	  new	  ehealth	  systems.	  	  	  
GENERAL	  OBSERVATIONS	  	  When	  observed	  in	  aggregate,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  ehealth	  system	  implementation	  in	  general,	  and	  EHR	  projects	  in	  particular,	  have	  produced	  mixed	  results.	  While	  many	  public	  policy	  experts	  and	  politicians	  laude	  the	  benefits	  of	  these	  systems,	  the	  immediate	  evidence	  is	  less	  conclusive.	  There	  are	  certainly	  success	  stories,	  like	  those	  experienced	  the	  Karolinksa	  University	  Hospital	  system	  in	  Sweden,79	  and	  failures	  like	  those	  experienced	  by	  Kaiser	  Permanente	  in	  the	  United	  States.80	  Taking	  into	  consideration	  all	  of	  the	  evidence,	  two	  important	  points	  should	  be	  highlighted	  to	  ensure	  successful	  implementation	  of	  ehealth	  systems.	  First,	  getting	  the	  technology	  right,	  with	  standardization	  and	  interoperability	  across	  the	  given	  healthcare	  unit,	  is	  critical	  for	  success.	  Second,	  policy	  practitioners	  must	  be	  cognizant	  of	  the	  governance	  and	  administrative	  challenges	  that	  co-­‐exist	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  ehealth	  systems.	  Without	  planning	  for	  these	  challenges,	  and	  adopting	  the	  right	  implementation	  strategy,	  user	  resistance	  will	  grow	  and	  health	  outcomes	  will	  be	  compromised.	  	  	  Despite	  the	  inherent	  challenges,	  and	  despite	  published	  failings,	  the	  promise	  of	  EHR	  systems	  should	  not	  be	  discounted.	  Through	  trial	  and	  error,	  and	  adaptation,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  	  Koppel	  and	  others,	  Role	  of	  Computerized	  Physician	  Order	  Entry	  Systems	  in	  Facilitating	  Medication	  
Errors,	  pp.	  1197-­‐1203.	  79	  	  Ovretveit	  and	  others,	  Improving	  Quality	  through	  Effective	  Implementation	  of	  Information	  
Technology	  in	  Healthcare,	  pp.	  259-­‐266.	  80	  	  Scott	  and	  others,	  Kaiser	  Permanente's	  Experience	  of	  Implementing	  an	  Electronic	  Medical	  Record:	  A	  
Qualitative	  Study,	  pp.	  1313-­‐1316.	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promised	  benefits	  of	  ehealth	  will	  be	  realized	  at	  some	  point	  in	  time.	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  identify	  what	  works,	  and	  what	  doesn’t.	  To	  learn	  from	  mistakes	  and	  evolve,	  while	  ensuring	  that	  public	  dollars	  are	  used	  in	  the	  most	  efficient	  way,	  with	  the	  best	  and	  most	  insightful	  processes	  that	  the	  available	  data	  and	  theory	  allows.	  It	  is	  with	  this	  mind	  that	  we	  now	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  Ontario	  healthcare	  system,	  and	  the	  EHR	  project.	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THE	  ONTARIO	  EHR	  PROJECT	  
	  
	   	  The	  EHR	  project	  in	  Ontario	  is	  one	  of	  the	  more	  interesting	  Canadian	  stories	  of	  policy	  fiasco,	  and	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Few	  government	  initiatives	  in	  recent	  memory	  have	  sparked	  more	  anger	  and	  public	  resentment	  towards	  the	  political	  class.	  How	  did	  a	  worthwhile	  idea,	  the	  development	  of	  an	  EHR	  for	  all	  Ontarians,	  turn	  into	  what	  the	  Toronto	  Star	  coined	  the	  Frankenstein	  project?81	  How	  were	  millions	  of	  dollars	  spent,	  without	  the	  government	  achieving	  its	  main	  objective?	  To	  understand	  the	  seminal	  event	  of	  Ontario’s	  recent	  political	  history,	  we	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  EHR	  project,	  and	  the	  five	  Ws	  -­‐	  Who,	  What,	  Where,	  When	  and	  Why.	  	  	  	  
THE	  HEALTHCARE	  SYSTEM	  IN	  ONTARIO	  AND	  THE	  IDEA	  OF	  EHRs	  	  	  To	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  in	  Ontario,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  Authority	  and	  responsibility	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  	  Tyler	  Hamilton,	  "Digital	  Health	  Slow	  to	  Boot	  Up;	  EXCLUSIVE	  Ontario's	  Push	  to	  Get	  Patient	  Records	  Online	  is	  Plagued	  with	  Bugs;	  Provincial	  Move	  to	  Electronic	  Records	  Running	  Year	  Behind;	  Few	  Benefits	  to	  show	  for	  Millions	  Spent,	  Critics	  Complain,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  01,	  November	  21,	  2005.	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healthcare	  is	  largely	  vested	  in	  provinces,	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  British	  North	  American	  Act	  (1867).82	  Since	  the	  1960s,	  Canada	  has	  operated	  a	  publically	  financed	  healthcare	  system	  known	  as	  Medicare.	  The	  system	  is	  primarily	  comprised	  of	  ten	  provincial	  and	  three	  territorial	  government	  health	  insurance	  plans,	  with	  the	  federal	  government	  providing	  insurance	  to	  a	  few	  distinct	  segments	  of	  society	  (for	  example,	  First	  Nations	  and	  the	  Canadian	  military).	  The	  provinces	  and	  territories	  plan,	  finance,	  and	  manage	  the	  healthcare	  system,	  providing	  insurance	  coverage	  for	  hospital	  care,	  physician	  and	  allied	  healthcare	  services,	  some	  drug	  costs	  and	  public	  health.	  The	  system	  is	  “national”	  in	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  assists	  in	  the	  financing	  of	  provincial	  and	  territorial	  plans,	  while	  all	  plans	  share	  an	  adherence	  to	  national	  healthcare	  principles,	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  federal	  Canada	  Health	  Act.83	  	  Therefore,	  while	  relatively	  similar	  levels	  of	  care	  are	  available	  to	  Canadians	  irrespective	  of	  geographic	  location,	  the	  governance	  models	  of	  the	  “system”	  are	  in	  effect	  creatures	  of	  provinces,	  and	  have	  unique	  organizational	  characteristics	  and	  structures.84	  	  	  The	  province	  of	  Ontario	  operates	  one	  the	  world’s	  largest	  publicly	  funded	  healthcare	  systems,	  which	  is	  ostensibly	  managed	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Long	  Term	  Care	  (MOHLTC).85	  In	  response	  to	  rising	  healthcare	  costs	  and	  budget	  constraints	  in	  the	  1990s,	  public	  policy	  makers	  in	  Ontario	  started	  looking	  at	  new	  forms	  of	  integration	  and	  information	  technology	  as	  possible	  cost	  saving	  solutions.	  As	  early	  as	  1996,	  a	  prominent	  think	  tank	  piece	  published	  by	  the	  Hospital	  Management	  Research	  Unit	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Toronto	  argued	  for	  a	  networked	  approach	  to	  organize	  healthcare,	  with	  ehealth	  systems	  taking	  centre	  stage.86	  In	  the	  late	  1990s,	  the	  MOHLTC	  began	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  	  Donald	  J.	  Philippon	  and	  Jeffrey	  Braithwaite,	  "Health	  System	  Organization	  and	  Governance	  in	  Canada	  and	  Australia:	  A	  Comparison	  of	  Historical	  Developments,	  Recent	  Policy	  Changes	  and	  Future	  Implications,"	  Healthcare	  Policy	  4,	  no.	  1	  (2008),	  p.	  169.	  83	  	  Richard	  C.	  Alvarez,	  "The	  Promise	  of	  e-­‐Health	  -­‐	  a	  Canadian	  Perspective,"	  EHealth	  International	  1,	  no.	  4	  (2002),	  p.	  1.	  84	  	  Philippon	  and	  Braithwaite,	  Health	  System	  Organization	  and	  Governance	  in	  Canada	  and	  Australia:	  A	  
Comparison	  of	  Historical	  Developments,	  Recent	  Policy	  Changes	  and	  Future	  Implications,	  p.	  170.	  85	  	  Margo	  C.	  Orchard	  and	  others,	  "Access	  to	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  by	  Care	  Setting	  and	  Provider	  Type:	  Perceptions	  of	  Cancer	  Care	  in	  Ontario,	  Canada,"	  BMC	  Medical	  Informatics	  and	  Decision	  Making	  9,	  no.	  38	  (2009),	  p.	  2.	  86	  	  Kevin	  Mercer,	  "Examining	  the	  Impact	  of	  Health	  Information	  Networks	  on	  Health	  System	  Integration	  in	  Canada,"	  Leadership	  in	  Health	  Services	  14,	  no.	  3	  (2001),	  pp.	  3,	  4.	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planning	  for	  the	  possible	  development	  of	  an	  EHR	  system	  for	  Ontario,	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Ontario	  Health	  Information	  Management	  Action	  Plan.87	  	  	  The	  arguments	  in	  favour	  of	  developing	  an	  EHR	  system	  for	  the	  province	  were	  compelling.	  At	  a	  visceral	  level,	  patients	  in	  Ontario	  were	  tired	  of	  repeating	  health	  histories	  over	  and	  over	  again	  to	  different	  providers.	  They	  could	  not	  understand	  why,	  in	  the	  wired	  age,	  test	  results	  would	  take	  so	  long	  to	  get	  to	  their	  clinicians,	  or	  why	  when	  one	  hospital	  took	  a	  radiograph,	  it	  was	  unavailable	  at	  another	  hospital.88	  Public	  policy	  experts,	  with	  detailed	  knowledge	  of	  the	  health	  system,	  largely	  agreed	  that	  an	  EHR	  system	  could	  dramatically	  improve	  health	  outcomes,	  while	  reducing	  costs.89	  The	  ability	  to	  manage	  the	  large	  volume	  of	  patient	  information	  largely	  recorded	  in	  print	  and	  on	  film,	  was	  particularly	  attractive.	  Employing	  the	  accounting	  methods	  of	  Bliemel	  and	  Hassanein,90	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  there	  were	  roughly	  1.3	  billion	  pages	  of	  patient	  medical	  records	  archived	  across	  Ontario,	  which	  were	  often	  inaccessible	  when	  required.	  In	  a	  public	  healthcare	  system,	  where	  between	  $0.25-­‐$0.40	  of	  every	  dollar	  spent	  goes	  towards	  administration	  costs,	  improved	  information	  management	  was	  viewed	  as	  critically	  important	  to	  managing	  rising	  costs.91	  While	  the	  estimates	  of	  savings	  from	  an	  EHR	  system	  in	  Ontario	  vary	  between	  $1.1	  billion92	  to	  $2.4	  billion93	  annually,	  there	  was	  universal	  agreement	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  EHRs	  would	  be	  a	  net	  positive	  for	  the	  province.	  Many	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  healthcare	  organizations	  were	  strongly	  in	  favour	  of	  introducing	  EHRs,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  	  Jim	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  Toronto:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Ontario,	  (2009),	  pp.	  5,	  47.	  	  88	  	  Ken	  Tremblay,	  "In	  Conversation	  with	  Richard	  Alvarez,"	  Healthcare	  Quarterly	  13,	  no.	  2	  (2010),	  p.	  25	  89	  	  Nancy	  Gill,	  Kevin	  Leonard	  and	  Anthony	  Jonker,	  "Does	  E-­‐Health	  Adoption	  Enable	  Improved	  Health	  Outcomes?	  Encouraging	  Evidence	  from	  Ontario	  Hospitals,"	  Healthcare	  Quarterly	  13,	  no.	  3	  (2010),	  pp.	  50-­‐56.	  90	  	  Michael	  Bliemel	  and	  Khaled	  Hassanein,	  "E-­‐Health:	  Applying	  Business	  Process	  Reengineering	  Principals	  to	  Healthcare	  in	  Canada,"	  International	  Journal	  of	  Electronic	  Business	  2,	  no.	  6	  (2004),	  p.	  627.	  91	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  635.	  92	  	  Yaron	  Derman	  and	  others,	  "Saving	  Ontario	  Healthcare	  Dollars	  through	  E-­‐Health	  Standardization:	  A	  Quantitative	  Study,"	  Electronic	  Healthcare	  7,	  no.	  2	  (2008),	  pp.	  1-­‐13.	  93	  	  "Ontario's	  Plan	  for	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  is	  at	  Risk,	  Official	  Says,"	  Canadian	  Medical	  
Association	  Journal,	  2010,	  p.	  253.	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including	  the	  Canadian	  Medical	  Association,	  the	  Canadian	  Nurses	  Association,	  the	  Canada	  Pharmacists	  Association,	  the	  Canadian	  Healthcare	  Association	  and	  the	  Ontario	  Hospital	  Association.94	  	  	  
COMMITTING	  TO	  AN	  EHR	  SYSTEM	  IN	  ONTARIOs	  –	  THE	  BEGINNING	  	  In	  September	  2000,	  the	  federal	  and	  provincial	  governments	  jointly	  agreed	  to	  develop	  an	  iEHR	  system.	  Similarly,	  the	  Ontario	  MOHLTC	  committed	  to	  developing	  a	  central,	  secure,	  and	  “private	  lifetime	  record	  of	  an	  individual’s	  health	  and	  care	  history,	  available	  electronically	  to	  authorized	  health	  providers.”95	  Hence,	  while	  the	  vision	  agreed	  to	  by	  all	  levels	  of	  government	  included	  an	  iEHR	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  the	  immediate	  goal	  for	  Ontario	  was	  an	  EHR	  for	  the	  province.	  The	  vision	  for	  Ontario	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  was	  a	  single,	  coherent,	  EHR	  system	  in	  which	  standardization	  and	  interoperability	  was	  paramount.	  At	  the	  outset,	  the	  province	  acknowledged	  that	  a	  non-­‐standardized	  patchwork	  of	  point-­‐to-­‐point	  ehealth	  system	  integration	  would	  result	  in	  organizational	  chaos,	  and	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  promise	  of	  EHRs.96	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  facilitate	  the	  adoption	  of	  EHR	  systems,	  the	  federal	  government	  created	  the	  Canada	  Health	  Infoway	  corporation	  (Infoway)	  in	  2001,	  with	  the	  consent	  and	  support	  of	  the	  provinces.	  Although	  the	  federal	  government	  funds	  Infoway,	  it	  reports	  directly	  to	  all	  federal,	  provincial,	  and	  territorial	  deputy	  ministers	  of	  health.97	  The	  stated	  mission	  of	  Infoway	  is	  to	  foster	  and	  accelerate	  the	  development	  and	  adoption	  of	  EHR	  systems,	  with	  compatible	  technology	  standards	  on	  a	  pan-­‐Canadian	  basis.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  mission,	  Infoway	  has	  five	  stated	  objectives:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  	  Tremblay,	  In	  Conversation	  with	  Richard	  Alvarez,	  p.	  26.	  95	  	  Hugh	  MacLeod	  and	  others,	  "The	  Times	  they	  are	  A-­‐Changing:	  What	  Worked	  and	  what	  we	  Learned	  in	  Deploying	  Ontario's	  Wait	  Time	  Information	  System,"	  Healthcare	  Quarterly	  12,	  no.	  Special	  Issue	  (2009),	  p.	  13.	  96	  	  Derman	  and	  others,	  Saving	  Ontario	  Healthcare	  Dollars	  through	  E-­Health	  Standardization:	  A	  
Quantitative	  Study,	  p.	  2.	  97	  	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  pp.	  1-­‐48.	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(1)	  To	  accelerate	  the	  development	  and	  adoption	  of	  modern	  systems	  of	  health	  information	  and	  communication	  technologies;	  (2)	  To	  define	  and	  promote	  standards	  governing	  shared	  data	  to	  ensure	  the	  compatibility	  of	  health	  information	  networks;	  	  (3)	  To	  support	  the	  adoption	  of	  such	  standards	  for	  health	  information	  and	  compatible	  communications	  technologies	  for	  the	  health	  sector;	  	  (4)	  To	  enter	  into	  collaborative	  arrangements	  as	  required	  with	  governments	  of	  Canada,	  provinces	  and	  territories,	  corporations	  and	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  	  	  organizations	  and	  other	  public	  and	  private	  partners	  for	  development	  and	  adoption	  of	  standards	  and	  technologies;	  and	  	  (5)	  To	  incorporate	  standards	  that	  protect	  personal	  privacy	  and	  confidentiality	  of	  individual	  records	  and	  security	  of	  health	  information.98	  	  	  In	  practical	  terms,	  Infoway	  acts	  as	  both	  a	  repository	  for	  best	  practices	  and	  technical	  guidance,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  federal	  funding	  conduit	  to	  support	  the	  development	  of	  EHR	  systems.	  In	  the	  classical	  bargaining	  approach	  to	  agenda	  setting,	  Infoway	  attempts	  to	  set	  the	  national	  direction	  for	  EHR	  systems	  through	  the	  power	  of	  the	  purse.	  To	  quote	  Richard	  Alvarez,	  the	  CEO	  of	  Infoway,	  “If	  a	  provinces’	  [EHR]	  priorities	  fall	  within	  Infoway’s	  strategic	  direction	  and	  plans,	  we	  fund	  the	  initiative.”99	  In	  practice,	  the	  history	  of	  Infoway	  suggests	  that	  it	  works	  both	  with,	  and	  around,	  the	  provinces,	  funding	  local	  health	  initiatives	  it	  deems	  worthy	  according	  to	  the	  criteria	  laid	  out	  above.	  	  	  Ontario	  formally	  began	  developing	  a	  provincial	  EHR	  system	  in	  2002.	  In	  order	  to	  complete	  the	  project	  as	  envisioned,	  the	  EHR	  system	  would	  require	  four	  fundamental	  components:	  	  (1)	  A	  secure	  network	  on	  which	  patient	  data	  could	  travel;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  	  Alvarez,	  The	  Promise	  of	  e-­Health	  -­	  a	  Canadian	  Perspective,	  p.	  5.	  99	  	  Tremblay,	  In	  Conversation	  with	  Richard	  Alvarez,	  p.	  25.	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(2)	  Applications	  that	  enable	  users	  to	  record,	  store	  and	  retrieve	  patient	  data;	  (3)	  Patient	  data,	  including	  treatment	  history,	  test	  results,	  diagnostic	  images,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  prescribed	  medications,	  in	  a	  digital	  form;	  and	  (4)	  Terminals	  or	  access	  points	  from	  which	  users	  can	  input	  and	  retrieve	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  patient	  data.100	  	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  EHR	  initiative,	  a	  strategic	  decision	  was	  made	  to	  separate	  the	  project	  into	  two	  distinct	  parts,	  which	  would	  be	  facilitated	  by	  two	  separate	  organizational	  units.	  The	  MOHLTC	  first	  created	  (2002)	  a	  separate	  body,	  the	  Smart	  Systems	  for	  Health	  Agency	  (SSHA),	  to	  oversee	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  secure	  electronic	  network	  and	  to	  connect	  the	  medical	  community	  to	  this	  network.	  SSHA	  was	  responsible,	  in	  effect,	  for	  the	  first	  and	  fourth	  components	  of	  the	  EHR	  system	  previously	  described.	  The	  MOHLTC	  itself,	  through	  the	  eHealth	  Program	  Branch,	  took	  over	  responsibility	  for	  the	  overall	  direction	  of	  the	  project,	  and	  specifically,	  for	  the	  clinical	  applications	  and	  associated	  databases	  that	  would	  run	  on	  the	  network.	  Therefore,	  in	  addition	  to	  its	  steering	  and	  oversight	  role,	  the	  MOHLTC	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  second	  component	  of	  the	  EHR	  system.	  Finally,	  realizing	  the	  third	  component	  of	  the	  system,	  the	  data,	  would	  be	  left	  to	  the	  direct	  providers	  of	  healthcare	  across	  the	  system.101	  Employing	  an	  analogy	  to	  describe	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  system,	  the	  network	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  private	  highway	  that	  has	  a	  number	  of	  off	  ramps,	  or	  terminals,	  through	  which	  information	  can	  be	  accessed.	  Different	  types	  of	  transport	  vehicles,	  be	  it	  cars	  or	  trucks,	  represent	  the	  software	  programs	  travelling	  along	  the	  highway,	  while	  passengers	  represent	  the	  data.	  In	  this	  analogy,	  the	  SSHA	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  highway	  and	  off	  ramps,	  the	  MOHLTC	  for	  the	  transport	  vehicles,	  and	  health	  providers	  for	  the	  passengers.	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  100	  	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  pp.	  1-­‐48.	  101	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The	  construction	  of	  a	  single	  EHR	  system	  for	  Ontario	  represented	  a	  large	  technical	  challenge	  for	  the	  province.	  Applying	  the	  Infoway	  methodology	  for	  Ontario,102	  there	  were	  roughly	  350	  million	  healthcare	  transactions	  occurring	  every	  year	  in	  the	  province,	  including:	  	   -­‐ 146	  million	  laboratory	  tests	  -­‐ 127	  million	  prescriptions	  -­‐ 110	  million	  visits	  to	  physicians’	  offices	  -­‐ 12	  million	  diagnostics	  -­‐ 1	  million	  in-­‐patient	  hospitalizations	  	  In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  there	  were	  already	  a	  number	  of	  distinct	  clinical	  IT	  solutions	  to	  aggregate	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  data	  produced	  every	  year	  by	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  A	  significant	  challenge	  was	  that	  parts	  of	  the	  system,	  doing	  the	  same	  task,	  could	  output	  data	  in	  different	  forms,	  making	  data	  aggregation	  difficult.	  Consider	  that	  an	  MRI	  machine	  purchased	  by	  hospital	  A,	  from	  company	  B,	  could	  output	  its	  scans	  in	  format	  C,	  while	  a	  similar	  hospital	  X,	  purchases	  a	  similar	  MRI	  machine	  from	  company	  Y,	  which	  outputs	  scans	  in	  format	  Z.	  Creating	  an	  EHR	  system	  which	  can	  take	  the	  input	  formats	  C	  and	  Z,	  and	  output	  the	  information	  in	  one	  consistent	  format,	  is	  not	  exceeding	  difficult.	  However,	  creating	  an	  EHR	  system	  that	  can	  accept	  thousands	  of	  different	  input	  formats	  becomes	  quite	  challenging,	  particularly	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  number	  of	  different	  legacy	  machines	  and	  codes	  that	  exist	  in	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  healthcare	  systems.103	  	  The	  overall	  challenge	  was	  accentuated	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  early	  action	  on	  an	  EHR	  system	  by	  the	  province.	  With	  an	  increased	  understanding	  of	  the	  promise	  of	  EHR	  systems	  in	  the	  1990s,	  many	  local	  healthcare	  organizations	  were	  eager	  to	  get	  the	  technology	  in	  place	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  then,	  that	  in	  the	  vacuum	  of	  action,	  units	  within	  the	  provincial	  healthcare	  system	  started	  building	  their	  own	  systems.	  To	  quote	  from	  a	  2002	  report	  by	  the	  Ontario	  Hospital	  eHealth	  Council,	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  Electronic	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  Initiative,	  p.	  5.	  103	  	  Patrick	  Powers,	  "Canada's	  E-­‐Health	  Journey	  and	  HIMSS	  Analytics'	  Canada	  Information	  and	  Communications	  Technology	  Study,"	  Healthcare	  Quarterly	  12,	  no.	  1	  (2008),	  pp.	  120-­‐123.	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[An	  effective	  EHR	  system]	  needs	  standards	  to	  ensure	  the	  seamless	  transmission	  of	  information.	  Currently,	  there	  are	  several	  healthcare	  providers	  collecting	  patient	  information	  using	  different	  procedures,	  recording	  the	  information	  in	  different	  electronic	  formats,	  and	  using	  incompatible	  software.	  Even	  with	  a	  secure	  health	  information	  network	  [provided	  by	  SSHA]…	  providers	  will	  be	  unable	  to	  share	  information	  unless	  common	  standards	  are	  introduced.”104	  	  The	  development	  of	  decentralized,	  non-­‐standardized	  and	  incompatible	  local	  EMR	  systems,	  and	  small	  network	  EHR	  systems,	  was	  an	  early	  warning	  sign	  of	  potential	  problems	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  provincial	  EHR	  system.	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  early	  delays	  by	  the	  province	  resulted	  in	  the	  Sick	  Kids	  Hospital	  Network	  (SKHN)	  going	  alone	  and	  developing	  their	  own,	  unique,	  EHR	  system	  in	  2002.	  The	  Child	  Health	  Network	  –	  Health	  Information	  Network	  (HiNet)	  aggregated	  clinical	  records	  from	  consenting	  parents	  of	  patients	  (under	  18	  years	  of	  age)	  exclusively	  from	  hospitals	  and	  pediatricians	  operating	  within	  the	  SKHN.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  HiNet	  system	  was	  incompatible	  with	  other	  ehealth	  systems	  in	  the	  province.105	  	  	  In	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  and	  to	  ensure	  its	  eventual	  success,	  it	  was	  incumbent	  on	  MOHLTC	  to	  make	  one	  significant	  technology	  decision.	  It	  many	  ways,	  this	  decision	  was	  a	  binary	  choice.	  The	  MOHLTC	  could	  try	  and	  interface	  existing	  and	  ongoing	  EMR/EHR	  systems	  through	  a	  patient	  and	  clinical	  portal,	  or	  develop	  an	  entirely	  new	  system	  from	  scratch,	  while	  executing	  a	  “rip	  and	  replace”	  strategy	  of	  all	  legacy	  systems.106	  The	  first	  option	  represented	  a	  decentralized	  technology	  solution.	  As	  the	  Auditor	  General	  noted,	  this	  type	  of	  solution	  has	  the	  risk	  of	  engendering	  information	  silos,	  in	  which	  subsystems	  and	  applications	  are	  incapable	  of	  interacting,	  or	  being	  integrated,	  with	  related	  subsystems	  and	  applications.	  Moreover,	  the	  decentralized	  solution	  tends	  to	  encourage	  e-­‐system	  duplication	  by	  different	  units	  within	  the	  healthcare	  system.107	  The	  benefits	  of	  the	  decentralization	  solution	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	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  "E-­‐Health	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  A	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International	  Journal	  of	  Healthcare	  Technology	  and	  Management	  8,	  no.	  1/2	  (2007),	  p.	  69.	  105	  	  Alvarez,	  The	  Promise	  of	  e-­Health	  -­	  a	  Canadian	  Perspective,	  p.	  6.	  106	  	  Powers,	  Canada's	  E-­Health	  Journey	  and	  HIMSS	  Analytics'	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  and	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  Study,	  p.	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  107	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  Report:	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  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  p.	  16.	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clear,	  in	  that	  existing	  systems	  could	  continue	  to	  evolve	  and	  operate	  as	  is,	  improving	  patient	  care	  in	  the	  short	  term.	  The	  latter	  option,	  the	  centralization	  approach,	  focuses	  on	  developing	  the	  technology	  capable	  of	  serving	  the	  widest	  number	  of	  uses,	  with	  the	  most	  consistent	  service	  and	  data	  access.	  With	  this	  option,	  the	  MOHLTC	  would	  discontinue	  funding	  for	  the	  development	  of	  localized	  EMR/EHR	  projects,	  while	  focusing	  one	  true	  provincial	  EHR	  system.	  While	  the	  centralization	  solution	  was	  technically	  easier	  to	  achieve,	  the	  risk	  of	  development	  delays	  would	  result	  in	  no	  EHR	  system	  of	  any	  kind	  being	  available	  for	  patients.108	  Unfortunately	  for	  the	  EHR	  project,	  the	  MOHLTC	  neglected	  to	  make	  a	  decision,	  and	  continued	  to	  build	  its	  own	  provincial	  system,	  while	  simultaneously	  funding	  various	  competing	  local	  projects,	  exacerbating	  technical,	  financial,	  and	  governance	  problems.	  Given	  what	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  binary	  technology	  choice,	  the	  government	  chose	  to	  pursue	  both	  avenues,	  despite	  the	  inherent	  contradiction	  of	  centralization	  vs.	  decentralization.	  	  
NEW	  GOVERNMENT,	  THE	  HEALTHCARE	  SYSTEM	  AND	  EHRs	  	  Through	  the	  1980s,	  existing	  healthcare	  governance	  models	  across	  Canada	  came	  under	  increased	  scrutiny.	  The	  centralized	  model	  of	  providing	  healthcare,	  in	  which	  the	  provincial	  ministry	  of	  health	  would	  contract	  directly	  with	  individual	  providers	  and	  hospitals,	  was	  increasingly	  viewed	  as	  outdated	  and	  ineffective.	  The	  prescriptive	  solution	  on	  offer	  was	  decentralization	  and	  regionalization.	  With	  these	  healthcare	  governance	  changes,	  experts	  argued	  that	  local	  integration	  of	  health	  services	  could	  be	  achieved	  along	  a	  wider	  continuum	  of	  care,	  improving	  health	  outcomes	  and	  allowing	  for	  increased	  local	  control.109	  	  	  By	  the	  late	  1990s,	  the	  trend	  towards	  decentralization	  and	  regionalization	  had	  taken	  hold	  in	  all	  provinces,	  except	  Ontario.	  While	  there	  was	  some	  differentiation	  amongst	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provinces,	  the	  establishment	  of	  regional	  health	  boards	  allowed	  provincial	  health	  ministries	  to	  devolve	  authority	  and	  discretion	  in	  healthcare	  spending,	  while	  fostering	  the	  integration	  of	  health	  services	  along	  geographic	  lines.	  Politically,	  the	  devolution	  of	  healthcare	  governance	  authority	  was	  useful	  during	  the	  budget	  cutbacks	  of	  the	  1990s,	  where	  responsibility	  for	  implementing	  cost-­‐cutting	  measures	  were	  largely	  left	  to	  regional	  boards.110	  Unlike	  the	  other	  Canadian	  provinces,	  the	  Ontario	  Progressive	  (PC)	  Conservative	  government	  led	  by	  Premiers	  Mike	  Harris	  (1995-­‐2002)	  and	  Ernie	  Eves	  (2002-­‐2003)	  chose	  a	  different	  path	  to	  managing	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  During	  their	  terms	  in	  office,	  the	  PC	  government	  chose	  to	  maintain	  the	  overarching	  structure	  of	  the	  healthcare	  system,	  while	  imposing	  changes	  from	  the	  political	  centre.	  During	  the	  eight	  years	  of	  PC	  rule,	  the	  government	  used	  a	  heavy-­‐handed	  approach	  to	  slash	  healthcare	  budgets,	  while	  forcing	  hospital	  mergers	  (consolidation).111	  By	  2003,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  choices	  made	  by	  the	  PC	  government,	  there	  were	  roughly	  150	  independent	  hospitals	  operating	  in	  Ontario,	  directly	  funded	  through	  the	  Ministry.	  Each	  hospital	  had	  its	  own	  CEO	  and	  independent	  board	  of	  directors.112	  Moreover,	  the	  government	  chose	  to	  maintain	  the	  direct	  funding	  relationship	  with	  pharmacies,	  mental	  health	  providers,	  rehabilitation	  facilities	  and	  physicians,	  which	  all	  operated	  independently	  of	  one	  another.	  There	  were	  some	  relatively	  minor	  changes	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  healthcare	  system,	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  43	  Community	  Care	  Access	  Centres	  (CACCs)	  in	  1997,	  responsible	  for	  purchasing	  community	  care	  and	  homecare	  services	  on	  behalf	  of	  patients	  in	  distinct	  geographic	  regions.	  Although	  the	  introduction	  of	  CACC	  could	  be	  viewed	  the	  first	  steps	  towards	  decentralization,	  legislation	  was	  introduced	  in	  2001	  gave	  the	  MOHLTC	  the	  power	  to	  appoint	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  and	  Boards	  of	  Directors	  of	  these	  organizations.113	  When	  viewed	  in	  aggregate,	  there	  were	  relatively	  few	  changes	  to	  the	  system	  structure	  under	  the	  PC	  government.	  Day	  to	  day	  authority	  over	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healthcare	  systems,	  both	  in	  de	  facto	  and	  de	  jure	  terms,	  resided	  at	  Queen’s	  Park	  and	  with	  the	  MOHLTC.	  To	  a	  large	  extent,	  maintaining	  centralization	  was	  the	  name	  of	  the	  game	  between	  1995-­‐2003.	  	  The	  October	  2003	  provincial	  election	  was	  a	  watershed	  political	  event.	  The	  Ontario	  Liberal	  Party,	  led	  by	  Dalton	  McGuinty,	  won	  the	  election	  and	  took	  office.	  The	  Liberal	  election	  platform	  focused	  heavily	  on	  healthcare	  reform,	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  increased	  funding,	  system	  integration,	  and	  delivery	  of	  a	  province	  wide	  EHR	  system.	  The	  McGuinty	  government	  also	  promised	  a	  new	  style	  of	  leadership	  and	  management,	  with	  a	  softer	  hand	  and	  increased	  community	  involvement.	  Both	  implicitly	  and	  explicitly,	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  healthcare	  system	  under	  the	  Liberals	  was	  positioned	  to	  contrast	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  former	  PC	  government.114	  Given	  the	  promises	  made	  by	  the	  McGuinty	  government	  during	  the	  election,	  the	  Ontario	  government	  faced	  a	  daunting	  healthcare	  reform	  agenda,	  with	  major	  fiscal	  and	  bureaucratic	  repositioning	  at	  stake,	  on	  an	  accelerated	  timetable.115	  	  	  In	  2001,	  Kevin	  Mercer,	  then	  CEO	  of	  a	  CCAC,	  noted	  the	  difficulty	  of	  Ontario	  healthcare	  organizations	  embracing	  system-­‐wide	  changes.	  The	  challenge,	  he	  argued,	  was	  that	  the	  system	  was	  a	  series	  of	  disconnected	  parts,	  or	  simply	  patchwork,	  with	  no	  unified	  direction.	  Many	  healthcare	  organizations,	  be	  they	  hospitals,	  primary	  care	  providers,	  or	  larger	  specialized	  units,	  like	  Cancer	  Care	  Ontario	  or	  the	  Sick	  Kids	  Network,	  operated	  in	  silos	  and	  were	  resistant	  to	  change.116	  In	  2005,	  health	  minister	  George	  Smitherman	  bluntly	  articulated	  the	  governance	  challenges	  of	  implementing	  any	  system-­‐wide	  change:	  If	  you	  look	  around	  Ontario,	  you	  can	  use	  the	  word	  ‘system’	  all	  you	  want	  but	  we	  don’t	  have	  one.	  Instead,	  medicare	  has	  become	  a	  chaotic	  jumble	  of	  disconnected	  services	  –	  hospitals,	  family	  doctor	  practices,	  community	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clinics,	  seniors’	  homes,	  drug	  stores,	  blood	  labs	  and	  home	  care,	  to	  name	  a	  few	  –	  all	  independently	  administered,	  frequently	  offering	  competing	  or	  duplicate	  services,	  and	  working	  in	  relative	  isolation	  from	  one	  another.117	  	  After	  taking	  office,	  the	  Liberal	  government	  took	  the	  first	  steps	  towards	  reforming	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  In	  conventional	  Canadian	  public	  administration,	  a	  newly	  elected	  government	  achieves	  its	  agenda	  by	  enlisting	  the	  public	  service	  to	  elaborate	  specific	  policy	  options,	  and	  implement	  change.	  In	  practice,	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.118	  In	  2004,	  the	  Premier	  established	  the	  Health	  Results	  Team	  (HRT)	  to	  implement	  several	  system-­‐wide	  transformative	  initiatives,	  with	  information	  management	  being	  a	  top	  priority.	  Through	  the	  HRT,	  the	  government	  first	  created	  the	  Ontario	  Health	  System	  Scorecard	  (OHSS),	  to	  link	  performance	  measures	  with	  overall	  strategy	  and	  integration.	  The	  OHSS	  had	  a	  nine	  themed	  Strategy	  Map,	  which	  evaluated	  healthcare	  organizations,	  and	  provided	  incentives	  to	  achieve	  government	  objectives	  (performance	  expectations),	  including	  the	  development	  of	  EHRs	  at	  the	  local	  level.119	  Secondly	  and	  concurrently,	  the	  MOHLTC	  developed	  Hospital	  Accountability	  Agreements	  (HAA),	  which	  provided	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  government	  to	  ensure	  that	  public	  funding	  achieved	  desired	  performance	  and	  operational	  changes	  in	  hospitals.	  Separate	  agreements	  were	  reached	  with	  each	  hospital,	  and	  funding	  was,	  technically,	  tied	  to	  changes	  including	  the	  adoption	  of	  EHRs.120	  The	  OHSS	  and	  the	  HAA	  represent	  a	  form	  or	  organizational	  bargaining,	  in	  which	  central	  funding	  was	  used	  as	  an	  instrument	  to	  direct	  policy	  choices	  at	  the	  local	  organizational	  level.	  Therefore,	  in	  terms	  of	  developing	  an	  EHR	  system,	  the	  message	  from	  the	  MOHLTC	  to	  healthcare	  providers	  in	  2004	  was	  clear:	  start	  developing	  your	  own	  EHR	  systems.	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While	  the	  message	  to	  healthcare	  providers,	  via	  the	  funding	  formula	  and	  accountability	  agreements,	  suggested	  a	  clear	  path	  for	  the	  development	  of	  an	  EHR	  system,	  other	  decisions	  muddied	  the	  waters.	  With	  an	  electoral	  promise	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  development	  of	  a	  province	  wide	  EHR	  system,	  the	  MOHLTC	  formally	  established	  (2004)	  an	  Office	  of	  E-­‐Health,	  akin	  to	  a	  central	  policy	  unit/program	  unit.	  The	  Office	  was	  meant	  to	  guide	  development	  of	  EHRs	  across	  the	  province,	  while	  simultaneously	  developing	  the	  software	  required	  for	  a	  central	  system,	  leaving	  the	  SSHA	  to	  continue	  building	  the	  network	  infrastructure.	  To	  complicate	  matters,	  the	  Office	  of	  E-­‐Health	  created	  a	  coordinating	  body	  for	  all	  EHR	  implementation	  efforts,	  called	  the	  Ontario	  e-­‐Health	  Council,	  technically	  consisting	  of	  four	  separate	  councils	  with	  different	  areas	  of	  focus	  (continuing	  care,	  laboratories,	  physicians	  and	  hospitals).	  The	  new	  Office,	  and	  its	  offspring,	  represented	  the	  first	  organizational	  overhaul	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  at	  the	  MOHLTC,	  just	  three	  years	  into	  the	  initiative.	  To	  complicate	  matters,	  the	  SSHA	  moved	  beyond	  its	  envisioned	  scope	  of	  responsibility,	  and	  spawned	  its	  own	  Ontario	  Health	  Information	  Standards	  Committee	  (OHISC)	  to	  try	  and	  facilitate	  integration	  of	  evolving	  EHR	  systems	  at	  the	  local	  level.121	  	  In	  2005,	  the	  first	  public	  warning	  signs	  emerged	  that	  the	  EHR	  project	  was	  in	  serious	  trouble.	  At	  the	  MOHLTC,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  coherent	  strategy,	  and	  overlapping	  governance	  problems,	  led	  one	  insider	  to	  label	  the	  initiative	  a	  “widowed	  portfolio.”122	  In	  the	  public	  realm,	  most	  the	  criticism	  was	  being	  leveled	  at	  the	  SSHA.	  Judy	  Middleton,	  Chief	  Information	  Officer	  with	  the	  William	  Osler	  Health	  Centre	  and	  an	  EHR	  project	  stakeholder,	  nicely	  sums	  up	  the	  popular	  sentiment	  at	  the	  time:	  	  “[the	  SSHA]	  keeps	  augmenting	  their	  staff,	  there’s	  no	  deliverables,	  and	  the	  salaries	  are	  far	  beyond	  what	  any	  corporate	  consultants	  make.	  It’s	  very	  discouraging.	  The	  money	  is	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  Roy,	  E-­Health	  in	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  A	  Multi-­Dimensional	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  pp.	  71,	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  Hamilton,	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going	  into	  this	  hole	  but	  we’re	  not	  seeing	  results.”123	  According	  to	  the	  public	  narrative,	  the	  SSHA	  was	  failing	  the	  people	  of	  Ontario.	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  December	  2005,	  Health	  Minister	  George	  Smitherman	  announced	  the	  first	  reorganization	  of	  the	  SSHA,	  with	  some	  internal	  staff	  changes	  and	  the	  appointment	  of	  six	  new	  members	  to	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors,	  to	  get	  the	  project	  back	  on	  track.124	  	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  summarize	  the	  early	  developments	  of	  the	  EHRs	  project	  under	  the	  new	  Liberal	  administration	  precisely	  because	  multiple	  signals	  were	  being	  sent	  from	  different	  units	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  government.	  The	  publically	  articulated	  vision	  of	  the	  government	  was	  an	  integrated	  healthcare	  system	  with	  a	  province	  wide	  EHR	  system,	  with	  a	  commitment	  to	  maintain	  independent	  governance	  (independent	  Boards	  of	  Directors)	  for	  each	  institution	  and	  agency	  operating	  in	  the	  province.125	  In	  practical	  terms,	  one	  part	  of	  government	  at	  the	  MOHLTC	  was	  giving	  explicit	  direction	  and	  funding	  to	  local	  healthcare	  providers	  to	  develop	  EHR	  systems	  of	  their	  own.	  Another	  part	  of	  government,	  again	  at	  the	  MOHLTC,	  was	  developing	  a	  centralized	  EHR	  system	  independently	  of	  local	  healthcare	  organizations.	  Finally,	  a	  third	  arm	  of	  government,	  the	  SSHA,	  was	  building	  the	  provincial	  hardware	  network,	  while	  attempting	  to	  set	  its	  own	  software	  integration	  standards	  for	  use	  on	  that	  network.	  	  	  Outside	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  provincial	  government,	  different	  units	  within	  the	  healthcare	  system	  started	  creating	  their	  own	  structures	  to	  help	  implement	  and	  develop	  EHRs.	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  the	  Ontario	  Hospital	  Association	  (OHA)	  created	  their	  own	  E-­‐Health	  Council,	  with	  multiple	  working	  groups,	  to	  investigate	  how	  to	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  Tyler	  Hamilton,	  "Smitherman	  to	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  Six	  New	  Board	  Members	  Nominated	  to	  Smart	  Systems	  Agency's	  Mandate	  to	  Create	  Electronic	  Health	  Record	  System,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  23,	  December	  6,	  2005.	  125	  	  Ted	  Ball,	  Dennis	  Pointer	  and	  Liz	  Cole-­‐Verlann,	  "Governance	  and	  Management	  Roles	  in	  Transforming	  and	  Integrating	  Independent	  Organizations	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  Interdependent	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  Law	  and	  Governance	  8,	  no.	  1	  (2004),	  pp.	  4,	  6.	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develop	  their	  own	  EHR	  systems,126	  effectively	  undermining	  the	  centralized	  effort.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  the	  SKHN127	  and	  Cancer	  Care	  Ontario128	  engaged	  in	  the	  development	  of	  their	  own	  systems,	  while	  Infoway,	  the	  Canadian	  Institutes	  for	  Health	  Research	  (CIHR),	  the	  Canadian	  Institute	  for	  Health	  Informatics	  (CIHI)	  were	  each	  acting	  as	  repositories	  of	  information,	  guidance	  and	  funding.129	  	  	  
HEALTHCARE	  GOVERNANCE	  TRANSFORMATION	  AND	  THE	  LHIN	  	  In	  2006,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  foster	  increased	  health	  system	  integration,	  the	  Liberal	  government	  followed	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  its	  provincial	  cousins	  and	  adopted	  a	  decentralization	  and	  regionalization	  agenda.130	  With	  the	  introduction	  and	  passage	  of	  the	  Bill	  36,	  the	  Local	  Health	  Systems	  Integration	  Act,	  the	  MOHLTC	  created	  a	  unique	  “made	  in	  Ontario	  plan”	  for	  healthcare	  governance.131	  The	  government	  established	  14	  geographically	  based	  entities,	  called	  a	  Local	  Health	  Integration	  Network	  (LHIN),	  with	  roughly	  500,000	  inhabitants	  per	  zone.	  LHINs	  were	  established	  as	  non-­‐profit	  corporations,	  responsible	  for	  the	  planning,	  integration	  and	  funding	  of	  local	  health	  services	  within	  their	  geographic	  areas	  of	  responsibility.132	  The	  LHINs	  would	  have	  significant	  decision	  making	  powers,	  with	  the	  specific	  authority	  to	  make	  “integration	  decisions”	  -­‐	  decisions	  that	  could	  order	  the	  transfer	  of	  services	  from	  one	  healthcare	  organization	  to	  another	  -­‐	  and	  would	  be	  accountable	  to	  the	  provinces	  through	  formal	  accountability	  agreements.133	  The	  objective	  of	  regionalization	  through	  LHINs	  was	  to	  execute	  fundamental	  system-­‐wide	  reform,	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  Healthcare	  
in	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  625-­‐643.	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  128	  	  Orchard	  and	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  of	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  in	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  129	  	  MacLeod	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  Wait	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  pp.	  10,	  11.	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  Transition	  Planning	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  Health	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  Healthcare	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  8,	  no.	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  (2005),	  pp.	  78-­‐82.	  131	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  Health	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  Networks:	  Will	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  p.	  46.	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  pp.	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with	  the	  MOHLTC	  extracting	  itself	  from	  “daily	  hurly	  –	  burly	  of	  crisis	  management”	  and	  giving	  up	  its	  “traditional	  pre-­‐eminent	  role”	  as	  the	  centre	  power	  in	  the	  provincial	  healthcare	  system.134	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  LHIN	  approach	  to	  healthcare,	  and	  the	  devolution	  of	  power	  away	  from	  the	  MOHLTC,	  can	  be	  judged	  by	  the	  budget	  allocation,	  with	  roughly	  $20	  billion	  of	  the	  $33	  billion/year	  health	  budget	  flowing	  through	  the	  regional	  organizations.	  Ostensibly,	  the	  MOHLTC	  would	  maintain	  some	  control	  over	  the	  LHINs	  through	  their	  power	  to	  appoint	  the	  Board	  or	  Directors,	  which	  in	  turn	  would	  select	  the	  CEO	  and	  management	  team.135	  	  	  The	  decentralization	  and	  regionalization	  agenda	  of	  the	  government	  was	  a	  “made	  in	  Ontario”	  plan	  precisely	  because	  it	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  traditional	  path	  of	  the	  other	  provinces.	  Despite	  the	  introduction	  of	  LHINs,	  the	  MOHLTC	  chose	  to	  omit	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  healthcare	  system	  from	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  these	  new	  organizations.	  To	  be	  specific,	  public	  health	  services,	  physician	  services,	  ambulatory	  services,	  laboratories	  and	  the	  provincial	  drug	  program	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  mandate	  of	  LHINs.136	  To	  further	  complicate	  the	  governance	  arrangement,	  the	  MOHLTC	  made	  two	  rather	  curious	  decisions.	  First,	  the	  MOHLTC	  chose	  to	  reform	  the	  Community	  Care	  Access	  Corporations	  (CCACs),	  consolidating	  them	  from	  42	  to	  14	  entities	  along	  the	  same	  geographic	  lines	  as	  the	  LHINs.137	  The	  CCACs	  would	  continue	  to	  manage	  community	  care	  and	  purchase	  homecare	  services	  for	  patients	  from	  provider	  organizations,	  however	  they	  would	  have	  the	  power	  to	  selected	  their	  own	  Boards	  of	  Directors	  and	  CEOs.138	  In	  effect,	  the	  MOHLTC	  created	  two	  parallel,	  geographically	  based,	  healthcare	  organizations	  with	  different	  areas	  of	  foci,	  with	  the	  intended	  outcome	  of	  fostering	  regional	  integration.	  The	  second	  curious	  decision	  by	  the	  MOHLTC	  was	  to	  maintain	  existing	  governance	  structure	  with	  respect	  to	  hospitals,	  which	  allowed	  them	  significant	  autonomy,	  despite	  the	  integration,	  funding	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  	  Fenn,	  Reinvigorating	  Publicly	  Funded	  Medicare	  in	  Ontario:	  New	  Policy	  and	  Public	  Administration	  
Techniques,	  p.	  538.	  135	  	  Ronson,	  Local	  Health	  Integration	  Networks:	  Will	  "made	  in	  Ontario"	  Work?,	  p.	  47.	  136	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  47.	  137	  	  Fenn,	  Reinvigorating	  Publicly	  Funded	  Medicare	  in	  Ontario:	  New	  Policy	  and	  Public	  Administration	  
Techniques,	  p.	  538.	  138	  	  Ronson,	  Local	  Health	  Integration	  Networks:	  Will	  "made	  in	  Ontario"	  Work?,	  p.	  46.	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oversight	  powers	  of	  the	  LHINs.	  Hospitals,	  despite	  the	  governance	  transformation	  agenda,	  maintained	  independent	  Board	  of	  Directors,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  appoint	  CEOs,	  resulting	  in	  a	  significant	  power	  base	  at	  the	  local	  level.139	  	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  the	  regionalization	  agenda	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  LHINs	  had	  a	  number	  of	  discernable	  impacts.	  First,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  there	  was	  no	  specific	  direction	  from	  the	  MOHLTC	  to	  LHINs	  regarding	  the	  development	  and	  deployment	  of	  information	  systems	  and	  information	  management	  tools.	  While	  no	  specific	  ‘marching	  orders’	  were	  delivered,	  funding	  was	  made	  available	  to	  LHINs	  to	  create	  integrated	  information	  management	  systems	  at	  the	  regional	  level.140	  Once	  again,	  the	  government	  adopted	  a	  bargaining	  approach	  to	  governance,	  where	  incentives	  were	  enacted	  to	  achieve	  an	  overall	  policy	  direction.	  The	  other	  important	  impact	  of	  the	  regionalization	  agenda	  was	  the	  resulting	  complexity	  of	  the	  governance	  arrangement.	  The	  development	  of	  independent	  LHINs,	  CCACs,	  and	  relatively	  independent	  hospitals,	  created	  a	  complex	  governance	  structure,	  with	  decentralized	  authority	  vested	  throughout	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  While	  authority	  to	  make	  decisions	  and	  implement	  new	  systems	  moved	  away	  from	  the	  MOHLTC	  and	  the	  SSHA,	  the	  Office	  of	  E-­‐Health	  continued	  to	  develop	  a	  centralized	  EHR	  system,	  laying	  the	  foundation	  for	  future	  implementation	  and	  governance	  challenges	  once	  the	  system	  was	  operational.141	  As	  Jeffrey	  Roy,	  an	  expert	  on	  governance	  and	  ehealth	  in	  Ontario	  noted	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  regionalization	  on	  the	  EHR	  agenda	  has	  simply	  “not	  been	  defined.”142	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  Roy,	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  in	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  A	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  p.	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  Ronson,	  Local	  Health	  Integration	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  Ibid.,	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Six	  years	  after	  the	  initial	  decision	  to	  undertake	  an	  EHR	  project	  for	  Ontario,	  and	  four	  years	  after	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  SSHA,	  little	  progress	  had	  been	  made	  on	  a	  centralized	  system.	  In	  2010,	  Doug	  Tessier,	  Senior	  Vice-­‐President	  of	  Development	  and	  Implementation	  at	  the	  agency	  responsible	  for	  implementing	  the	  governments’	  EHR	  strategy,	  reflected	  on	  early	  efforts	  at	  the	  MOHLTC.	  Tessier	  argued	  that	  there	  were	  consistent	  delays	  in	  making	  key	  political	  decisions,	  starting	  in	  2000.	  Decisions	  within	  the	  MOHLTC	  were	  taking	  up	  two	  years,	  while	  legislation	  to	  enable	  a	  provincial	  EHR	  system	  failed	  to	  materialize.143	  Recall	  that	  the	  MOHLTC	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  software	  end	  of	  the	  EHR	  system,	  and	  had	  established	  the	  Office	  of	  E-­‐Health	  in	  2004	  to	  coordinate	  the	  efforts	  in	  the	  first	  reorganization	  of	  the	  project.	  Between	  2004	  and	  2007,	  the	  MOHLTC	  invested	  approximately	  $100	  million	  to	  develop	  the	  EHR	  software.	  With	  no	  strategic	  plan,	  the	  Office	  made	  little	  discernable	  progress,	  with	  the	  medical	  community	  unable	  to	  use	  even	  a	  skeleton	  EHR	  system.144	  As	  Jim	  McCarter,	  Ontario’s	  Auditor	  General	  noted,	  the	  MOHLTC	  at	  the	  time	  relied	  heavily	  on	  consultants	  to	  both	  develop	  and	  manage	  the	  project,	  all	  without	  proper	  oversight.145	  	  	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  the	  SSHA	  continued	  to	  build	  the	  network	  infrastructure.	  Throughout	  its	  tenure,	  the	  SSHA	  continuously	  over	  promised	  and	  under	  delivered.	  With	  the	  reorganization	  of	  December	  2005	  complete,	  the	  Chair	  of	  the	  SSHA	  publically	  assured	  Ontarians	  in	  2006	  that	  EHRs	  would	  be	  available	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  with	  a	  fully	  functional	  system	  in	  place	  by	  2010.146	  However,	  this	  promise	  failed	  to	  materialize,	  and	  new	  problems	  emerged.	  A	  2007	  report	  on	  the	  SSHA	  by	  Deloitte	  Consulting	  questioned	  the	  efficacy	  of	  its	  spending,	  and	  argued	  for	  a	  new,	  aggressive,	  turn	  around	  strategy.147	  Between	  2004	  and	  early	  2007,	  the	  SSHA	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  p.	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  10.	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Star,	  sec.	  A	  09,	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  23,	  2006.	  147	  	  Staff	  Reporter,	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  Wired	  World,"	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  14,	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spent	  $400	  million	  building	  the	  information	  highway,	  and	  developing	  the	  capacity	  to	  connect	  the	  medical	  community	  to	  it.148	  As	  a	  Crown	  agency,	  the	  SSHA	  was	  operating	  in	  a	  more	  arm’s-­‐length	  capacity,	  and	  had	  developed	  a	  difficult	  relationship	  with	  the	  MOHLTC,	  one	  “marred	  by	  mutual	  mistrust	  and	  confusion	  over	  roles	  and	  responsibilities.”149	  Like	  the	  Office	  of	  eHealth,	  the	  SSHA	  relied	  heavily	  on	  external	  consultants,	  without	  proper	  controls	  and	  procedures	  in	  place.150	  For	  much	  of	  the	  medical	  community,	  the	  SSHA	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  disappointment	  for	  its	  failure	  to	  deliver	  a	  workable	  EHR	  system.151	  Although	  the	  SSHA	  was	  publically	  taking	  much	  of	  the	  blame,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  network	  infrastructure	  was	  one	  of	  few	  pieces	  of	  the	  project	  that	  was	  making	  progress.	  Returning	  to	  our	  analogy,	  by	  2007	  the	  SSHA	  was	  relatively	  successful	  in	  building	  the	  highway,	  albeit	  at	  an	  inflated	  cost.	  The	  problem	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  software,	  of	  transport	  vehicles,	  to	  operate	  on	  the	  highway.	  In	  2007,	  the	  SSHA	  was	  spending	  $2.5	  million	  per	  month	  to	  maintain	  the	  workable	  network,	  which	  was	  functionally	  inactive.152	  	  	  In	  2007,	  the	  Liberal	  government	  of	  Dalton	  McGuinty	  was	  re-­‐elected	  with	  a	  second	  majority	  mandate.	  Once	  again,	  getting	  an	  EHR	  system	  operational	  was	  front	  and	  center	  of	  the	  governments’	  agenda.	  Throughout	  the	  medical	  community,	  and	  at	  the	  MOHLTC,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  EHR	  project	  was	  not	  delivering	  as	  promised.	  In	  2007,	  a	  number	  of	  new	  and	  important	  decisions	  were	  made.	  First,	  the	  government	  decided	  to	  undertake	  a	  second	  reorganization	  of	  the	  project	  at	  the	  MOHLTC,	  supplanting	  the	  Office	  of	  e-­‐Health	  with	  a	  new	  internal	  eHealth	  Programs	  Branch.	  With	  new	  leadership	  and	  focus,	  it	  was	  hoped	  that	  the	  Ministry	  would	  be	  able	  to	  make	  some	  progress	  towards	  developing	  the	  requisite	  software	  system	  for	  the	  EHR	  project,153	  while	  the	  SSHA	  was	  left	  to	  augment	  and	  maintain	  the	  network	  infrastructure.	  Second,	  the	  MOHLTC	  started	  investigating	  new	  avenues	  to	  get	  the	  software	  end	  of	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  p.	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  150	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  152	  	  McCarter,	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  p.	  11.	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the	  system	  working.	  A	  draft	  strategy	  was	  developed	  to	  borrow	  and	  expand	  the	  existing	  EHR	  system	  used	  by	  the	  Hospital[s]	  for	  Sick	  Children.	  According	  to	  the	  draft	  strategy,	  by	  using	  and	  modifying	  the	  electronic	  Child	  Health	  Netword	  (eCHN),	  formally	  HiNet,154	  the	  province	  could	  have	  a	  workable,	  central,	  and	  fully	  interoperable	  EHR	  system	  in	  place	  by	  2010,	  and	  accessible	  throughout	  the	  primary	  care	  system	  by	  2011-­‐2012.155	  	  	  The	  draft	  strategy	  to	  adopt	  the	  eCHN	  province	  wide,	  disregarding	  all	  previous	  software	  development	  work	  from	  2000	  to	  early	  2007,	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  the	  lack	  of	  central	  progress	  made	  on	  the	  EHR	  project,	  and	  the	  dearth	  of	  effective	  coordination	  across	  the	  province.	  The	  strategy	  also	  illustrates	  how	  regionalization	  was	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  problems	  towards	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  centralized	  system,	  with	  SSHA	  and	  the	  MOHLTC	  having	  to	  coordinate	  through	  multiple	  organizations	  and	  political	  power	  centers.156	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  standalone	  EMR	  and	  EHR	  system	  were	  proliferating,	  funded	  by	  the	  MOHLTC	  and	  Infoway,	  and	  unable	  to	  communicate	  with	  one	  another.	  John	  Ronson	  wrote	  in	  2006	  that	  the	  track	  record	  of	  Ontario’s	  hospitals	  voluntarily	  integrating	  the	  ehealth	  systems	  was	  weak.157	  Between	  2006	  and	  2008,	  a	  large	  study	  of	  Ontario’s	  hospitals	  on	  EHR	  implementation	  found	  that	  while	  health	  outcomes	  improved	  where	  these	  system	  were	  in	  place,	  uptake	  was	  uneven,	  both	  at	  the	  institutional	  and	  user	  level.158	  When	  viewed	  in	  aggregate,	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  project	  was	  spiraling	  out	  of	  control,	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  eCHN	  system	  was	  one	  viable	  option	  to	  get	  the	  project	  back	  on	  track.	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  120-­‐123.	  155	  	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  p.	  18.	  156	  	  Powers,	  Canada's	  E-­Health	  Journey	  and	  HIMSS	  Analytics'	  Canada	  Information	  and	  Communications	  
Technology	  Study,	  120-­‐123.	  157	  	  Ronson,	  Local	  Health	  Integration	  Networks:	  Will	  "made	  in	  Ontario"	  Work?,	  p.	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  Hospitals,	  p.	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For	  reasons	  unexplained,	  the	  eCHN	  adoption	  plan	  was	  never	  approved.159	  Moreover,	  alternative	  options,	  like	  adopting	  and	  modifying	  the	  systems	  from	  Cancer	  Care	  Ontario	  or	  the	  Cardiac	  Care	  Network,160	  were	  not	  pursued.	  Curiously,	  the	  eHealth	  Programs	  Branch	  charted	  a	  new	  course,	  and	  decided	  to	  create	  yet	  another	  new	  system,	  the	  Wait	  Time	  Information	  System	  (WTIS).	  The	  WTIS	  was	  primarily	  designed	  to	  improve	  wait	  time	  across	  the	  province.	  However,	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Client	  Registry/Enterprise	  Master	  Patient	  Index	  that	  would	  store	  and	  link	  patient	  information,	  the	  MOHLTC	  believed	  that	  the	  WTIS	  would	  ultimately	  become	  the	  cornerstone,	  once	  reconfigured,	  of	  a	  provincial	  EHR	  system.161	  The	  challenge	  with	  the	  WTIS	  strategy	  was	  not	  merely	  technological,	  but	  organizational,	  to	  develop	  a	  working	  ehealth	  system	  and	  to	  get	  the	  varied	  actors	  within	  the	  healthcare	  system	  to	  adopt	  the	  technology.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  coordination	  challenges,	  consider	  that	  the	  WTIS	  required	  bringing	  together	  the	  key	  stakeholders	  for	  the	  new	  initiative,	  including	  the	  MOHLTC,	  the	  SSHA,	  LHINs,	  CCACs,	  individual	  hospitals,	  and	  from	  the	  federal	  side,	  Infoway	  and	  the	  Canadian	  Institute	  of	  Health	  Informatics.	  As	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  WTIS	  project	  noted,	  they	  found	  themselves	  “competing	  for	  priority	  with	  its	  stakeholders	  at	  the	  hospitals,	  LHINs	  and	  the	  Ministry.”162	  To	  secure	  compliance	  with	  the	  project,	  a	  bargaining	  and	  coercive	  governance	  approach	  was	  adopted,	  with	  special	  funding	  allocated	  through	  funding	  envelopes	  to	  hospitals	  for	  the	  WTIS	  strategy,	  and	  performance	  and	  implementation	  assured	  through	  Hospital	  Accountability	  Agreements.163	  The	  WTIS	  was	  successful,	  insofar	  that	  it	  was	  developed	  quickly	  and	  was	  at	  least	  partly	  responsible	  for	  reducing	  wait	  times	  across	  the	  province.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  local	  healthcare	  organizations	  chose	  to	  stop	  the	  development	  of	  their	  own	  local	  EMR	  and	  EHR	  systems,	  with	  the	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belief	  that	  the	  WTIS	  would	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  central,	  province	  wide,	  EHR	  system.	  	  In	  a	  June	  2008	  cabinet	  shuffle,	  David	  Caplan	  was	  appointed	  Minister	  of	  Health	  and	  Long-­‐Term	  Care,	  taking	  over	  the	  portfolio	  from	  George	  Smitherman.	  By	  that	  time,	  the	  EHR	  project	  was	  seriously	  out	  of	  control.	  Between	  2007-­‐2008,	  the	  SSHA	  agency	  continued	  its	  practice	  of	  improper	  outsourcing	  and	  contracting,	  spending	  roughly	  $200	  million	  dollars	  to	  continue	  building	  and	  maintaining	  the	  network.164	  The	  problems	  experienced	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  e-­‐Health	  continued	  at	  the	  newly	  constituted	  eHealth	  Programs	  Branch,	  albeit	  on	  a	  larger	  scale.	  By	  2008,	  the	  Branch	  was	  engaging	  more	  than	  300	  external	  consultants	  compared	  to	  fewer	  than	  30	  full-­‐time	  ministry	  employees,	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  sole	  sourcing	  contracts	  while	  failing	  to	  adhere	  to	  established	  procedure	  continued.165	  Most	  disappointingly,	  eight	  years	  after	  committing	  the	  province	  to	  develop	  a	  central	  EHR	  system,	  the	  government	  did	  not	  have	  a	  strategic	  plan	  in	  place	  to	  achieve	  the	  objective,	  and	  had	  still	  not	  developed	  the	  requisite	  software	  to	  make	  the	  system	  functional.	  Fragmentation	  across	  the	  healthcare	  system	  was	  resulting	  in	  poor	  coordination,	  and	  key	  stakeholders,	  particular	  those	  involved	  with	  the	  EHR	  project,	  realized	  that	  something	  had	  to	  change.166	  Therefore,	  despite	  being	  the	  champion	  of	  regionalization	  and	  decentralization	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system,	  the	  Liberal	  government	  under	  the	  new	  Minister,	  David	  Caplan,	  chose	  to	  implement	  an	  EHR	  centralization	  agenda.	  	  	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  2008,	  the	  government	  implemented	  a	  fourth	  reorganization	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  eHealth	  Ontario,	  a	  new	  central	  agency.167	  eHealth	  Ontario	  took	  over	  both	  the	  SSHA	  and	  Ministry’s	  own	  EHR	  initiatives,	  with	  a	  mandate	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to	  have	  an	  EHR	  in	  place	  for	  Ontarians	  by	  2015,168	  effectively	  pushing	  back	  the	  deadline	  by	  five	  years.	  Sara	  Kramer,	  who	  previously	  headed	  the	  WTIS	  intiative	  was	  appointed	  CEO	  of	  the	  eHealth	  Ontario,	  while	  Allan	  Hudson	  was	  appointed	  Chair	  of	  Board	  of	  Directors.	  As	  Davis	  noted	  back	  in	  2004,	  “governments	  can	  devolve	  authority	  for	  healthcare,	  but	  they	  cannot	  devolve	  responsibility.”169	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  province	  had	  one	  focal	  point	  for	  development	  and	  management	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  and	  one	  organization	  that	  was	  ultimately	  responsible.	  By	  locating	  authority	  for	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  project	  in	  eHealth	  Ontario,	  the	  government	  followed	  in	  the	  centralizing	  footsteps	  of	  Prince	  Edward	  Island170	  and	  Alberta.171	  Like	  other	  public	  ICT	  projects,172	  the	  EHR	  project	  had	  increasingly	  become	  a	  governance	  problem,	  where	  both	  knowledge	  and	  power	  were	  distributed	  throughout	  the	  system.	  Centralization,	  it	  was	  hoped,	  would	  deliver	  results,	  promptly	  and	  efficiently.	  	  
EHEALTH	  ONTARIO	  FAILURES,	  THE	  ENSUING	  SCANDAL	  AND	  THE	  
AFTERMATH	  	  	  The	  most	  authoritative	  account	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  as	  previously	  mentioned,	  was	  the	  Special	  Report	  issued	  by	  Ontario	  Auditor	  General	  Jim	  McCarter	  in	  October	  2009.	  While	  the	  report	  focused	  primarily	  on	  the	  contracting	  aspects	  of	  the	  project,	  and	  the	  value-­‐for-­‐money	  achieved	  by	  the	  SSHA,	  the	  MOHLTC,	  and	  eHealth	  Ontario,	  McCarter	  went	  to	  some	  lengths	  to	  provide	  context	  to	  challenges	  facing	  the	  EHR	  initiative.	  At	  the	  outset,	  eHealth	  Ontario	  was	  playing	  catch	  up.	  As	  McCarter	  noted:	  The	  CEO	  of	  the	  eHealth	  Ontario	  agency	  [Sarah	  Kramer]	  was	  appointed	  in	  2008	  and	  reportedly	  told	  that	  there	  were	  serious	  problems	  with	  the	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eHealth	  agenda	  and	  that	  overcoming	  these	  problems	  required	  urgent	  action.	  She	  wanted	  to	  build	  her	  own	  team	  –	  people	  she	  had	  worked	  with	  in	  the	  past	  or	  whom	  she	  personally	  recruited	  –	  rather	  than	  rely	  on	  ministry	  or	  SSHA	  staff	  or	  their	  consultants.	  The	  CEO	  felt	  she	  had	  the	  implied,	  if	  not	  the	  formal,	  authority	  to	  do	  whatever	  was	  necessary	  to	  get	  the	  job	  done.	  If	  this	  meant	  personally	  selecting	  the	  firms	  and	  individual	  consultants	  that	  she	  wanted,	  so	  be	  it.173	  	  With	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  new	  agency,	  little	  work	  was	  accomplished	  between	  October	  2008	  and	  June	  2009,	  as	  multiple	  projects	  were	  put	  on	  hold	  and	  CEO	  Sarah	  Kramer	  charted	  yet	  another	  new	  course	  for	  the	  EHR	  project.174	  Kramer	  immediately	  focused	  eHealth	  Ontario	  on	  a	  few	  “quick-­‐win”	  projects,	  including	  a	  diabetes	  management	  system,	  a	  medical	  management	  system,	  and	  a	  medication	  management	  system.175	  Like	  the	  WTIS	  strategy,	  which	  it	  was	  hoped	  could	  evolve	  into	  a	  central	  EHR	  system	  for	  the	  province,	  eHealth	  Ontario	  banked	  on	  the	  diabetes	  system.	  According	  to	  the	  MOHLTC,	  “achieving	  an	  EHRs	  for	  diabetes	  patients	  will	  provide	  a	  foundation	  for	  achieving	  EHRs	  for	  patients	  with	  chronic	  diseases.	  From	  there,	  EHRs	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  all	  Ontarians.”176	  In	  his	  audit	  McCarter	  expressed	  surprise	  with	  the	  MOHLTC	  and	  eHealth	  Ontario	  “de-­‐emphasizing”	  the	  EHR	  objective	  and	  questioned	  how	  the	  new	  plan	  would	  enable	  “the	  agency	  to	  deliver	  a	  fully	  functional	  EHR	  for	  all	  Ontarians	  by	  2015.”177	  Despite	  this	  obvious	  concern,	  eHealth	  Ontario	  ramped	  up	  spending	  to	  make	  it	  a	  reality.	  	  By	  2008,	  eHealth	  Ontario	  was	  spending	  $6	  million/month	  to	  maintain	  the	  network	  infrastructure	  previously	  under	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  SSHA,	  despite	  it	  being	  severely	  under	  used.178	  With	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  new	  “quick	  win”	  projects,	  Kramer	  immediately	  began	  awarding	  multi-­‐million	  dollar	  contracts	  without	  an	  open	  and	  competitive	  process,	  and	  adopted	  questionable	  procurement	  practices.	  Summarizing	  the	  operating	  culture	  at	  eHealth	  Ontario,	  the	  Auditor	  wrote:	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  p.	  12.	  174	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  10.	  175	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  8.	  176	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  20.	  177	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  20.	  178	  	  Ibid..	  p.	  9.	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To	  sum	  up,	  too	  many	  procurements	  at	  the	  eHealth	  Ontario	  agency	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  at	  the	  Ministry’s	  eHealth	  Programs	  Branch	  and	  at	  SSHA	  were	  the	  product	  of	  rushed	  decision	  making;	  the	  acceptance	  of	  expediency	  over	  thoroughness;	  the	  routine	  defence	  that	  the	  work	  was	  of	  an	  emergency	  and	  therefore	  justified	  the	  bypassing	  of	  normal	  procurement	  controls;	  procedural	  shortcuts;	  absent,	  or	  contradictory	  documentation;	  and,	  of	  particular	  concern,	  the	  concentration	  of	  decision-­‐making	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  few	  individuals	  with	  no	  compensating	  controls	  to	  ensure	  their	  decisions	  were	  appropriate.	  Sound	  and	  all	  reasonable	  policies	  were	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  suppliers	  could	  fairly	  compete	  for	  government	  business	  and	  that	  tax	  dollars	  would	  be	  prudently	  spend,	  but	  all	  too	  often	  the	  rules	  were	  not	  followed.179	  	  While	  CEO	  Sarah	  Kramer	  and	  Chair	  of	  the	  Board,	  Allan	  Hudson,	  were	  given	  carte	  blanche	  to	  get	  projects	  moving	  forward,	  scandals	  started	  to	  emerge	  at	  eHealth	  Ontario.	  In	  April	  2009,	  Kramer	  became	  the	  source	  of	  public	  indignation	  when	  a	  story	  broke	  that	  she	  spent	  $51,000	  redecorating	  her	  private	  office.180	  A	  month	  later,	  a	  Toronto	  Star	  investigation	  found	  an	  eHealth	  Ontario	  consultant	  billing	  $2,750/day	  plus	  expenses	  for	  his	  advice,	  for	  a	  net	  cost	  of	  $61,875	  for	  22.5	  days	  of	  work.181	  Once	  the	  bad	  headlines	  started,	  they	  kept	  on	  coming.	  In	  June,	  it	  publically	  emerged	  that	  the	  Premier’s	  former	  chief	  of	  staff	  and	  health	  advisor	  were	  both	  consulting	  for	  eHealth	  Ontario,	  charging	  over	  $300/hour	  to	  discuss	  communication	  strategies	  for	  the	  embattled	  agency.182	  Another	  headline	  publically	  roasted	  Kramer	  for	  hiring	  five	  consultants	  to	  draft	  a	  3,356	  word	  speech	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  $25,001,	  and	  another	  six	  consultants	  to	  draft	  a	  3,319	  word	  speech	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  $24,675.183	  Besieged	  by	  scandal,	  and	  with	  no	  progress	  towards	  a	  workable	  EHR,	  the	  project	  had	  evolved	  into	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  policy	  fiasco.	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  p.	  13..	  180	  	  Tanya	  Talaga,	  "Critics	  Roast	  Government	  Over	  $647M	  Boondoggle;	  Ontario's	  Abandoned	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  e-­‐Records	  Plan	  Called	  a	  Waste	  of	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  Star,	  sec.	  A	  01,	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  8,	  2009.	  181	  	  Tanya	  Talaga,	  "Health	  Agency	  Paid	  Consultants	  $2,750	  a	  Day,	  Documents	  show;	  CEO	  of	  eHealth	  Ontario	  also	  Got	  Six-­‐Figure	  Bonus,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  06,	  May	  29,	  2009.	  182	  	  Tanya	  Talaga,	  "EHealth	  Scandal	  Reaches	  Premier's	  Inner	  Circle,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  01,	  June	  11,	  2009.	  183	  	  Tanya	  Talaga,	  "1	  Speech	  5	  Consultants	  3,356	  Words	  the	  Cost	  to	  You	  $25,001;	  1	  Speech,	  6	  Consultants,	  3,319	  Words	  $24,675.28,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  01,	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  8,	  2009.	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The	  ultimate	  result	  of	  the	  central	  EHR	  project,	  and	  hence	  activities	  undertaken	  in	  various	  forms	  by	  the	  MOHLTC,	  the	  SSHA,	  and	  eHealth	  Ontario,	  was	  roughly	  $1	  billion	  in	  spending	  between	  2002	  and	  2009	  with	  few	  results.	  As	  the	  Auditor	  General	  wrote	  in	  his	  report,	  “the	  value	  of	  this	  investment,	  at	  least	  to	  date,	  has	  not	  been	  realized.”184	  The	  immediate	  fallout	  of	  the	  Auditor’s	  Report	  was	  the	  resignation	  of	  eHealth	  Ontario	  CEO	  Sarah	  Kramer,	  Board	  Chair	  Allan	  Hudson,	  Health	  Minister	  David	  Caplan	  and	  the	  Deputy	  Minister	  of	  Health,	  Ron	  Sapsford.	  Moreover,	  the	  EHR	  project	  was	  once	  again	  put	  on	  hold,	  with	  a	  fifth	  reorganization	  required	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  top	  management	  team	  resigning	  from	  eHealth	  Ontario.185	  	  	  In	  2010,	  Richard	  Alvarez,	  CEO	  of	  Infoway,	  noted	  that	  the	  “name	  of	  the	  game	  is	  not	  technology.	  The	  name	  of	  the	  game	  is	  change	  management.”186	  Alvarez	  is	  at	  least	  partially	  correct.	  While	  technology	  questions	  are	  certainly	  important	  parts	  of	  the	  equation,	  equally	  important	  are	  questions	  of	  governance	  and	  compliance.	  By	  2010,	  ten	  years	  after	  committing	  to	  a	  provincial	  EHR	  system,	  eight	  years	  after	  work	  had	  began,	  and	  $1	  billion	  spent,	  there	  was	  no	  working	  centralized	  system.	  As	  Nancy	  Gill	  noted,	  the	  EHR	  project	  experienced	  a	  “reduced	  pace	  of	  change,”	  while	  the	  scandals	  drove	  “funders,	  innovators	  and	  change	  champions	  to	  other	  projects.”187	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  question	  that	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  initiative	  is	  a	  project	  fiasco.	  The	  question	  is:	  what	  now?	  While	  the	  central	  authorities,	  the	  MOHLTC,	  the	  SSHA	  and	  eHealth	  Ontario	  dithered	  and	  wasted	  significant	  resources,	  local	  units	  within	  the	  healthcare	  system	  have	  worked	  hard	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  EMR	  and	  EHR	  systems.	  During	  this	  review	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  we	  have	  briefly	  mentioned	  some	  of	  the	  local	  initiatives,	  like	  those	  undertaken	  by	  the	  SKHN	  (the	  eCHN),	  between	  2000	  and	  2010.	  According	  to	  a	  recent	  analysis	  by	  the	  Canadian	  Medical	  Association	  (CMA),	  there	  are	  now	  at	  least	  20	  different	  EHR	  systems	  operating	  in	  Ontario,	  across	  different	  LHINs,	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  185	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  In	  Conversation	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  Alvarez,	  p.	  26.	  187	  	  Gill,	  Leonard	  and	  Jonker,	  Does	  E-­Health	  Adoption	  Enable	  Improved	  Health	  Outcomes?	  Encouraging	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  from	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  pp.	  50,	  51.	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specialized	  agencies,	  and	  hospital	  networks.	  Moreover,	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  developing	  just	  one	  of	  these	  systems	  is	  upwards	  of	  $100	  million.	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  provincial	  initiative,	  the	  government	  noted	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  central	  system	  to	  ensure	  interoperability.	  However,	  as	  the	  CMA	  notes,	  “integrating	  those	  [20]	  systems	  is	  problematic	  as	  many	  are	  incompatible,”	  while	  certain	  health	  organizations	  have	  used	  off-­‐the-­‐shelf	  products	  that	  can	  not	  integrated	  because	  of	  commercial	  competition	  considerations	  between	  system	  vendors.188	  With	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  EHR	  story	  in	  Ontario	  between	  2000	  and	  2010,	  the	  problems	  of	  governance	  and	  technology	  choice	  have	  come	  full	  circle.	  Once	  again,	  the	  province	  of	  Ontario	  is	  at	  a	  crossroads.	  Millions	  of	  dollars	  have	  been	  spent	  on	  a	  centralized	  system	  with	  few	  deliverables,	  while	  millions	  more	  have	  been	  spent	  on	  ehealth	  systems	  that	  functionally	  operate	  in	  silos.	  At	  question,	  as	  the	  next	  decades	  unfolds,	  is	  whether	  the	  provincial	  government	  will	  redouble	  its	  efforts,	  ultimately	  adopting	  a	  rip-­‐and-­‐replace	  strategy,	  or	  whether	  the	  healthcare	  system	  will	  continue	  to	  operate	  in	  an	  uncoordinated	  manner,	  befitting	  its	  current	  governance	  structure.	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A	  FRAMEWORK	  FOR	  THE	  IMPLEMENTATION	  PHASE	  
	  
	   	  In	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	  we	  reviewed	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  project.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  project	  had	  two	  distinct	  components:	  a	  design	  phase	  and	  an	  implementation	  phase.	  The	  design	  phase	  involved	  developing	  a	  solution,	  an	  EHR	  system,	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  managing	  vast	  amounts	  of	  patient	  information.	  The	  implementation	  phase,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  involved	  various	  actors	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  healthcare	  system	  trying	  to	  adopt	  technological	  solutions.	  A	  few	  interesting	  points	  worthy	  of	  further	  investigation	  emerge	  from	  this	  story	  of	  policy	  fiasco.	  	   	  The	  first	  interesting	  feature	  of	  this	  project	  was	  the	  decentralized	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  province	  to	  achieve	  the	  goal	  of	  an	  EHR	  system	  that	  was	  interoperable	  across	  the	  province.189	  While	  the	  political	  centre,	  the	  MOHLTC,	  suggested	  that	  it	  was	  developing	  one	  coherent	  system,	  it	  simultaneously	  funded	  the	  development	  of	  local	  EHR	  and	  EMR	  projects	  across	  the	  province.	  Hence,	  during	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  project,	  there	  were	  a	  host	  of	  actors	  developing	  their	  own	  unique	  solutions	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  	  Yaron	  Derman	  and	  others,	  "Saving	  Ontario	  Healthcare	  Dollars	  through	  E-­‐Health	  Standardization:	  A	  Quantitative	  Study,"	  Electronic	  Healthcare	  7,	  no.	  2	  (2008),	  p.	  2.	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patient	  information	  management	  problem.	  The	  first	  question,	  therefore,	  is	  whether	  a	  decentralized,	  or	  independent,	  approach	  is	  appropriate	  for	  solving	  this	  type	  of	  EHR	  problem.	  The	  second	  interesting	  feature	  of	  this	  project	  is	  the	  implication	  of	  independent	  actors	  implementing	  their	  own	  solutions.	  What	  are	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  for	  the	  healthcare	  system	  of	  this	  decentralized	  implementation	  approach?	  	  There	  is	  obviously	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  design	  phase	  and	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  an	  ICT	  project.	  It	  is	  only	  natural	  for	  government	  to	  think	  of	  these	  projects	  in	  linear	  terms:	  (1)	  how	  should	  one	  design	  a	  solution;	  and	  (2)	  how	  should	  one	  implement	  the	  solution.	  However,	  it	  is	  often	  useful	  to	  think	  about	  implementation	  first.	  By	  using	  backwards	  induction,	  decision	  makers	  can	  first	  theorize	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  solution	  that	  is	  required	  for	  any	  given	  problem,	  and	  then	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  best	  tackle	  the	  problem.190	  As	  this	  chapter	  will	  demonstrate,	  all	  solutions	  are	  not	  created	  equal.	  For	  government,	  different	  types	  of	  solutions	  require	  different	  policy	  responses.	  	  	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  we	  develop	  a	  game	  theoretic	  framework	  to	  examine	  the	  two	  basic	  types	  of	  solutions:	  independent	  and	  interdependent.	  With	  this	  basic	  distinction	  in	  mind,	  we	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  a	  highly	  simplified	  example	  of	  two	  organizations	  working	  to	  implement	  EHR	  systems.	  As	  we	  will	  demonstrate,	  even	  in	  a	  highly	  simplified	  example,	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  amongst	  actors	  is	  critically	  important	  to	  develop	  an	  effective	  EHR	  system.	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  we	  add	  to	  the	  framework	  and	  examine	  how	  government	  can	  use	  its	  authority	  to	  effectively	  coordinate	  and/or	  cooperate	  on	  solutions.	  We	  argue	  that	  government	  can	  exercise	  its	  authority	  through	  the	  use	  of	  persuasion,	  incentives,	  or	  
rules.	  Further,	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  use	  of	  authority	  must	  be	  matched	  in	  a	  logical	  and	  discriminating	  manner	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  interdependent	  solutions.	  Finally,	  we	  briefly	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  See,	  for	  example:	  Robert	  Gibbons,	  Game	  Theory	  for	  Applied	  Economists	  (New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1992).	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apply	  the	  modified	  framework	  to	  our	  EHR	  example,	  and	  conclude	  that	  a	  decentralized	  approach	  is	  particularly	  ill	  suited	  to	  overcoming	  the	  patient	  information	  management	  problem.	  	  	  
TYPES	  OF	  SOLUTIONS:	  INDEPENDENT	  AND	  INTERDEPENDENT	  	  We	  begin	  with	  the	  premise	  that	  there	  are	  fundamentally	  two	  different	  types	  of	  solutions:	  independent	  and	  interdependent.	  When	  solutions	  are	  independent,	  their	  selection,	  or	  adoption,	  by	  any	  actor	  has	  no	  material	  impact	  on	  any	  other	  actor.	  When	  solutions	  are	  interdependent,	  their	  selection,	  or	  adoption,	  by	  any	  actor	  has	  a	  material	  impact	  on	  all	  other	  actors.	  Hence,	  there	  are	  strategic	  interdependencies	  at	  play.	  We	  can	  illustrate	  the	  difference	  between	  independent	  and	  interdependent	  solutions	  with	  a	  few	  simple	  game	  theoretic	  examples.	  	  Let’s	  first	  consider	  an	  independent	  solution,	  relevant	  to	  government.	  We	  have	  two	  actors,	  the	  Parking	  Enforcement	  Department	  and	  the	  Police	  Department,	  who	  both	  need	  to	  acquire	  new	  vehicles	  to	  conduct	  their	  affairs.	  For	  sake	  of	  simplicity,	  assume	  that	  they	  can	  only	  select	  amongst	  two	  different	  models,	  the	  Smart	  Car	  and	  the	  Crown	  Victoria.	  The	  Smart	  Car	  is	  a	  small	  vehicle	  with	  limited	  space	  (a	  two	  seater),	  which	  has	  a	  small	  engine,	  and	  is	  very	  fuel-­‐efficient.	  The	  Smart	  Car	  is	  ideal	  for	  a	  parking	  enforcement	  officer,	  who	  has	  to	  make	  frequent	  stops	  and	  issue	  tickets	  for	  delinquently	  parked	  vehicles.	  The	  Crown	  Victoria,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  large	  vehicle	  with	  loads	  of	  space	  (a	  four	  seater)	  and	  comes	  with	  a	  powerful	  engine.	  The	  Crown	  Victoria	  is	  ideal	  for	  police	  officers,	  who	  require	  a	  more	  versatile	  vehicle	  to	  chase	  down	  suspects,	  haul	  gear,	  and	  place	  citizens	  under	  arrest	  in	  the	  back	  of	  their	  cruisers.	  A	  hypothetical	  payoff	  matrix	  for	  Parking	  Enforcement	  Department	  and	  the	  Police	  Department	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  1	  (see	  following	  page).	  	  As	  the	  payoff	  matrix	  in	  Figure	  1	  indicates,	  both	  actors	  settle	  on	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  (the	  payoff	  is	  10,10,	  and	  has	  been	  circled).	  In	  this	  example,	  each	  actor	  can	  select	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their	  most	  favored	  solution,	  and	  have	  no	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  other	  actor.	  To	  be	  specific,	  the	  solutions	  here	  are	  independent	  because	  the	  benefit	  to	  each	  actor	  is	  not	  predicated	  on	  both	  actors	  choosing	  the	  same	  vehicle	  (or	  solution),	  and	  likewise,	  choosing	  alternative	  vehicles	  poses	  no	  cost	  (loss	  of	  benefit)	  to	  any	  other	  actor	  in	  the	  system.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  1	  -­‐	  Vehicle	  Solution	  Payoffs	  	  While	  independent	  solutions	  are	  relatively	  straightforward,	  interdependent	  solutions,	  which	  arise	  from	  either	  cooperation	  or	  coordination	  games,	  are	  considerably	  more	  complicated.	  First,	  we	  consider	  the	  canonical	  cooperation	  game,	  the	  prisoner’s	  dilemma.191	  In	  this	  example,	  we	  have	  two	  actors,	  A	  and	  B,	  who	  have	  both	  been	  arrested	  by	  the	  police.	  The	  police	  have	  insufficient	  evidence	  for	  a	  big	  conviction,	  a	  ten	  year	  sentence,	  but	  have	  enough	  evidence	  to	  put	  both	  actors	  behind	  bars	  for	  one	  year.	  The	  police	  separate	  the	  two	  actors	  so	  they	  cannot	  communicate,	  and	  then	  proceed	  to	  offer	  them	  the	  same	  deal.	  If	  one	  actor	  testifies	  against	  the	  other	  (defects),	  while	  the	  other	  remains	  silent	  (cooperates),	  then	  the	  defector	  goes	  free	  while	  his	  silent	  accomplice	  receives	  a	  ten	  year	  sentence.	  If	  both	  actors	  remain	  silent	  (both	  cooperate),	  they	  each	  receive	  a	  one	  year	  sentence.	  If	  both	  actors	  agree	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  191	  For	  an	  accessible	  discussion	  of	  the	  prisoner’s	  dilemma,	  with	  applications,	  see:	  William	  Poundstone,	  Prisoner's	  Delimma	  (New	  York:	  Doubleday,	  1992).	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testify,	  they	  both	  receive	  a	  five	  year	  sentence.	  The	  payoff	  matrix	  for	  both	  actors,	  A	  and	  B,	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  2	  below.	  
	  
FIGURE	  2	  -­‐	  Cooperation	  Game	  	  We	  assume	  both	  actors	  are	  rational,	  and	  that	  their	  only	  consideration	  is	  minimizing	  their	  time	  spent	  in	  jail.	  In	  this	  example,	  the	  dominant	  strategy	  is	  to	  defect.	  Hence,	  irrespective	  of	  actor	  A’s	  choice,	  actor	  B	  is	  always	  better	  off	  by	  defecting,	  and	  vice	  
versa.	  Since	  both	  actors,	  A	  and	  B,	  chose	  to	  defect,	  they	  settle	  on	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  (the	  years	  is	  jail	  is	  5,5,	  and	  has	  been	  circled	  in	  the	  Figure).	  Of	  course,	  the	  equilibrium	  point	  is	  a	  Pareto	  suboptimal	  outcome.	  If	  both	  actors	  had	  cooperated	  (stayed	  silent),	  they	  would	  have	  each	  been	  rewarded	  with	  four	  fewer	  years	  in	  jail.	  	  	  Cooperation	  games,	  therefore,	  lead	  to	  the	  first	  type	  of	  interdependent	  solutions.	  Here,	  the	  solution	  payoff	  for	  an	  actor	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  his	  actions,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  other	  actors;	  hence,	  there	  is	  mutual	  interdependence.	  In	  this	  type	  of	  scenario,	  absent	  some	  external	  force	  or	  mechanism,	  rational	  actors	  will	  fail	  to	  cooperate	  on	  a	  solution,	  leaving	  everyone	  involved	  in	  a	  suboptimal	  position.	  	  	  Coordination	  games	  help	  to	  inform	  the	  second	  type	  of	  interdependent	  solutions.	  Consider	  a	  canonical	  coordination	  game	  in	  which	  there	  are	  two	  actors,	  A	  and	  B,	  who	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are	  both	  driving	  down	  a	  rural	  road	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.192	  Both	  actors	  can	  choose	  to	  drive	  on	  either	  the	  left	  or	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  road.	  If	  both	  actors	  coordinate	  their	  behavior	  and	  adopt	  the	  same	  strategy,	  choosing	  to	  drive	  on	  the	  same	  side	  of	  the	  road,	  they	  pass	  each	  other	  without	  incident.	  If	  both	  actors	  fail	  to	  coordinate	  their	  behavior	  and	  adopt	  divergent	  strategies,	  the	  result	  is	  a	  head-­‐on	  collision.	  We	  can	  illustrate	  this	  game	  in	  the	  Figure	  3	  below,	  in	  which	  strategic	  payoff	  for	  ‘passing’	  results	  in	  10,	  and	  a	  ‘collision’	  results	  in	  0.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  3	  -­‐	  Coordination	  Game	  	  Again,	  we	  assume	  that	  both	  actors,	  A	  and	  B,	  are	  rational	  and	  seek	  to	  avoid	  a	  head-­‐on	  collision.	  In	  this	  example,	  the	  dominant	  strategy	  is	  to	  coordinate	  on	  either	  (left,	  left)	  or	  (right,	  right);	  there	  are	  two	  Nash	  equilibriums.	  When	  both	  actors	  choose	  the	  same	  corresponding	  strategy,	  they	  arrive	  at	  a	  Pareto	  efficient	  outcome	  (in	  Figure	  3,	  both	  outcomes	  have	  been	  circled,	  and	  the	  resulting	  payoff	  is	  10,10).	  If	  they	  fail	  to	  cooperate,	  they	  collide	  (payoff	  is	  0,0).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  For	  a	  more	  extended	  discussion	  on	  cooperation	  games,	  see:	  Russell	  W.	  Cooper,	  Coordination	  
Games:	  Complementarities	  and	  Macroeconomics	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999).	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As	  this	  example	  demonstrates,	  coordination	  games	  are	  necessarily	  distinct	  for	  cooperation	  games	  because	  the	  dominant	  strategy	  is	  to	  cooperate.	  Cooperation	  games,	  therefore,	  lead	  to	  the	  second	  type	  of	  interdependent	  solutions.	  Once	  again,	  the	  solution	  payoff	  for	  an	  actor	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  his	  actions,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  other	  actors;	  hence,	  there	  is	  still	  mutual	  interdependence.	  However,	  in	  this	  type	  of	  scenario,	  the	  only	  consideration	  is	  how	  actors	  ought	  to	  coordinate	  on	  a	  solution	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  Pareto	  efficient	  outcome.	  	  In	  the	  preceding	  section,	  we	  identified	  two	  basic	  types	  of	  solutions,	  independent	  and	  interdependent.	  For	  government,	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  solution	  raises	  important	  governance	  considerations.	  In	  the	  simplest	  case,	  when	  solutions	  are	  independent,	  the	  only	  criterion	  for	  government	  is	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  of	  some	  form,	  and	  then	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  best	  available	  option	  (solution).	  However,	  when	  strategic	  interdependencies	  are	  in	  play,	  as	  in	  our	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  examples,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  role	  for	  government.	  To	  fully	  illustrate	  the	  issues	  involved,	  we	  proceed	  to	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  where	  we	  analyze,	  in	  game	  theoretic	  terms,	  the	  behavior	  of	  two	  groups	  trying	  to	  implement	  an	  EHR	  system.	  	  
INTERDEPENDENT	  SOLUTIONS:	  COORDINATING	  AND	  COOPERATING	  ON	  
AN	  EHR	  SYSTEM	  	  In	  order	  to	  illustrate	  the	  challenges	  of	  implementing	  an	  EHR	  system,	  consider	  a	  highly	  simplified	  scenario,	  in	  which	  there	  are	  two	  organizations,	  the	  Association	  of	  Pediatricians,	  and	  the	  Association	  of	  Oncologists,	  both	  operating	  in	  a	  public	  healthcare	  system.	  Both	  Associations	  operate	  independently,	  and	  are	  certain	  that	  they	  can	  improve	  productivity	  and	  patient	  welfare	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  an	  EHR	  system.	  Furthermore,	  to	  keep	  things	  simple,	  assume	  that	  each	  Association	  has	  only	  two	  actors.	  Actors	  A	  and	  B	  belong	  to	  the	  Association	  of	  Pediatricians,	  while	  actors	  X	  and	  Z	  belong	  to	  the	  Association	  of	  Oncologists.	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  actors	  A	  and	  B	  at	  the	  Association	  of	  Pediatricians	  have	  a	  choice	  to	  use	  one	  of	  two	  EHR	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systems,	  M	  and	  N.	  Similarly,	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  actors	  X	  and	  Z	  at	  the	  Association	  of	  Oncologists	  have	  a	  choice	  to	  use	  one	  of	  two	  EHR	  systems,	  O	  and	  P.	  	  	  	  In	  this	  example,	  we	  make	  three	  assumptions:	  (1)	  Each	  EHR	  system	  is	  tailored	  in	  a	  way	  that	  maximizes	  its	  usefulness	  (benefit)	  to	  specific	  types	  of	  users.	  Hence,	  EHR	  systems	  M	  and	  N	  are	  specifically	  tailored	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  Pediatricians,	  while	  EHR	  systems	  O	  and	  P	  are	  tailored	  to	  needs	  of	  Oncologists.	  (2)	  As	  a	  patient	  database,	  EHR	  systems	  are	  more	  effective	  when	  they	  contain	  more	  records.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  benefit	  when	  actors	  coordinate	  on	  one	  system,	  and	  input	  all	  their	  information	  into	  one	  system.	  After	  all,	  a	  database	  system	  with	  no	  data	  is	  largely	  irrelevant.	  (3)	  We	  assume	  that	  EHR	  systems	  M,	  N,	  O	  and	  P	  are	  not	  interoperable.	  Therefore,	  information	  stored	  in	  one	  EHR	  system	  cannot	  move	  to	  another	  system.	  	  With	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  this	  example	  now	  in	  place,	  consider	  the	  choices	  faced	  by	  the	  two	  Associations	  as	  they	  seek	  to	  implement	  an	  EHR	  solution.	  First,	  actors	  A	  and	  B,	  operating	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  must	  choose	  between	  EHR	  systems	  M	  and	  N.	  We	  can	  illustrate	  a	  hypothetical	  payoff	  matrix	  for	  these	  actors	  in	  Figure	  4	  (see	  following	  page).	  As	  Figure	  4	  demonstrates,	  the	  dominant	  strategy	  for	  actors	  A	  and	  B	  is	  to	  coordinate	  on	  either	  EHR	  system	  M	  or	  N	  (both	  Nash	  equilibriums	  have	  been	  circled).193	  If	  the	  actors	  coordinate	  on	  system	  M,	  the	  Pareto	  superior	  outcome,	  the	  resulting	  payoff	  is	  10,10.	  If	  the	  actors	  coordinate	  on	  system	  N,	  the	  Pareto	  inferior	  outcome,	  the	  resulting	  payoff	  is	  8,	  8.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  a	  given	  that	  actors	  A	  and	  B	  will	  coordinate	  on	  M,	  the	  Pareto	  efficient	  outcome,194	  we	  assume	  they	  do.195	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193	  The	  coordinative	  benefits	  here	  are	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  assumption	  two	  (2)	  in	  this	  EHR	  implementation	  example.	  194	  A	  frequently	  cited	  example	  involves	  consumers	  choosing	  to	  coordinate	  on	  a	  Video	  Cassette	  Recorder	  (VCR)	  standard.	  Two	  independent	  solutions	  (standards)	  were	  offered	  in	  the	  1970s,	  the	  Betamax	  developed	  by	  Sony,	  and	  the	  Video	  Home	  System	  (VHS)	  developed	  by	  JVC.	  While	  many	  argue	  that	  the	  Betamax	  solution	  was	  superior,	  consumers	  ultimately	  settled	  on	  the	  VHS	  standard,	  perhaps	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium,	  Pareto	  inferior,	  outcome.	  For	  more,	  see:	  Michael	  A.	  Cusumano,	  Yiorgos	  Mylonadis	  and	  Richard	  S.	  Rosenbloom,	  "Maneuvering	  and	  Mass-­‐Market	  Dynamics:	  The	  Triumph	  of	  VHS	  Over	  Beta,"	  The	  Business	  History	  Review	  66,	  no.	  1	  (1992),	  pp.	  51-­‐94.	  195	  We	  return	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  government	  can	  effectively	  coordinate	  on	  a	  solution	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	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FIGURE	  4	  –	  Payoff	  Matrix	  for	  Actors	  A	  and	  B	  
	  Next,	  the	  oncologists,	  actors	  X	  and	  Z,	  operating	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  must	  choose	  between	  EHR	  systems	  O	  and	  P.	  We	  can	  illustrate	  a	  hypothetical	  payoff	  matrix	  for	  these	  actors	  in	  Figure	  5	  below	  (note	  that	  both	  Nash	  equilibriums	  have	  been	  circled).	  Applying	  the	  same	  logic	  as	  we	  did	  with	  the	  pediatricians,	  the	  oncologists	  coordinate	  on	  system	  O,	  the	  Pareto	  superior	  outcome,	  with	  payoff	  10,10.	  
	  
FIGURE	  5	  –	  Payoff	  Matrix	  for	  Actors	  X	  and	  Z	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Therefore,	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  the	  pediatricians	  coordinate	  on	  ERH	  system	  M,	  while	  the	  oncologists	  coordinate	  on	  EHR	  system	  O.	  Both	  Associations	  get	  comfortable	  using	  their	  preferred	  system,	  and	  find	  that	  productivity	  and	  patient	  welfare	  have	  both	  improved.	  	  Witnessing	  the	  benefits	  of	  EHR	  systems,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health,	  the	  manager	  of	  the	  public	  healthcare	  system,	  concludes	  that	  getting	  both	  Associations	  to	  adopt	  one	  system	  would	  improve	  the	  public	  welfare.	  After	  all,	  one	  EHR	  system	  with	  more	  patient	  records	  is	  theoretically	  more	  valuable	  than	  multiple	  EHR	  systems,	  with	  fewer	  records,	  ceteris	  paribus.196	  Consider,	  now,	  the	  choices	  (payoffs)	  facing	  the	  two	  Associations	  in	  Figure	  6	  (see	  following	  page).	  In	  this	  cooperation	  problem,	  both	  Associations	  are	  better	  off	  using	  their	  preferred	  system,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  adoption	  decision	  by	  the	  other	  actor.	  Each	  Association,	  left	  to	  their	  own	  devices	  and	  behaving	  rationally,	  plays	  their	  dominant	  strategy	  and	  the	  resulting	  payoff	  is	  10,	  10	  (the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  point	  has	  been	  circled	  in	  Figure	  6).	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  if	  the	  Association	  of	  Pediatricians	  could	  be	  compelled	  to	  adopt	  system	  O,	  and	  the	  Association	  of	  Oncologists	  played	  their	  dominant	  strategy,	  the	  net	  payoff	  would	  be	  28	  (the	  lower	  right	  quadrant,	  payoffs	  8,	  20).	  Similarly,	  if	  the	  Oncologists	  could	  be	  compelled	  to	  adopt	  system	  M,	  the	  net	  payoff	  would	  be	  28	  (the	  top	  left	  quadrant,	  payoffs	  20,8).	  However,	  absent	  some	  external	  force	  that	  imposes	  a	  solution,	  the	  adoption	  of	  either	  system	  M	  or	  O,	  both	  Associations	  fail	  to	  cooperate.	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Health,	  therefore,	  is	  left	  is	  a	  suboptimal	  position.	  	   As	  a	  quick	  aside,	  it	  worth	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  second	  assumption	  in	  this	  example:	  the	  lack	  of	  EHR	  system	  interoperability.	  The	  solutions	  in	  this	  example	  are	  interdependent	  precisely	  because	  systems	  M	  and	  O	  cannot	  communicate.	  If,	  however,	  this	  assumption	  were	  dropped,	  then	  both	  solutions,	  M	  and	  O,	  would	  be	  independent.	  In	  this	  case,	  both	  Associations	  would	  be	  free	  to	  adopt	  their	  uniquely	  tailored	  EHR	  systems,	  and	  would	  both	  gain	  the	  coordinative	  benefit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  Recall	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  EHR	  systems	  are	  not	  interoperable.	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of	  having	  more	  patient	  records	  at	  their	  disposal.	  Simply	  put,	  the	  adoption	  of	  systems	  M	  and	  O	  would	  be	  the	  Pareto	  optimal	  outcome.	  
	  
	  
FIGURE	  6	  –	  Payoff	  Matrix	  for	  the	  Associations	  
	  	  This	  example	  of	  interdependent	  solutions,	  albeit	  highly	  simplified,	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  two	  broad	  yet	  important	  points.	  First	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  an	  EHR	  system,	  and	  the	  implementation	  phase.	  Using	  backwards	  induction,	  if	  the	  healthcare	  system	  is	  ultimately	  better	  off	  with	  only	  one	  final	  solution,	  hence	  one	  single	  EHR	  system,	  then	  it	  is	  only	  rational	  to	  develop/design	  one	  system,	  and	  deploy	  one	  system.	  Put	  another	  way,	  it	  is	  cost	  ineffective	  to	  adopt	  a	  decentralized	  approach,	  in	  which	  multiple	  actors	  design	  multiple	  systems,	  and	  then	  try	  to	  cooperate	  on	  one	  final	  solution.	  This	  first	  point	  is	  important	  because	  it	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  project	  that	  was	  defined,	  in	  part,	  by	  a	  decentralized	  approach.	  Although	  a	  more	  in	  depth	  and	  nuanced	  analysis	  will	  be	  provided	  in	  chapter	  6,	  it	  is	  worth	  recalling	  that	  by	  2010,	  the	  province	  of	  Ontario	  had	  upwards	  of	  twenty	  different	  EHR	  systems	  in	  operation	  that	  were	  largely	  incompatible	  (not	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interoperable).197	  Moreover,	  it	  also	  worth	  recalling	  that,	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  project,	  the	  government	  noted	  the	  necessity	  of	  developing	  a	  central	  system	  precisely	  to	  ensure	  interoperability	  across	  the	  province.198	  Therefore,	  this	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  project	  fiasco	  can	  be	  explained,	  in	  part,	  by	  a	  large	  number	  of	  independent	  actors	  each	  designing	  and	  implementing	  their	  own	  solutions	  (EHR	  systems)	  without	  considering	  the	  strategic	  interdependencies	  in	  play.	  	  The	  second	  important	  point	  involves	  government,	  and	  how	  it	  can	  best	  deploy	  its	  authority	  to	  manage	  the	  interdependent	  solutions.	  As	  the	  example	  demonstrated,	  absent	  some	  external	  force,	  both	  Associations	  failed	  to	  cooperate	  on	  a	  single	  EHR	  system.	  This	  failure	  to	  cooperate	  resulted	  in	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  being	  worse	  off.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  first	  point	  laid	  out	  above,	  when	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  issues	  arise,	  there	  is	  a	  role	  for	  a	  central	  authority,	  a	  role	  for	  government.	  Government,	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  unique	  position	  in	  society,	  has	  the	  legitimate	  right	  to	  exercise	  its	  authority	  to	  manage	  interdependent	  solutions.	  Authority,	  of	  course,	  comes	  in	  different	  forms.	  For	  government	  intervention	  to	  be	  effective,	  the	  use	  of	  authority	  must	  be	  matched	  in	  a	  logical	  and	  discriminating	  manner	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  interdependent	  solutions.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  we	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  which	  examines	  the	  types,	  or	  forms,	  of	  government	  authority,	  and	  how	  it	  can	  best	  be	  applied	  to	  interdependent	  solutions.	  	  	  
THE	  USE	  OF	  GOVERNMENT	  AUTHORITY	  AND	  INTERDEPENDENT	  
SOLUTIONS	  	  We	  start	  with	  the	  rather	  uncontroversial	  premise	  that	  government	  has	  the	  legitimate	  right	  to	  exercise	  authority	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  state.	  Hence,	  within	  reasonable	  limits,	  government	  is	  legitimately	  entitled	  to	  suggest,	  or	  compel,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  	  "Ontario's	  Plan	  for	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  is	  at	  Risk,	  Official	  Says,"	  Canadian	  Medical	  
Association	  Journal,	  2010,	  p.	  254.	  198	  	  Hugh	  MacLeod	  and	  others,	  "The	  Times	  they	  are	  A-­‐Changing:	  What	  Worked	  and	  what	  we	  Learned	  in	  Deploying	  Ontario's	  Wait	  Time	  Information	  System,"	  Healthcare	  Quarterly	  12,	  no.	  Special	  Issue	  (2009),	  p.	  13.	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citizens	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  certain	  manner.	  The	  use	  of	  authority	  by	  government	  can	  assume	  one	  of	  three	  fundamentally	  different	  political	  forms:	  persuasion,	  incentives,	  or	  rules.199	  Each	  of	  these	  forms,	  described	  in	  greater	  detail	  below,	  is	  a	  tool	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  alter	  the	  behavior	  of	  an	  actor,	  of	  group	  of	  actors.	  In	  practice,	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  each	  tool	  is	  highly	  depending	  on	  the	  political	  context	  of	  any	  given	  situation.	  In	  the	  abstract,	  each	  tool	  is	  simply	  a	  different	  means	  to	  an	  end.	  	  The	  first	  form	  of	  authority	  is	  persuasion,	  or	  the	  use	  of	  argument	  and	  rhetoric	  to	  compel	  actors	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  Burnell	  and	  Reeve	  define	  persuasion	  as:	  [Actor	  A]	  gets	  [actor	  B]	  to	  do	  or	  believe	  or	  accept	  or	  reject	  something	  which	  he	  would	  not	  otherwise	  do	  or	  believe	  or	  accept	  or	  reject,	  by	  exhibiting	  reasons	  or	  by	  exhibiting	  consequences	  of	  alternatives	  confronting	  [actor	  B].200	  The	  use	  of	  persuasion	  as	  a	  political	  tool,	  or	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  authority,	  is	  familiar	  to	  all	  political	  scientists.	  International	  relations	  scholars	  sometimes	  refer	  to	  persuasion	  as	  ‘soft	  power’,201	  while	  Americanists	  frequently	  refer	  to	  the	  ‘power	  of	  the	  bully	  pulpit’.202	  Irrespective	  of	  language	  choice,	  persuasion	  refers	  to	  the	  use	  of	  authority	  through	  argument,	  reason,	  and	  moral	  justification,	  which	  is	  necessarily	  outside	  of	  the	  power	  family	  of	  options	  (incentives	  and	  rules).	  Used	  as	  a	  tool,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  In	  what	  follows,	  we	  adopt	  an	  economic	  approach	  to	  consider	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  government	  authority.	  While	  this	  approach	  is	  relatively	  straightforward,	  it	  abstract	  away	  from	  some	  important	  ethical	  considerations	  on	  the	  use	  of	  authority.	  For	  excellent	  discussion	  on	  ethics	  and	  the	  use	  of	  authority,	  see:	  Ruth	  R.	  Grant,	  “Ethics	  and	  Incentives:	  A	  Political	  Approach,”	  American	  Political	  Science	  
Review	  100,	  no.	  1	  (2006):	  pp.	  29-­‐39.	  200	  	  Peter	  Burnell	  and	  Andrew	  Reeve,	  "Persuasion	  as	  a	  Political	  Concept,"	  British	  Journal	  of	  Political	  
Science	  14,	  no.	  4	  (1984),	  p.	  394.	  201	  The	  term	  ‘soft	  power’	  was	  coined	  by	  Joseph	  Nye	  in	  1991;	  see:	  Joseph	  S.	  Nye,	  Bound	  to	  Lead:	  The	  
Changing	  Nature	  of	  American	  Power	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1991).	  For	  a	  more	  recent	  and	  nuanced	  account,	  see:	  Joseph	  S.	  Nye,	  Soft	  Power:	  The	  Means	  to	  Success	  in	  World	  Politics	  (New	  York:	  PublicAffairs,	  2004).	  202	  For	  an	  examination	  on	  persuasion,	  and	  its	  limits,	  in	  American	  presidential	  politics,	  see:	  George	  C.	  Edwards,	  On	  Deaf	  Ears:	  The	  Limits	  of	  the	  Bully	  Pulpit	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2006).	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persuasion	  is	  often	  an	  attractive	  option	  for	  elected	  decision-­‐makers,	  precisely	  because	  there	  are	  limited	  financial	  costs.203	  	  Persuasion	  can	  be	  an	  effective	  tool	  to	  address	  interdependent	  solutions	  that	  require	  coordination.	  As	  Foss	  notes,	  leadership	  (used	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  persuasion)	  can	  be	  used	  to	  coordinate	  the	  complementary	  actions	  of	  many	  actors,	  simply	  through	  development	  of	  shared	  beliefs	  conditions.204	  Consider,	  again,	  the	  example	  of	  the	  two	  Pediatricians,	  A	  and	  B,	  and	  their	  choice	  between	  two	  independent	  EHR	  systems,	  M	  and	  N	  (refer	  back	  to	  Figure	  4).	  Recall	  that	  there	  were	  two	  Nash	  equilibriums,	  where	  actors	  A	  and	  B	  could	  coordinated	  on	  either	  systems	  M	  or	  N.	  Coordination	  on	  either	  EHR	  system	  was	  a	  possibility,	  despite	  one	  being	  Pareto	  superior	  (10,10)	  and	  the	  other	  being	  Pareto	  inferior	  (8,8).	  In	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  system	  M	  will	  be	  adopted,	  government	  can	  deploy	  its	  authority,	  through	  persuasion,	  in	  order	  to	  help	  ‘tip	  the	  scales’	  towards	  the	  optimal	  outcome.	  Hence,	  if	  government	  can	  establish	  a	  shared	  belief	  amongst	  independent	  actors	  that	  coordination	  on	  system	  M	  is	  preferable	  than	  coordination	  on	  system	  N,	  then	  it	  can	  arrive	  at	  the	  optimal	  solution	  without	  resorting	  to	  the	  use	  of	  incentives	  or	  rules.	  The	  importance	  of	  persuasion,	  beliefs	  and	  leadership	  in	  coordinating	  behavior	  on	  ehealth	  systems	  is	  a	  recurring	  theme	  in	  the	  literature,	  and	  applies	  at	  the	  both	  the	  organizational	  and	  provincial	  levels.205,	  206,	  207,	  208,	  209,	  210,	  211,	  212	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  consider	  a	  TV	  advertising	  campaign	  conducted	  by	  government	  to	  advance	  a	  public	  message.	  It	  might	  cost	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  dollars,	  but	  all	  things	  considered,	  persuasion	  remains	  a	  relatively	  inexpensive	  way	  to	  exercise	  authority.	  	  204	  	  Nicolai	  Foss,	  "Leadership,	  Beliefs	  and	  Coordination:	  An	  Explorative	  Discussion,"	  Industrial	  and	  
Corporate	  Change	  10,	  no.	  2	  (2001),	  pp.	  357-­‐388.	  205	  	  Asif	  Ahmand	  and	  others,	  "Key	  Attributes	  of	  a	  Successful	  Physician	  Order	  Entry	  System	  Implementation	  in	  a	  Multi-­‐Hospital	  Environment,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Informatics	  
Association	  9	  (2002),	  pp.	  16-­‐24.	  206	  	  Michael	  D.	  Gray	  and	  Bill	  G.	  Felkey,	  "Computerized	  Prescriber	  Order-­‐Entry	  Systems:	  Evaluation,	  Selection,	  and	  Implementation,"	  American	  Journal	  of	  Health-­System	  Pharmacy	  61,	  no.	  2	  (2004),	  pp.	  190-­‐197.	  207	  	  Nancy	  M.	  Lorenzi	  and	  Robert	  T.	  Riley,	  "Organizational	  Issues	  =	  Change,"	  International	  Journal	  of	  
Medical	  Informatics	  29,	  no.	  2	  (2003),	  pp.	  197-­‐203.	  208	  	  John	  S.	  Lou,	  "Computer	  Physician	  Order	  Entry:	  To	  Implement	  Or	  Not?"	  Primary	  Psychiatry	  13,	  no.	  3	  (2006),	  pp.	  19-­‐21.	  209	  	  Eric	  G.	  Poon	  and	  others,	  "Overcoming	  Barriers	  to	  Adopting	  and	  Implementing	  Computer	  Physician	  Order	  Entry	  Systems	  in	  U.S.	  Hospitals,"	  Health	  Affairs	  23,	  no.	  4	  (2004),	  pp.	  184-­‐190.	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  Incentives	  are	  the	  second	  form	  of	  authority,	  and	  involve	  government	  using	  financial	  mechanisms	  to	  try	  and	  compel	  actors	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  Here,	  actor	  A	  gets	  actor	  B	  to	  accept	  or	  reject	  something	  which	  he	  would	  not	  otherwise	  accept	  or	  reject,	  by	  changing	  the	  financial	  calculus	  of	  actor	  B.213	  Incentives	  are	  a	  commonly	  employed	  strategy	  in	  government.	  In	  the	  positive	  sense,	  government	  might	  offer	  a	  financial	  incentive,	  like	  a	  tax	  credit	  (hence	  a	  subsidy)	  to	  encourage	  citizens	  to	  take	  music	  lessons.	  Similarly,	  but	  in	  the	  negative	  sense,	  government	  might	  increase	  taxes	  on	  cigarettes	  in	  order	  to	  discourage	  consumption	  (hence,	  a	  disincentive).	  Incentives,	  as	  means	  to	  exercise	  authority,	  have	  limits.	  Incentives	  can	  only	  encourage	  the	  behavior	  of	  actors,	  because	  decision	  rights	  ultimately	  rest	  with	  the	  independent	  actors.214	  Hence,	  when	  interdependent	  solutions	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  society,	  government	  cannot	  ensure	  compliance	  solely	  through	  the	  use	  of	  incentives.	  	  	  Incentives	  can	  be	  effective	  to	  address	  interdependent	  solutions	  that	  require	  coordination	  and/or	  cooperation.215	  Consider,	  again,	  the	  simple	  example	  of	  the	  two	  Associations	  and	  their	  choice	  to	  adopt	  EHR	  systems	  M	  or	  O	  (refer	  back	  to	  Figure	  6).	  Both	  Associations,	  playing	  their	  dominant	  strategy,	  fail	  to	  cooperate.	  The	  result	  was	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  outcome	  with	  payoff	  10,10,	  a	  suboptimal	  solution.	  Clearly,	  there	  is	  an	  opportunity	  for	  government	  to	  assert	  its	  authority	  and	  offer	  an	  incentive	  to	  encourage	  cooperation	  on	  one	  system.	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  consider	  an	  incentive	  equivalent	  to	  three	  units	  of	  benefit	  paid	  to	  the	  Association	  of	  Oncologists	  if	  they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  	  David	  M.	  Schuster	  and	  others,	  "Involving	  Users	  in	  the	  Implementation	  of	  an	  Imaging	  Order	  Entry	  System,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Informatics	  Association	  10,	  no.	  4	  (2003),	  pp.	  315-­‐321.	  211	  	  Tim	  Scott	  and	  others,	  "Kaiser	  Permanente's	  Experience	  of	  Implementing	  an	  Electronic	  Medical	  Record:	  A	  Qualitative	  Study,"	  BMJ	  -­	  British	  Medical	  Journal	  331	  (2003),	  pp.	  1313-­‐1316.	  212	  	  Robert	  L.	  Wears	  and	  Marc	  Berg,	  "Computer	  Technology	  and	  Clinical	  Work,"	  JAMA	  -­	  the	  Journal	  of	  
the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  293,	  no.	  10	  (2005),	  pp.	  1261-­‐1263.	  213	  	  Peter	  Burnell	  and	  Andrew	  Reeve,	  "Persuasion	  as	  a	  Political	  Concept,"	  British	  Journal	  of	  Political	  
Science	  14,	  no.	  4	  (1984),	  p.	  400.	  214	  	  Evert	  Vedung,	  "Policy	  Instruments:	  Typologies	  and	  Theories,"	  in	  Carrots,	  Sticks	  and	  Sermons:	  
Policy	  Instruments	  and	  their	  Evaluation,	  eds.	  Marie-­‐Louise	  Bemelmans-­‐Videc,	  Ray	  C.	  Rist	  and	  Evert	  Vedung	  (New	  Jersey:	  Transaction	  Publishing,	  2007),	  p.	  24.	  215	  While	  we	  forgo	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  incentives	  can	  overcome	  coordination	  problems,	  consider	  that	  even	  incredibly	  small	  incentives	  may	  be	  sufficient	  to	  ‘tip	  the	  scales’	  and	  ensure	  a	  desired	  outcome	  is	  adopted.	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adopt	  system	  M.	  Assuming	  the	  Oncologists	  are	  rational	  actors,	  they	  are	  now	  better	  off	  by	  adopting	  system	  M	  (hence,	  benefitsM>benefitsO,	  or	  11>10).	  Moreover,	  despite	  a	  government	  expenditure	  equivalent	  to	  three	  units	  of	  benefit,	  the	  net	  benefit	  of	  this	  expenditure	  is	  five	  units.216	  Clearly,	  incentives	  can	  be	  a	  useful	  expression	  of	  government	  authority	  to	  address	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  interdependent	  solutions.	  The	  use	  of	  incentives,	  to	  encourage	  system	  adoption	  and	  facilitate	  cooperation,	  is	  widely	  discussed	  in	  the	  ehealth	  literature,217,	  218,	  219	  while	  specific	  attention	  is	  frequently	  paid	  to	  the	  use	  government	  incentives	  to	  ensure	  adoption,	  coordination,	  and	  cooperation	  on	  ehealth	  systems.220,	  221	  	  Finally,	  we	  have	  the	  third	  form	  of	  authority,	  rules,	  which	  involves	  forcing	  actors	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  Here,	  actor	  A	  (the	  government)	  gets	  actor	  B	  to	  accept	  or	  reject	  something	  which	  he	  would	  not	  otherwise	  accept	  or	  reject,	  by	  forcing	  actor	  A’s	  preferences	  on	  actor	  B.	  Rules,	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  authority,	  is	  also	  frequently	  labeled	  as	  coercive	  authority,	  and	  most	  frequently	  arises	  from	  government	  legislation	  or	  regulation.222	  Government	  frequently	  establishes	  rules	  that	  restrict	  the	  behavior	  of	  actors,	  for	  example,	  by	  outlawing	  theft,	  abuse	  and	  murder.	  Similarly,	  government	  might	  establish	  rules	  to	  overcome	  coordination	  problems,	  for	  example,	  by	  ensuring	  that	  everyone	  drives	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  road.	  The	  two	  key	  attributes	  of	  the	  rules	  based	  expression	  of	  government	  authority	  are:	  (1)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  216	  Cooperating	  on	  system	  M	  results	  in	  a	  net	  benefit	  of	  28.	  The	  Nash	  equilibrium	  outcome	  (absent	  the	  incentive)	  results	  in	  a	  net	  benefit	  of	  20.	  The	  incentive	  cost	  to	  ensure	  cooperation	  on	  M	  is	  3.	  Therefore,	  28	  –	  20	  -­‐	  3	  =	  5	  (units	  of	  benefit).	  	  217	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independent	  actors	  no	  longer	  have	  freedom	  of	  choice,	  they	  must	  obey;223	  (2)	  there	  is	  no	  immediate	  financial	  cost	  for	  government,	  notwithstanding	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  legislative/regulatory	  process.	  While	  the	  cost	  factor	  might	  suggest	  that	  the	  use	  of	  coercive	  authority	  to	  legislate	  or	  regulate	  a	  solution	  is	  always	  preferable,	  elected	  decision	  makers	  in	  government	  are	  frequently	  reticent	  to	  simply	  impose	  a	  solution.	  The	  imposition	  of	  a	  solution	  through	  rules	  might	  have	  no	  immediate	  financial	  costs,	  but	  there	  are	  certainly	  political	  costs:	  a	  frustrated	  constituency	  that	  has	  to	  absorb	  transition	  costs,	  and	  have	  their	  freedoms	  curtailed	  by	  the	  coercive	  powers	  of	  the	  state.	  Therefore,	  the	  rules	  based	  approach	  is	  frequently	  a	  measure	  of	  last	  resort	  for	  elected	  decision	  makers.	  	  	  Rules	  are	  often	  the	  most	  efficient	  way	  for	  government	  to	  address	  interdependent	  solutions	  that	  require	  coordination	  and/or	  cooperation.	  Consider,	  for	  the	  last	  time,	  the	  simple	  example	  of	  two	  Associations	  and	  their	  choice	  to	  adopt	  EHR	  systems	  M	  or	  O	  (refer	  back	  to	  Figure	  6).	  Recall	  that	  both	  Associations	  failed	  to	  cooperate,	  resulting	  in	  the	  Nash	  equilibrium	  outcome	  of	  10,10	  (a	  net	  benefit	  of	  20).	  Now,	  consider	  if	  government	  simply	  passed	  a	  law	  that	  compelled	  both	  Associations	  to	  cooperate	  on	  system	  M.	  The	  Association	  of	  Oncologists	  would	  lose	  two	  units	  of	  benefit,	  but	  net	  result	  of	  the	  forced	  cooperation	  is	  28.	  Hence,	  by	  intervening	  and	  establishing	  a	  rule,	  government	  increased	  the	  net	  benefit	  by	  8	  units.224	  Moreover,	  recall	  that	  using	  incentives	  to	  compel	  both	  Associations	  to	  cooperate	  on	  system	  M	  cost	  the	  government	  the	  equivalent	  of	  three	  units	  of	  benefit.	  Therefore,	  in	  this	  theoretical	  exercise,	  government	  could	  save	  the	  equivalent	  of	  three	  units	  of	  benefit	  by	  simply	  imposing	  a	  solution.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  reticence	  of	  elected	  decision	  makers	  to	  impose	  solutions,	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  debate	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  government	  intervention	  to	  force	  adoption,	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  on	  ehealth	  systems.	  Those	  who	  champion	  the	  rules	  based	  approach	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  223	  While	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  everyone	  has	  choice,	  the	  penalty	  for	  disobeying	  government	  rules	  is	  such	  that	  we	  assume	  obedience	  from	  rational	  actors.	  224	  Both	  Associations	  cooperating	  on	  M	  results	  in	  28	  units	  of	  benefit.	  Absent	  government	  intervention,	  the	  net	  benefit	  is	  20.	  Therefore,	  28	  –	  20	  =	  8	  (units	  of	  benefit).	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suggest	  that,	  absent	  government	  intervention,	  ehealth	  systems	  will	  remain	  independent	  (not	  interoperable)	  and	  individual	  actors	  will	  fail	  to	  cooperate.225,	  226	  However,	  others	  argue	  that	  healthcare	  organizations	  are	  large	  and	  complex,	  with	  their	  own	  unique	  organizational	  cultures,	  and	  power	  structures,	  that	  will	  simply	  fail	  to	  efficiently	  respond	  to	  government	  edicts.	  In	  effect,	  they	  argue	  that	  the	  imposition	  of	  ehealth	  solutions	  will	  create	  internal	  organizational	  strife,	  and	  make	  a	  difficult	  implementation	  situation	  even	  more	  challenging.227,	  228	  	  To	  summarize,	  we	  have	  identified	  three	  forms	  of	  government	  authority,	  persuasion,	  incentives	  and	  rules,	  which	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  overcome	  the	  inherent	  challenges	  posed	  by	  interdependent	  solutions.	  When	  interdependent	  solutions	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  society	  and	  coordination	  is	  required,	  the	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  government	  ought	  to	  use	  persuasion	  or	  incentives.	  Likewise,	  when	  cooperation	  is	  required,	  the	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  government	  ought	  to	  use	  incentives	  or	  rules.	  We	  are	  largely	  agnostic	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  authority	  that	  government	  can	  exert	  in	  either	  scenario	  (when	  either	  coordination	  or	  cooperation	  is	  called	  for).	  It	  is	  sufficient	  to	  illustrate	  that	  there	  is	  choice,	  and	  when	  governments	  are	  faced	  with	  interdependent	  solutions,	  they	  much	  chose.	  Failure	  to	  act	  will	  ultimately	  increase	  the	  costs	  of	  finding	  workable	  solutions,	  and	  will	  leave	  all	  members	  of	  society	  worse	  off.	  	  	  
GENERAL	  OBSERVATIONS	  	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  we	  questioned	  whether	  the	  decentralized	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  province	  of	  Ontario	  was	  appropriate	  to	  develop	  an	  EHR	  system	  to	  serve	  the	  public	  interest.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  this	  question,	  we	  employed	  a	  simple	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  Clinical	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game	  theoretic	  framework	  to	  analyze	  the	  implications	  of	  independent	  actors	  developing	  and	  implementing	  independent	  EHR	  systems.	  While	  this	  study	  will	  have	  more	  to	  say	  on	  this	  issue	  in	  chapter	  six,	  we	  concluded	  from	  our	  theoretical	  exercise	  that	  EHR	  solutions	  are	  highly	  interdependent	  and	  would	  be	  ill	  served	  by	  an	  independent,	  or	  decentralized,	  approach.	  Moreover,	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  interdependent	  solutions,	  we	  suggested	  that	  it	  is	  highly	  appropriate	  for	  government	  to	  actively	  intervene	  and	  exert	  its	  authority	  to	  facilitate	  adoption,	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  on	  EHR	  systems.	  	  By	  employing	  backwards	  induction	  and	  looking	  at	  the	  type	  of	  solution	  required	  to	  successfully	  overcome	  the	  patient	  information	  problem,	  one	  lesson	  becomes	  rather	  evident:	  there	  is	  value	  in	  developing	  one	  solution,	  hence	  one	  EHR	  system.	  In	  an	  ideal	  scenario,	  governments	  would	  use	  backwards	  induction	  to	  analyze	  the	  type	  of	  solution	  required	  to	  overcome	  any	  given	  problem,	  and	  then	  take	  action.	  Hence,	  if	  governments	  would	  consider	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  their	  EHR	  solution(s),	  they	  would	  ostensibly	  be	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  avert	  long	  term	  problems.	  	  If	  we	  can	  accept,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  that	  implementing	  one	  EHR	  system	  in	  Ontario	  would	  have	  led	  to	  a	  superior	  outcome,	  then	  our	  attention	  should	  naturally	  turn	  to	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  project.	  At	  question,	  therefore,	  is	  how	  government	  can	  most	  efficiently	  develop	  an	  EHR	  solution.	  In	  the	  opinion	  of	  this	  research	  study,	  how	  governments	  organize	  themselves	  to	  arrive	  at	  policy/project	  solutions	  is	  under	  theorized.	  In	  this	  chapter	  we	  have	  identified	  that	  there	  are	  different	  types	  of	  solutions	  (independent	  and	  interdependent).	  It	  is	  only	  natural	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  also	  different	  types	  of	  problems,	  which	  require	  different	  organizational	  structures,	  to	  efficiently	  arrive	  at	  solutions.	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  we	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  project,	  and	  develop	  a	  framework	  that	  matches	  the	  nature	  of	  problems	  to	  specific	  types	  of	  organizational	  forms,	  which	  in	  turn	  dictates	  the	  efficiency	  of	  arriving	  at	  valuable	  solutions.	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  As	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  three,	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  faced	  two	  separate	  but	  related	  problems	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  EHR	  project	  –	  a	  design	  problem	  and	  an	  implementation	  problem.	  The	  design	  problem	  focused	  on	  devising	  a	  comprehensive	  ehealth	  system	  that	  would	  enable	  medical	  data	  to	  be	  shared	  and	  utilized	  across	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  The	  implementation	  problem,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  focused	  on	  putting	  the	  designed	  system	  into	  operation.	  To	  ensure	  an	  effective	  solution	  to	  these	  problems,	  government	  decision	  makers	  ought	  to	  consider	  them	  in	  reverse	  order,	  since	  effective	  design	  work	  can	  only	  be	  carried	  out	  if	  the	  subsequent	  implementation	  phase	  is	  well	  understood.	  Following	  this	  logic,	  the	  preceding	  chapter	  examined	  the	  incentives	  for	  implementation	  that	  different	  groups	  involved	  in	  the	  health	  system	  possess.	  Given	  this	  knowledge	  of	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  attention	  can	  now	  be	  directed	  to	  the	  design	  phase.	  	  	  In	  what	  follows,	  we	  develop	  a	  coherent	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  think	  about	  technology	  problems,	  and	  how	  government	  should	  be	  organized	  to	  develop,	  or	  design,	  technology	  solutions.	  This	  framework	  is	  a	  valuable	  tool	  because	  it	  links	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problems,	  organization,	  and	  solutions	  together.	  Once	  developed,	  the	  framework	  can	  assist	  in	  dissecting	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  two	  basic	  design	  problems	  facing	  the	  EHR	  project:	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  secure	  electronic	  network,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  EHR	  software.	  These	  two	  design	  problems	  required	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  to	  search	  for	  solutions.	  During	  the	  project,	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  established	  a	  central	  agency,	  the	  SSHA,	  to	  locate	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  network	  problems,	  while	  a	  traditional	  line	  department,	  the	  MOHLTC,	  was	  tasked	  with	  locating	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  software	  problem.	  At	  question	  in	  chapter	  six	  is	  whether	  these	  organizations	  were	  appropriately	  structured	  to	  tackle	  the	  design	  problems	  just	  identified.	  Our	  attention,	  in	  this	  chapter,	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  framework	  with	  which	  to	  undertake	  this	  analysis.	  	  	  
THE	  DESIGN	  PROBLEM	  	  The	  framework	  used	  to	  examine	  the	  issues	  facing	  decision	  makers	  at	  the	  design	  phase	  is	  based	  on	  the	  model	  of	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger.229	  At	  the	  core	  of	  their	  model	  is	  the	  problem	  that	  the	  decision	  makers	  wish	  to	  address	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  EHR	  project,	  the	  problem	  would	  be	  the	  development	  of	  an	  electronic	  network,	  and	  the	  associated	  software,	  that	  would	  facilitate	  the	  sharing	  of	  health	  records).	  Solutions	  to	  this	  problem	  are	  defined	  by	  different	  combinations	  of	  design	  elements	  (or	  knowledge	  sets),	  with	  different	  combinations	  (and	  thus	  solutions)	  generating	  different	  costs	  and	  benefits	  (and	  hence	  net	  benefits).	  	  	  It	  is	  relatively	  straightforward	  to	  visualize	  problems,	  and	  their	  corresponding	  solution	  landscapes,	  three	  dimensionally.	  In	  this	  three	  dimensional	  space,	  an	  (x,	  y)	  point	  represents	  a	  particular	  combination	  of	  the	  design	  elements	  X	  and	  Y.	  The	  net	  benefit	  (or	  value)	  of	  this	  combination	  is	  given	  by	  the	  height	  z	  of	  the	  three	  dimensional	  curve.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  229	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  pp.	  617-­‐632.	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PROBLEMS	  AND	  SOLUTION	  LANDSCAPES	  	  Choosing	  the	  right	  combination	  of	  design	  elements	  –	  i.e.,	  the	  combination	  that	  generates	  the	  greatest	  net	  benefit	  –	  can	  be	  difficult,	  however.	  As	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  outline:	  Peaks	  on	  such	  solution	  landscapes	  represent	  valuable	  combinations	  of	  knowledge	  sets	  or	  technologies	  that	  are	  highly	  complementary.	  Valleys	  on	  such	  landscapes	  represent	  low-­‐value	  combinations	  of	  existing	  knowledge.	  When	  knowledge	  sets	  are	  highly	  interdependent,	  solution	  landscapes	  are	  more	  rugged	  and	  unpredictable.	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  global	  maximum	  rises,	  but	  the	  average	  height	  of	  peaks	  declines.	  On	  these	  more	  rugged	  landscapes,	  a	  series	  of	  incremental	  changes	  in	  design	  are	  unlikely	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  highly	  valuable	  solutions.230	  	  Indeed,	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  argue	  that	  different	  types	  of	  solution	  landscapes	  require	  different	  search	  (or	  design)	  procedures.	  Borrowing	  from	  Herbet	  Simon’s	  typology	  of	  complex	  systems,	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  three	  fundamental	  types	  of	  problems:	  decomposable	  or	  low-­‐interaction	  problems,	  nondecomposable	  or	  high-­‐interaction	  problems,	  and	  nearly	  decomposable	  problems	  with	  moderate	  levels	  of	  knowledge	  interaction.231	  	  	   	  Decomposable	  or	  low-­‐interaction	  problems	  are	  ones	  where	  the	  value	  of	  a	  solution	  depends	  very	  little	  on	  the	  interaction	  among	  knowledge	  sets	  and	  design	  choices.	  As	  Nickerson	  and	  Zerger	  note,	  “with	  such	  problems,	  groups	  of	  individuals	  possessing	  rather	  distinct	  knowledge	  sets	  can	  independently	  apply	  their	  knowledge	  to	  unique	  design	  choices	  with	  a	  reasonable	  expectation	  that	  the	  aggregation	  of	  their	  independent	  efforts,	  along	  with	  the	  independent	  efforts	  of	  others	  with	  distinctly	  different	  knowledge	  sets,	  will	  uncover	  valuable”232	  solutions.	  The	  key	  here	  is	  that	  no	  coordination	  is	  required	  amongst	  relevant	  actors	  to	  discover	  valuable	  solutions.	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  A	  simple	  example	  illustrates	  the	  nature	  of	  decomposable,	  or	  low	  interaction,	  problems.	  Consider	  the	  problem	  of	  developing	  a	  high	  performing	  desktop	  computer.	  Within	  a	  range,	  performance	  could	  be	  improved	  by	  individuals	  independently	  developing	  a	  better	  hard	  drive,	  or	  a	  new	  video	  card,	  or	  a	  faster	  processor,	  among	  any	  number	  of	  possibilities.	  Given	  the	  nature	  of	  large	  desktop	  computers,	  in	  which	  physical	  space,	  energy,	  and	  heat	  are	  not	  consequential,	  once	  a	  new	  component,	  or	  subsystem,	  is	  developed,	  it	  can	  be	  swapped	  in	  to	  improve	  overall	  performance.	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  the	  new	  subsystem	  (or	  solution)	  has	  no	  meaningful	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  any	  other	  subsystems	  currently	  part	  of	  the	  desktop	  computer.	  Hence,	  groups	  can	  work	  independently,	  attacking	  different	  subproblems	  without	  consideration	  to	  what	  their	  counterparts	  are	  doing,	  and	  still	  improve	  overall	  performance,	  or	  the	  value	  of	  the	  solution.233	  	  	  The	  solution	  landscape	  in	  the	  decomposable	  case	  can	  be	  illustrated	  graphically.	  As	  Figure	  1	  illustrates	  (see	  following	  page),	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  optimize	  on	  design	  element	  X	  (i.e.,	  choose	  the	  value	  of	  this	  element	  that	  generates	  the	  highest	  value)	  without	  any	  knowledge	  of	  what	  the	  optimal	  value	  is	  of	  design	  element	  Y.	  Likewise,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  optimize	  on	  design	  element	  Y	  without	  any	  knowledge	  of	  what	  the	  optimal	  value	  is	  of	  design	  element	  X.	  As	  a	  result,	  design	  can	  take	  place	  by	  individuals	  or	  groups	  acting	  independently.	  While	  some	  communication	  is	  required	  to	  find	  the	  optimal	  combination	  of	  X	  and	  Y,	  this	  communication	  need	  only	  take	  place	  at	  the	  very	  end.	  Prior	  to	  this,	  the	  searches	  can	  proceed	  independently.	  	  Nondecomposable,	  or	  high-­‐interaction,	  problems	  are	  ones	  in	  which	  the	  solution	  value	  is	  highly	  dependent	  on	  the	  interaction	  of	  design	  choices.	  Here,	  knowledge	  sets	  cannot	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  subproblems,	  since	  the	  interaction	  amongst	  distinct	  knowledge	  sets	  are	  simply	  too	  extensive.	  The	  implication,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  groups	  of	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individuals	  possessing	  distinct	  knowledge	  sets	  cannot	  independently	  apply	  their	  knowledge	  to	  unique	  design	  choices,	  with	  any	  reasonable	  expectation	  that	  their	  efforts	  will	  uncover	  valuable	  solutions.234	  
FIGURE	  1	  –	  Decomposable	  Problem	  	  The	  development	  of	  a	  microprocessor	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  nondecomposable	  problem.	  In	  developing	  a	  better	  processor,	  each	  design	  choice	  necessarily	  impacts	  all	  other	  design	  choices.235	  Modifying	  and	  increasing	  the	  bus	  speed,	  for	  instance,	  could	  increase	  the	  production	  of	  heat,	  damaging	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  processors’	  circuitry	  and	  thus	  reduce	  overall	  performance.	  Similarly,	  developing	  a	  larger	  memory	  cache	  could	  increase	  the	  demand	  for	  energy,	  drawing	  it	  away	  from	  the	  core,	  and	  ultimately	  decreasing	  overall	  performance.	  The	  key	  point	  is	  that	  no	  group	  of	  actors,	  operating	  in	  isolation	  with	  distinct	  knowledge	  sets,	  can	  hope	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  microprocessor	  based	  exclusively	  on	  their	  stock	  of	  knowledge.	  Ultimately,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  design	  process	  depends	  on	  the	  coordinated	  efforts	  of	  a	  group	  with	  different	  knowledge	  sets,	  and	  using	  different	  design	  choices,	  working	  towards	  a	  common	  end.	  Hence,	  in	  our	  simplistic	  examination	  of	  the	  microprocessor,	  the	  circuitry,	  bus,	  cache	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and	  core	  must	  all	  work	  together,	  the	  result	  of	  a	  planned	  and	  coordinated	  effort	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  solution.236	  	  	  The	  solution	  landscape	  in	  the	  nondecomposable	  case	  can	  also	  be	  illustrated	  graphically.	  As	  Figure	  2	  illustrates	  (see	  following	  page),	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  exclusively	  optimize	  on	  design	  element	  X	  (i.e.,	  choose	  the	  value	  of	  this	  element	  that	  generates	  the	  highest	  value)	  without	  a	  thorough	  understanding,	  or	  knowledge,	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  elements	  X	  and	  Y.	  The	  same	  logic	  applies	  to	  exclusively	  optimizing	  on	  design	  element	  Y.	  Simply	  put,	  with	  nondecomposable	  problems,	  design	  elements	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  highly	  interdependent.	  As	  a	  result,	  design	  cannot	  take	  place	  by	  individuals	  or	  groups	  acting	  independently.	  Coordination,	  by	  actors	  with	  extensive	  knowledge	  of	  both	  design	  elements	  X	  and	  Y,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  interaction,	  is	  required	  for	  search.	  	  	  Finally,	  we	  have	  moderate-­‐interaction,	  or	  nearly	  decomposable,	  problems	  which	  exists	  between	  our	  low-­‐interaction	  and	  high-­‐interaction	  problems.	  As	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  note,	  “the	  level	  of	  interaction	  among	  design	  choices	  is	  intermediate	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  subproblems	  associated	  with	  distinctive	  knowledge	  sets	  can	  be	  defined,	  but	  the	  value	  of	  a	  design	  choice	  within	  one	  subproblem	  is	  not	  fully	  independent	  of	  the	  design	  choices	  made	  in	  another	  subproblem.”237	  Therefore,	  while	  the	  interactions	  amongst	  knowledge	  sets	  are	  not	  trivial,	  “near	  decomposability	  suggests	  that	  interactions	  among	  knowledge	  sets	  within	  subproblems	  are	  greater	  than	  among	  subproblems.”238	  	  	  An	  example	  of	  a	  nearly	  decomposable	  problem	  would	  be	  improving	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  laptop	  computer.	  While	  building	  a	  better	  laptop	  can	  clearly	  be	  separated	  into	  a	  number	  of	  subproblems,	  for	  example	  improving	  the	  screen,	  hard	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drive,	  or	  motherboard,	  each	  design	  choice	  involves	  a	  number	  of	  tradeoffs	  and	  interdependencies.	  Improving	  screen	  size	  and	  quality,	  for	  example,	  affects	  the	  size,	  weight,	  and	  battery	  life	  of	  the	  laptop.	  Similarly,	  a	  high	  end	  and	  separate	  graphics	  card	  might	  only	  slightly	  increase	  the	  overall	  weight	  of	  the	  laptop,	  but	  draw	  significantly	  more	  energy,	  thereby	  reducing	  overall	  system	  performance.	  Each	  component,	  therefore,	  interacts	  with	  every	  other	  component	  in	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  way.	  Necessarily,	  some	  degree	  of	  coordination	  is	  required	  amongst	  groups	  of	  individuals	  working	  on	  the	  nearly	  decomposable	  problems,	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  an	  effective,	  complete	  and	  valuable	  solution.	  	  
	  	  
FIGURE	  2	  –	  Nondecomposable	  Problem	  	  The	  solution	  landscape	  in	  the	  nearly	  decomposable	  case	  is	  illustrated	  graphically	  in	  Figure	  3	  (see	  following	  page).	  As	  the	  Figure	  illustrates,	  specific	  combinations	  of	  design	  elements	  X	  and	  Y	  that	  manifest	  themselves	  in	  high	  value	  solutions	  are	  clustered	  in	  one	  area.	  The	  implication	  of	  the	  clustering	  of	  (high	  value)	  solutions	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  optimize	  on	  design	  element	  X	  without	  knowledge	  of	  the	  interaction	  amongst	  element	  X	  and	  Y.	  Similarly,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  optimize	  on	  design	  element	  Y,	  without	  knowledge	  of	  interaction	  amongst	  elements	  X	  and	  Y.	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Hence,	  because	  design	  elements	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  (moderately)	  interdependent,	  knowledge	  of	  how	  they	  interact	  is	  critical	  in	  order	  to	  locate	  high	  value	  solutions.	  However,	  once	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  design	  elements	  X	  and	  Y	  is	  defined,	  and	  hence	  there	  is	  an	  appreciation	  of	  where	  the	  cluster	  of	  high	  value	  solutions	  is	  located	  on	  the	  landscape,	  then	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  independently	  optimize	  on	  individual	  design	  elements.	  At	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  optimize	  of	  design	  element	  X	  (i.e.	  choose	  the	  value	  of	  this	  element	  that	  generates	  the	  highest	  value)	  without	  any	  knowledge	  of	  what	  the	  optimal	  value	  is	  of	  design	  element	  Y,	  and	  vice	  
versa.	  	  Therefore,	  with	  nearly	  decomposable	  problems,	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	  design	  elements	  X	  and	  Y	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  interaction	  are	  initially	  required	  for	  search.	  However,	  once	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  interaction	  has	  been	  established,	  design	  (or	  search)	  can	  take	  place	  by	  individuals	  or	  groups	  acting	  independently.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  3	  –	  Nearly	  Decomposable	  Problem	  	  If	  problems	  are	  the	  basic	  unit	  of	  analysis,	  and	  the	  end	  points	  are	  valuable	  solutions,	  then	  we	  need	  a	  means	  to	  an	  end.	  How	  do	  we	  go	  from	  point	  A	  to	  point	  B?	  How	  should	  organizations	  search	  for	  solutions?	  Following	  from	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  we	  now	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  two	  basic	  methods	  of	  search.	  Once	  these	  methods	  are	  identified,	  we	  match	  them	  in	  a	  discriminating	  manner	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	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under	  investigation	  (i.e.,	  whether	  the	  problem	  is	  decomposable,	  nearly	  decomposable,	  or	  nondecomposable).	  	  	  	  	  
PROBLEMS	  AND	  THE	  METHODS	  OF	  SEARCH	  
	  The	  three	  types	  of	  problems	  identified	  above	  result	  in	  three	  related	  types	  of	  solution	  landscapes.	  Once	  a	  type	  problem	  has	  been	  identified,	  decision	  makers	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  type	  of	  solution	  landscape	  under	  investigation.	  However,	  decision	  makers	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  precise	  contours	  of	  the	  landscape.	  Therefore,	  to	  effectively	  explore	  these	  landscapes,	  decision	  makers	  are	  required	  to	  conduct	  a	  search.	  Different	  types	  of	  solution	  landscapes	  benefit	  from	  different	  methods	  of	  search,	  or	  search	  strategies.	  According	  to	  the	  framework,	  there	  are	  two	  distinct	  approaches	  to	  search:	  directional	  and	  heuristic.239	  	  	  	  Directional,	  or	  local	  search,	  is	  reliant	  on	  the	  feedback	  or	  experience	  of	  previous	  trials.240	  In	  this	  form	  of	  search,	  new	  combinations	  of	  design	  elements	  are	  pursued	  sequentially,	  by	  altering	  one	  design	  element	  at	  a	  time.	  With	  each	  design	  change,	  the	  resulting	  change	  in	  the	  solution	  value	  can	  be	  observed.	  If	  the	  design	  change	  yields	  a	  higher	  solution	  value,	  then	  the	  search	  continues	  along	  the	  path.	  Similarly,	  if	  the	  design	  change	  yields	  a	  lower	  solution	  value,	  then	  the	  original	  design	  is	  restored,	  and	  a	  new	  path	  (or	  design	  choice)	  is	  chosen.	  The	  key	  attribute	  of	  directional	  search	  is	  the	  focus	  on	  only	  one	  design	  element	  of	  a	  problem.	  Hence,	  an	  actor	  using	  directional	  search	  need	  not	  understand,	  a	  priori,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  interaction	  amongst	  design	  elements	  of	  any	  given	  problem.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  621.	  240	  This	  form	  of	  search	  has	  assumed	  a	  number	  of	  labels,	  including	  experiential	  search,	  or	  the	  search	  by	  trial	  and	  error,	  but	  the	  basic	  premise	  is	  the	  same.	  See,	  for	  example:	  Ross	  W.	  Ashby,	  Design	  for	  a	  
Brain	  (London:	  Chapman	  and	  Hall,	  1952).;	  James	  G.	  March	  and	  Herbert	  A.	  Simon,	  Organizations	  (New	  York:	  John	  Wiley,	  1958).;	  Richard	  M.	  Cyert	  and	  James	  G.	  March,	  A	  Behavioral	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm,	  Second	  ed.	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  1992).;	  Herbert	  A.	  Simon,	  The	  Sciences	  of	  the	  Artificial	  (Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  1981).;	  Richard	  R.	  Nelson	  and	  Sidney	  G.	  Winter,	  An	  Evolutionary	  Theory	  of	  
Economic	  Change	  (Cambridge:	  Belknap	  Press,	  1992).	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  To	  illustrate	  directional	  search,	  consider	  an	  example	  of	  two	  independent	  actors,	  M	  and	  N,	  working	  on	  the	  decomposable	  problem	  illustrated	  graphically	  in	  Figure	  4	  (below).	  In	  this	  example,	  actor	  M	  only	  has	  knowledge	  of	  design	  element	  X,	  while	  actor	  N	  only	  has	  knowledge	  of	  design	  element	  Y.	  Actor	  N	  begins	  his	  search	  fixed	  at	  X1	  and	  optimizes	  on	  design	  element	  Y.	  His	  first	  design	  combination,	  X1	  and	  Y1	  (point	  A	  in	  the	  figure)	  results	  in	  a	  solution	  valued	  at	  Z1.	  In	  this	  second	  trial,	  N	  selects	  design	  choice	  X1	  and	  Y2	  (point	  B	  in	  the	  figure),	  resulting	  in	  a	  solution	  valued	  at	  Z2.	  Observing	  the	  results,	  actor	  N	  realizes	  that	  Z1>Z2,	  and	  the	  solution	  is	  therefore	  less	  valuable.	  Having	  metaphorically	  ‘walked	  down	  the	  hill’,	  actor	  N	  returns	  to	  point	  A,	  and	  chooses	  an	  alternative	  design	  choice,	  X1	  and	  Y3	  (point	  C),	  resulting	  in	  a	  value	  of	  Z3.	  Using	  direction	  search,	  actor	  N	  concludes	  that	  his	  most	  recent	  design	  choice	  (X1,	  Y3)	  is	  superior	  to	  his	  previous	  attempts	  (Z3>Z1>Z2),	  and	  ends	  up	  with	  a	  higher	  value	  solution.	  Now,	  consider	  actor	  M,	  who	  has	  just	  observed	  the	  final	  result	  of	  actor	  N	  (X1,	  Y3,	  Z3).	  Actor	  M,	  who	  can	  only	  optimize	  on	  design	  element	  X,	  keeps	  Y3	  and	  moves	  from	  X1	  to	  X2	  (point	  D	  in	  the	  figure),	  resulting	  in	  Z4.	  Actor	  M	  observes	  that	  he	  found	  a	  higher	  value	  solution	  (Z4>Z3),	  and	  has	  metaphorically	  ‘climbed	  the	  solution	  hill.’	  	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  4	  –	  Directional	  Search	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As	  the	  example	  demonstrates,	  directional	  search	  does	  not	  require	  coordination	  between	  actors	  M	  and	  N	  to	  arrive	  at	  higher	  value	  solutions.	  Each	  actor,	  operating	  independently,	  and	  without	  knowledge	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  interaction	  amongst	  design	  elements	  X	  and	  Y,	  can	  optimize	  on	  one	  design	  element	  and	  arrive	  at	  a	  higher	  valued	  solution.	  To	  be	  explicit,	  while	  independent	  actors	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  their	  own	  theories	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  X	  and	  Z,	  or	  Y	  and	  Z,	  these	  theories	  need	  not	  be	  aligned	  with	  the	  theories	  possessed	  by	  other	  actors	  working	  on	  the	  same	  problem.	  Hence,	  actors	  can	  search	  independently,	  without	  a	  common	  theoretical	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  design	  elements	  interact.	  	  	  	  	  Heuristic,	  or	  cognitive,	  search	  occurs	  when	  an	  actor,	  or	  a	  group	  of	  actors,	  cognitively	  evaluates	  how	  different	  design	  choices	  interact.	  In	  this	  form	  of	  search,	  new	  combinations	  of	  design	  elements	  are	  considered	  together.	  Search	  trials	  are	  therefore	  a	  product	  of	  optimizing	  on	  all	  design	  elements	  concurrently,	  as	  opposed	  to	  sequentially.	  The	  use	  of	  heuristics,	  informing	  a	  cognitive	  representation	  of	  the	  solution	  landscape,	  allows	  actor(s)	  to	  select	  trials	  that	  maximize	  the	  probability	  of	  finding	  a	  high-­‐value	  solution.	  As	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  note,	  	  [Search	  trials]	  are	  thus	  selected	  based	  on	  a	  cognitive	  map	  or	  implicit	  theory	  of	  how	  knowledge	  sets	  and	  specific	  design	  choices	  relevant	  to	  the	  problem	  interact	  to	  determine	  solution	  performance.	  These	  heuristics	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  simplified	  representations	  of	  the	  solution	  landscape	  or,	  as	  Gavetti	  and	  Levinthal	  describe,	  ‘cognitive	  representations…	  of	  lower	  dimensionality	  than	  the	  actual	  landscapes.’	  [As	  Walsh	  notes],	  these	  ‘theory-­‐driven	  structures’	  speed	  problem	  solving	  by	  ‘furnishing	  a	  basis	  for	  evaluating	  information.’	  These	  cognitive	  representations	  of	  the	  solution	  landscape	  are	  then	  used	  to	  select	  trials	  that	  maximize	  the	  probability	  of	  quickly	  discovering	  a	  high-­‐value	  solution.	  Of	  course,	  cognitive	  maps	  are	  not	  static.	  As	  trials	  are	  undertaken	  and	  knowledge	  is	  gleaned	  through	  feedback,	  [decision	  makers]	  update	  their	  heuristics.241	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  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  621.	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To	  illustrate	  heuristic	  search,	  consider	  another	  simple	  example	  with	  two	  actors,	  F	  and	  G,	  each	  working	  independently	  on	  the	  nondecomposable	  problem	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  5.	  	  
	  
FIGURE	  5	  –	  Heuristic	  Search	  	  First,	  we	  have	  actor	  F	  who	  employs	  directional	  search,	  and	  modifies	  design	  element	  X,	  between	  X1	  and	  X2,	  and	  element	  Y,	  between	  Y1	  and	  Y2	  (hence,	  in	  space	  defined	  by	  the	  rectangle	  ABCD).	  No	  matter	  what	  combinations	  of	  design	  choices	  X	  and	  Y	  (bounded	  by	  ABCD)	  he	  selects,	  actor	  F	  will	  never	  locate	  a	  valuable	  solution.	  In	  the	  space	  defined	  by	  ABCD,	  there	  simply	  are	  no	  valuable	  solutions	  to	  be	  discovered.	  Now,	  reflect	  on	  actor	  G,	  who	  posses	  a	  cognitive	  appreciation	  of	  how	  design	  elements	  X	  and	  Y	  interact.	  Given	  actor	  G’s	  knowledge,	  he	  discounts	  searching	  in	  the	  space	  defined	  by	  ABDC,	  and	  opts	  instead	  to	  optimize	  on	  X,	  between	  X1	  and	  X2,	  and	  on	  Y,	  between	  Y1	  and	  Y2	  (hence,	  in	  space	  defined	  by	  the	  rectangle	  LMNO).	  With	  consideration	  given	  to	  how	  the	  design	  elements	  interact,	  and	  employing	  his	  search	  heuristic,	  actor	  G	  is	  quite	  likely	  to	  discover	  a	  valuable	  solution	  in	  the	  space	  defined	  by	  LMNO.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  certainly	  possible	  that	  through	  his	  search	  process,	  actor	  G	  discovers	  new	  information	  (gains	  new	  knowledge)	  of	  how	  the	  design	  elements	  interact,	  leading	  to	  a	  new	  search	  around	  the	  space	  defined	  by	  PQRS	  (where	  the	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highest	  solution	  value	  is	  found).	  Therefore,	  heuristic	  search	  is	  defined	  by	  an	  actor(s)	  possessing	  knowledge	  of	  how	  design	  elements	  interact,	  and	  using	  that	  knowledge	  to	  develop	  a	  cognitive	  map	  of	  the	  solution	  landscape	  to	  guide	  the	  search	  process.	  	  	  	  Heuristic	  search	  is	  a	  powerful	  approach	  to	  problem	  solving	  that	  takes	  on	  two	  different	  forms,	  based	  on	  whether	  the	  solution	  is	  being	  sought	  by	  an	  individual	  or	  a	  group	  of	  individuals.	  As	  Herbert	  Simon	  rightly	  pointed	  out,	  individuals	  face	  cognitive	  limitations	  and	  are	  thus	  boundedly	  rational.	  The	  human	  mind	  is	  incapable	  of	  digesting	  and	  applying	  an	  infinite	  amount	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  thus	  cannot	  be	  “rational”	  in	  the	  pure	  sense.242	  If	  an	  individual	  had	  infinite	  cognitive	  capacity,	  and	  could	  absorb	  all	  possible	  knowledge	  relevant	  to	  a	  given	  problem,	  he	  would	  be	  able	  to	  single	  handily	  develop	  advanced	  theories	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  knowledge	  and	  design	  interactions,	  and	  undertake	  an	  optimal	  pattern	  of	  search.	  Given	  our	  knowledge	  of	  bounded	  rationality,	  the	  solutions	  to	  complex	  problems	  will	  often	  require	  distinct	  knowledge	  sets,	  possessed	  by	  different	  individuals,	  therefore	  requiring	  a	  collective	  approach	  to	  problem	  solving.243	  As	  Foss	  notes,	  coordinating	  and	  aggregating	  the	  dispersed	  knowledge	  of	  multiple	  actors	  is	  best	  achieved	  through	  formal	  organization.244	  Or,	  as	  Loasby	  notes,	  “firms	  [or	  groups,	  or	  organizations]	  are	  a	  response	  to	  human	  cognitive	  limitations.”245	  In	  practice,	  therefore,	  we	  are	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  group	  behavior	  and	  heuristics	  (within	  organizations),	  and	  not	  the	  behavior	  of	  individuals	  operating	  in	  isolation.	  	  	  	  Regarding	  the	  search	  heuristics	  of	  groups,	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  nicely	  encapsulate	  the	  issues	  at	  hand:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  242	  	  Herbert	  A.	  Simon,	  Administrative	  Behavior:	  A	  Study	  of	  Decision-­Making	  Processes	  in	  Administrative	  
Organization	  (New	  York:	  Macmillan,	  1957).	  243	  The	  example	  of	  heuristic	  search	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  5	  was	  highly	  simplified,	  given	  that	  there	  were	  only	  two	  design	  elements	  (X	  and	  Y).	  In	  practice,	  however,	  complex	  problems	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  dozens	  of	  design	  elements	  that	  all	  interact.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  almost	  a	  certainty	  that	  the	  knowledge	  sets	  of	  multiple	  actors	  will	  be	  required	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  interactions.	  	  	  244	  Nicolai	  Foss,	  "Leadership,	  Beliefs	  and	  Coordination:	  An	  Explorative	  Discussion,"	  Industrial	  and	  
Corporate	  Change	  10,	  no.	  2	  (2001),	  pp.	  357-­‐388.	  245	  Brian	  Loasby,	  “Organizations	  as	  Interpretive	  Systems,”	  Revue	  d’économie	  industrielle	  97,	  4e	  trimestre	  (2001),	  p.	  25.	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[Consider]	  three	  actors	  with	  different	  and	  distinct	  knowledge	  sets,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  relevant	  to	  a	  particular	  problem.	  Assume	  that	  these	  knowledge	  sets	  reflect	  a	  set	  of	  design	  choices	  that	  define	  a	  solution	  landscape	  to	  a	  particular	  problem	  and	  that	  the	  landscape	  is	  at	  last	  somewhat	  rugged.	  Each	  actor	  can	  independently	  develop	  an	  ordering	  for	  trials	  based	  on	  his	  or	  her	  respective	  knowledge.	  However,	  differences	  in	  knowledge	  are	  likely	  to	  yield	  differences	  in	  cognitive	  maps	  and	  hence	  the	  recommended	  order	  of	  [search]	  trials.	  Moreover,	  absent	  knowledge	  sharing,	  these	  independently	  developed	  cognitive	  maps	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  well	  matched	  to	  the	  topography	  of	  the	  solution	  landscapes.	  Only	  by	  developing	  heuristics	  that	  encompass	  the	  knowledge	  of	  all	  actors	  can	  the	  probability	  of	  discovering	  highly	  valued	  solutions	  be	  advanced.	  While	  individual	  beliefs	  are	  the	  basis	  of	  heuristics	  that	  guide	  group	  decisions,	  developing	  group	  heuristics	  requires	  the	  resolution	  of	  inherent	  conflicts	  in	  beliefs.	  These	  group	  heuristics	  are	  shaped	  not	  only	  by	  the	  quality	  of	  actors’	  logic,	  but	  also	  by	  each	  actor’s	  self	  interest	  and	  political	  position.	  Thus,	  while	  individual	  beliefs	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  group	  beliefs	  or	  heuristics,	  not	  all	  individual	  beliefs	  are	  equally	  important	  or	  influential	  in	  this	  process.	  Heuristic	  search	  first	  necessitates	  knowledge	  transfer	  to	  facilitate	  the	  development	  of	  heuristics	  that	  derive	  from	  multiple	  and	  dispersed	  knowledge	  sets.	  Knowledge	  transfer	  in	  turn	  necessitates	  the	  development	  of	  a	  shared	  language	  to	  support	  it.	  Finally,	  the	  development	  of	  group	  heuristics	  requires	  the	  reconciliation	  of	  the	  divergent	  beliefs	  about	  the	  proper	  shape	  of	  the	  search	  heuristic.246	  	  	  There	  is	  necessarily	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  the	  style	  of	  governance	  required	  for	  directional	  and	  heuristic	  search.	  Directional	  search	  simply	  requires	  that	  an	  agent	  optimize	  on	  a	  design	  choice,	  and	  observe	  the	  outcome.	  Therefore,	  with	  directional	  search,	  agents	  can	  operate	  independently.	  Conversely,	  heuristic	  search	  requires	  group	  decision	  making,	  which	  necessitates	  a	  coordinated	  effort.247	  As	  a	  result,	  different	  types	  of	  search	  require	  different	  types	  of	  governance	  structures.	  Before	  we	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  governance	  considerations,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  briefly	  match	  search	  type	  to	  problem	  type.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  246	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  621.	  247	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  621	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Directional	  search	  is	  well	  suited	  to	  low-­‐interaction,	  or	  decomposable,	  problems.	  When	  there	  is	  little	  interaction	  among	  design	  elements,	  the	  only	  relevant	  feedback	  is	  whether	  the	  value	  of	  the	  solution,	  hence	  its	  performance,	  is	  superior	  or	  inferior	  with	  each	  successive	  trial.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  directional	  search	  is	  poorly	  suited	  to	  high-­‐interaction	  problems.	  When	  there	  is	  extensive	  interaction	  amongst	  design	  elements,	  directional	  search	  strategies	  will	  often	  leave	  problems	  solvers	  out	  in	  the	  wilderness,	  with	  no	  map	  and	  no	  sense	  of	  where	  the	  high	  value	  treasure	  lies.248	  	  	  Heuristic	  search	  methods	  are	  naturally	  well	  suited	  to	  high-­‐interaction,	  or	  nondecomposable,	  problems.	  When	  the	  interaction	  amongst	  design	  elements	  is	  high,	  a	  cognitive	  map	  of	  the	  solution	  space	  can	  be	  highly	  beneficial.	  While	  a	  workable	  solution	  might	  be	  found	  through	  directional	  search	  processes,	  a	  cognitive	  appreciation	  of	  the	  solution	  map	  will	  lead	  actors	  to	  discount	  searching	  for	  low	  value	  alternatives,	  in	  favour	  of	  searching	  in	  a	  space	  where	  high	  value	  solutions	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  found.249	  	  	  Moderate-­‐interaction	  problems	  can	  benefit	  from	  both	  directional	  or	  heuristic	  search	  patterns,	  depending	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  interaction	  between	  design	  elements.	  As	  the	  level	  of	  interaction	  amongst	  design	  elements	  increases,	  a	  heuristic	  search	  process	  becomes	  more	  valuable.	  Similarly,	  as	  the	  level	  of	  interaction	  decreases,	  directional	  search	  becomes	  more	  valuable.	  With	  moderate-­‐interaction	  problems,	  it	  is	  often	  helpful	  to	  use	  a	  heuristic	  search	  tool	  to	  define	  the	  area	  of	  the	  landscape	  where	  solutions	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  appear,	  and	  then	  use	  directional	  search	  to	  methodically	  search	  that	  area.	  Adopting	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger’s	  language,	  cognitive	  maps	  are	  useful	  for	  “discovering	  the	  regions	  of	  the	  solution	  landscape	  particularly	  attractive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  248	  The	  implication	  here,	  recalling	  Figure	  5,	  is	  that	  actors	  could	  be	  searching	  in	  the	  space	  defined	  by	  the	  rectangle	  ABCD.	  	  249	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  621.	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for	  search,	  while	  directional	  search	  involving	  independent	  actors	  effectively	  explores	  these	  regions.”250	  	  
INCENTIVE	  PROBLEMS	  AND	  KNOWLEDGE	  HAZARDS	  	  If	  different	  types	  of	  problems	  demand	  different	  search	  strategies,	  then	  decision	  makers	  are	  naturally	  compelled	  to	  identify	  appropriate	  governance	  structures	  to	  guide	  these	  processes.	  As	  will	  be	  demonstrated,	  the	  optimal	  governance	  system	  for	  low-­‐interaction,	  decomposable,	  problems	  is	  a	  relatively	  straightforward	  issue.	  However,	  high-­‐interaction	  problems,	  which	  benefit,	  if	  not	  require,	  heuristic	  search,	  present	  a	  number	  of	  challenges.	  These	  challenges,	  or	  hazards,	  include	  knowledge	  appropriation,	  knowledge	  accumulation,	  and	  knowledge	  destruction	  (expanded	  upon	  below).	  Overcoming	  these	  hazards,	  through	  appropriate	  governance	  structures,	  is	  critical	  to	  facilitate	  heuristic	  search.	  	  The	  first	  knowledge	  hazard	  identified	  by	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  appropriation,	  is	  fundamentally	  an	  incentive	  problem.251	  Heuristic	  search	  requires	  independent	  actors	  to	  share	  information,	  but	  there	  is	  little	  incentive	  for	  individual	  actors	  to	  behalf	  benevolently.	  This	  famous	  paradox,	  identified	  by	  Kenneth	  Arrow,252	  works	  as	  follows:	  “The	  value	  of	  knowledge	  to	  its	  potential	  acquirer	  is	  not	  known	  until	  after	  the	  knowledge	  is	  revealed;	  however,	  once	  that	  value	  is	  revealed,	  the	  potential	  acquirer	  has	  no	  need	  to	  pay	  for	  it	  and	  can	  resell	  it	  at	  near	  zero	  marginal	  cost.”253	  The	  incentive	  problem	  is	  that	  individuals	  are	  naturally	  predisposed	  to	  assimilate	  the	  knowledge	  of	  others,	  extracting	  its	  value,	  while	  revealing	  nothing.	  Each	  individual,	  therefore,	  is	  prone	  to	  knowledge	  hoarding.	  Each	  individual,	  acting	  in	  his	  or	  her	  own	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  250	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  621.	  251	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  622.	  252	  	  Kenneth	  J.	  Arrow,	  "Information	  and	  Economic	  Behavior,"	  Stockholm,	  Federation	  of	  Swedish	  
Industries	  -­	  Reprint	  of	  Nobel	  Prize	  Paper	  28	  (1973):	  1-­‐34.	  253	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  622.	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self-­‐interest,	  can	  make	  knowledge	  sharing	  exceedingly	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  While	  property	  rights	  and	  contracts	  can	  to	  some	  degree	  alleviate	  the	  incentive	  problem,	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  heuristics	  developed	  in	  group	  settings	  makes	  this	  exceedingly	  difficult.254	  	  	  The	  knowledge	  appropriation	  hazard	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  heuristic	  search,	  which	  requires	  extensive	  knowledge	  sharing.	  Directional	  search,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  does	  not	  require	  knowledge	  sharing,	  and	  is	  therefore	  unaffected	  by	  this	  form	  of	  knowledge	  hazard.255	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  construct	  a	  governance	  system	  appropriate	  for	  heuristic	  search	  and	  high-­‐interaction	  problems,	  which	  overcomes	  the	  knowledge	  appropriation	  hazard.256	  	  	  The	  second	  knowledge	  hazard	  indentified	  by	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  involves	  knowledge	  accumulation	  by	  individuals,	  and	  is	  similarly	  an	  incentive	  problem.	  In	  addition	  to	  hoarding	  knowledge,	  actors	  are	  naturally	  predisposed	  to	  shape	  knowledge	  formation	  and	  discovery	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  ends.	  Each	  individual,	  naturally,	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  influence,	  or	  strategically	  alter,	  the	  heuristic	  guiding	  group	  search.	  Individual	  actors,	  with	  an	  incentive	  to	  accumulate	  knowledge	  that	  is	  beneficial	  to	  them,	  can	  shape	  the	  search	  heuristic	  in	  a	  way	  that	  optimizes	  the	  likely	  of	  discovering	  interactions/solutions	  that	  adds	  uniquely	  to	  their	  value	  stock	  of	  knowledge.	  As	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  note:	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  p.	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  255	  While	  directional	  search	  does	  not	  require	  ‘knowledge	  sharing’	  per	  se,	  this	  form	  of	  search	  does	  facilitate	  knowledge	  transfer	  through	  other	  means.	  Once	  solutions	  are	  developed,	  any	  actor	  can	  examine	  the	  work	  ex	  post,	  and	  add	  this	  information	  to	  his	  stock	  of	  knowledge.	  Here,	  knowledge	  transfer	  occurs	  through	  markets	  and	  prices	  in	  the	  Hayekian	  sense.	  For	  more	  on	  this	  topic,	  see:	  F.	  A.	  Hayek,	  “The	  Use	  of	  Knowledge	  in	  Society,”	  The	  American	  Economic	  Review	  35,	  no.	  4	  (1945),	  pp.	  519-­‐530;	  Nicolai	  J.	  Foss,	  “The	  Use	  of	  Knowledge	  in	  Firms,”	  Journal	  of	  Institutional	  and	  Theoretical	  
Economics	  155,	  no.	  33	  (1999),	  pp.	  458-­‐486;	  Nicolai	  J.	  Foss,	  “Misesian	  ownership	  and	  coasian	  authority	  in	  hayekian	  settings:	  The	  case	  of	  the	  knowledge	  economy,”	  Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Austrian	  
Economics	  4,	  no.	  4	  (2001),	  pp.	  3-­‐24.	  	  256	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  622.	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[Actors]	  have	  incentives	  to	  strategically	  influence	  the	  pattern	  of	  [search]	  trials	  in	  ways	  that	  enhance	  their	  specialized	  knowledge	  or	  complement	  knowledge	  that	  they	  already	  possess,	  while	  avoiding	  efforts	  that	  require	  knowledge	  sharing.	  Consequently…	  efforts	  to	  explore	  problems	  requiring	  heuristic	  search	  are	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  attempts	  to	  distort	  cognitive	  maps,	  to	  conflicts	  regarding	  the	  proper	  ordering	  of	  trials,	  and	  more	  generally	  to	  an	  underinvestment	  in	  knowledge	  sharing	  activities	  that	  facilitate	  the	  development	  of	  common	  heuristics.257	  	  While	  the	  knowledge	  accumulation	  hazard	  is	  largely	  irrelevant	  for	  decomposable,	  low-­‐interaction,	  problems	  that	  do	  not	  require	  knowledge	  sharing,	  there	  are	  important	  governance	  implications	  for	  high-­‐interaction	  problems.	  Put	  another	  way,	  as	  problem	  complexity	  increases,	  moving	  from	  low	  to	  high-­‐interaction,	  different	  governance	  mechanisms	  are	  necessarily	  required	  to	  mitigate	  knowledge	  exchange	  hazards.258	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  two	  knowledge	  hazards	  identified	  by	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  a	  third	  and	  final	  hazard	  deserves	  attention:	  knowledge	  destruction.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  shared	  search	  heuristic	  necessitates	  individuals	  with	  distinct	  knowledge	  sets	  of	  different	  design	  interactions	  coordinating	  their	  knowledge	  and	  learning	  from	  each	  other.	  The	  knowledge	  set	  that	  each	  actor	  brings	  to	  the	  table,	  once	  shared	  and	  aggregated,	  forms	  the	  embedded	  knowledge	  of	  an	  organization.259	  The	  process	  of	  developing	  embedded	  knowledge,	  and	  through	  it,	  a	  search	  heuristic,	  is	  not	  immediate.	  It	  takes	  individuals	  time	  to	  learn,	  share,	  and	  process	  information.	  Necessarily,	  the	  embedded	  knowledge	  of	  an	  organization	  is	  not	  static.	  When	  new	  individuals	  enter	  an	  organization,	  embedded	  knowledge	  evolves.	  Similarly,	  when	  individuals	  exit	  an	  organization,	  embedded	  knowledge	  can	  evaporate.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  heuristic	  search	  tool,	  that	  is	  product	  of	  embedded	  knowledge,	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  -­	  the	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  p.	  622.	  258	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  622.	  259	  For	  a	  thorough	  discussion	  of	  knowledge	  manifests	  itself	  within	  organizations,	  see:	  Alice	  Lam,	  "Tacit	  Knowledge,	  Organizational	  Learning	  and	  Societal	  Institutions:	  An	  Integrated	  Framework,"	  
Organization	  Studies	  21,	  no.	  3	  (2000),	  pp.	  487-­‐513,	  and	  Nicolai	  Foss,	  Kenneth	  Husted	  and	  Snejina	  Michailova,	  "Governing	  Knowledge	  Sharing	  in	  Organizations:	  Levels	  of	  Analysis,	  Governance	  Mechanisms,	  and	  Research	  Directions,"	  Journal	  of	  Management	  Studies	  47,	  no.	  3	  (2010),	  pp.	  455-­‐482.	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necessarily	  changes	  when	  actors	  join	  or	  exit	  an	  organization.	  Therefore,	  during	  the	  search	  process,	  when	  the	  solution	  landscape	  is	  being	  examined,	  actors	  leaving	  an	  organization	  can	  destroy	  (to	  some	  degree)	  the	  search	  heuristic,	  decreasing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  uncovering	  valuable	  solutions.	  The	  implication	  of	  the	  knowledge	  destruction	  hazard	  is	  that	  organizational	  durability,	  particularly	  during	  the	  search	  process,	  is	  critically	  important.	  	  Before	  we	  complete	  our	  review	  of	  the	  framework	  and	  map	  the	  appropriate	  governance	  structures	  to	  problem	  type	  and	  search	  type,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  briefly	  summarize	  the	  terrain	  covered	  thus	  far.	  We	  began	  with	  the	  ‘problem’	  as	  the	  primary	  unit	  of	  analysis,	  of	  which	  there	  are	  three	  types:	  (1)	  low-­‐interaction,	  decomposable;	  (2)	  moderate-­‐interaction,	  nearly	  decomposable;	  and	  (3)	  high-­‐interaction,	  nondecomposable.	  Moreover,	  the	  framework	  suggests	  that	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  search,	  directional	  and	  heuristic.	  The	  efficiency	  of	  organizing	  a	  search,	  hence	  the	  ordering	  of	  search	  trials,	  is	  a	  match	  between	  problem	  type	  and	  search	  type,	  which	  necessarily	  dictates	  the	  organizational	  form	  and	  appropriate	  governance	  mechanisms.	  Finally,	  we	  have	  identified	  three	  knowledge	  hazards,	  appropriation,	  accumulation,	  and	  destruction,	  that	  manifest	  themselves	  predominantly	  during	  heuristic	  group	  search.	  	  	  
MATCHING	  PROBLEM	  TYPE	  AND	  SEARCH	  TO	  ORGANIZATIONAL	  
GOVERNANCE	  	  As	  demonstrated,	  different	  problems	  require	  different	  search	  procedures.	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  this	  section,	  different	  search	  procedure	  can	  be	  linked	  to	  different	  organizational	  forms	  to	  efficiently	  locate	  valuable	  solutions.	  To	  simplify	  the	  analysis,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  there	  are	  three	  separate	  prototypical	  organizational	  forms:	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outsource-­‐markets	  (OM),	  insource-­‐Weberian	  administration	  (IWA),	  and	  insource-­‐agency	  administration	  (IAA).260	  	  	  As	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  6,261	  each	  of	  these	  organizational	  forms	  are	  associated	  with	  different	  cost	  structures	  to	  find	  a	  solution.	  	  
	  
	  FIGURE	  6	  -­‐	  RELATIONSHIP	  BETWEEN	  GOVERNANCE	  AND	  DESIGN	  SET	  INTERACTION	  	  For	  problems	  where	  there	  is	  limited	  interaction	  among	  design	  elements,	  the	  OM	  structure	  is	  the	  lowest	  cost	  alternative	  to	  find	  a	  solution.	  When	  problems	  have	  moderate	  levels	  of	  interaction	  among	  design	  elements,	  the	  IWA	  structure	  is	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  260	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  are	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  organizational	  forms	  of	  firms.	  In	  their	  model,	  markets	  are	  analogous	  to	  OM,	  authority-­‐based	  hierarchies	  are	  analogous	  to	  IWA,	  and	  consensus-­‐based	  hierarchies	  are	  analogous	  to	  IAA.	  We	  have,	  in	  effect,	  translated	  their	  model	  to	  make	  it	  directly	  applicable	  to	  the	  study	  of	  government.	  For	  more,	  see:	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­
Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  pp.	  622-­‐627.	  261	  This	  figure	  has	  been	  largely	  reproduce.	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  
Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  627.	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lowest	  cost	  alternative	  to	  find	  a	  solution.	  The	  same	  logical	  applies	  to	  problems	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  interaction	  among	  design	  elements,	  and	  IAA.	  Thus,	  Figure	  6	  suggests	  that	  different	  organizational	  structures	  are	  called	  for	  depending	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  under	  investigation.	  	  The	  rest	  of	  this	  section	  examines	  in	  greater	  detail	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  each	  of	  the	  organizational	  structures,	  and	  provides	  a	  rationale	  for	  the	  shape	  and	  position	  of	  the	  curves	  in	  Figure	  6.	  As	  will	  be	  shown,	  costs	  are	  linked	  to	  three	  factors:	  (1)	  decision	  rights	  over	  the	  path	  of	  search,	  (2)	  communication	  channels	  to	  support	  knowledge	  transfer,	  and	  (3)	  incentives	  to	  motivate	  search.	  How	  does	  government	  align	  these	  three	  organizational	  forms	  to	  problem	  type,	  while	  also	  addressing	  the	  knowledge	  hazards	  endemic	  to	  heuristic	  search?	  We	  now	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  this	  question.	  	  Like	  any	  organization	  in	  society,	  government	  has	  the	  choice	  to	  insource	  or	  outsource	  activity.	  They	  can	  locate	  solutions	  to	  problems	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  government,	  or	  look	  to	  the	  outside	  world	  for	  answers.	  When	  governments	  are	  faced	  with	  low-­‐interaction	  problems,	  the	  most	  efficient	  organizational	  form	  is	  outsource-­‐markets	  (OM).	  With	  this	  form	  of	  governance,	  government	  acts	  as	  a	  contractor,	  or	  purchaser,	  of	  solutions	  that	  are	  developed	  in	  the	  market.	  By	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  incentive	  structures	  imbedded	  in	  markets,	  governments	  can	  ensure	  that	  multiple	  independent	  actors	  compete	  to	  provide	  valuable	  solutions,	  at	  the	  lowest	  possible	  cost.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  OM	  form	  of	  governance	  parallels	  the	  New	  Public	  Management	  (NPM)	  way	  of	  thinking,	  following	  the	  edict	  that	  government	  should	  be	  ‘steering,	  not	  rowing.’262	  Within	  the	  OM	  framework,	  government	  continues	  its	  traditional	  role	  of	  defining	  the	  solution	  being	  sought,	  however	  the	  means	  to	  achieve	  the	  solution	  is	  left	  to	  independent	  actors	  operating	  outside	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  state.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  262	  For	  a	  popular	  account	  of	  the	  NPM	  philosophy,	  see:	  David	  Osborne	  and	  Ted	  Gaebler,	  Reinventing	  
Government:	  How	  the	  Entrepreneurial	  Spirit	  is	  Transforming	  the	  Public	  Sector	  (New	  York:	  Plume,	  1993).	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  Markets	  and	  prices,	  in	  the	  Hayekian	  sense,	  are	  invaluable	  because	  they	  dispense	  with	  the	  need	  for	  conscious	  control.	  In	  this	  framework,	  OM	  effectively	  determines	  the	  path	  of	  search	  through	  decentralized	  controls,	  while	  the	  price	  mechanism	  affords	  high-­‐powered	  incentives	  that	  motivate	  self-­‐interested	  actors	  to	  search	  for	  valuable	  solutions.	  The	  OM	  form	  of	  governance	  is	  well	  suited	  to	  governing	  directional	  search.	  Directional	  search	  requires	  high-­‐powered	  incentives	  to	  ensure	  actors	  pursue	  solution	  trials,	  which	  are	  embedded	  in	  markets.	  Moreover,	  directional	  search	  does	  not	  require	  immediate	  knowledge	  sharing,	  which	  markets	  inherently	  fail	  to	  facilitate,	  or	  perhaps	  more	  accurately,	  actively	  discourage.263	  	  OM,	  therefore,	  actively	  avoids	  the	  three	  knowledge	  hazards,	  appropriation,	  accumulation,	  and	  destruction.264	  	  	  While	  OM	  are	  an	  extremely	  effective	  tool	  for	  governing	  directional	  search,	  they	  function	  poorly	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  heuristic	  search,	  which	  requires	  knowledge	  sharing.	  For	  OM	  to	  work	  with	  heuristic	  search,	  independent	  actors	  would	  have	  to	  contractually	  agree	  on	  search	  patterns,	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  search,	  and	  a	  host	  of	  other	  considerations.	  The	  cost	  to	  effectively	  manage	  heuristic	  search	  through	  OM/contracts,	  including	  the	  cost	  of	  resolving	  disputes	  through	  legal	  means,	  makes	  this	  form	  of	  governance	  particularly	  ill	  suited	  for	  heuristic	  search,	  and	  therefore,	  for	  locating	  solutions	  to	  complex	  problems.	  	  When	  faced	  with	  moderate-­‐interaction	  problems,	  where	  a	  combination	  of	  heuristic	  and	  directional	  search	  strategies	  are	  desirable,	  the	  framework	  suggests	  that	  insource-­‐Weberian	  administration	  (IWA)	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  form	  of	  governance.	  IWA	  is	  simply	  the	  traditional,	  hierarchical,	  administrative	  apparatus	  that	  is	  common	  in	  most	  western	  liberal	  democratic	  states.	  From	  the	  parlance	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  263	  Once	  a	  solution	  is	  developed	  and	  sold,	  ex	  post	  knowledge	  sharing	  (or	  acquisition)	  is	  likely	  to	  occur.	  With	  OM,	  independent	  actors	  necessarily	  seek	  to	  protect	  their	  knowledge/solutions	  until	  government	  has	  acquired	  them.	  	  264	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  623.	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government,	  IWA	  is	  the	  stereotypical	  ‘line	  department’.265	  With	  IWA,	  actors	  are	  organized	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  pyramid,	  with	  authority	  over	  decision	  rights	  located	  at	  the	  top,	  and	  communications	  channels	  operating	  along	  vertical	  lines.	  	  	  IWA,	  in	  the	  problem-­‐solving	  context,	  is	  valuable	  because	  it	  confers	  authority	  on	  one	  actor	  to	  identify	  the	  ordering	  of	  trials.	  Unlike	  market	  processes	  (OM	  type	  governance),	  authority	  embedded	  in	  a	  decision	  maker	  circumvents	  the	  need	  to	  contractually	  manage	  the	  ordering	  of	  trials.	  By	  bundling	  knowledge	  sets	  within	  government	  and	  using	  authority,	  decision	  makers	  can	  economize	  on	  the	  extensive	  and	  costly	  knowledge	  sharing	  required	  to	  solve	  moderately	  complex	  problems.	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  IWA	  appears	  well	  suited	  to	  govern	  heuristic	  search.	  	  In	  this	  form	  of	  governance,	  a	  decision-­‐maker	  can	  define	  the	  critical	  knowledge	  interactions,	  develop	  suitable	  heuristics	  to	  guide	  search,	  and	  in	  effect,	  narrow	  the	  area	  of	  the	  solution	  landscape	  requiring	  investigation.266	  	  While	  IWA	  certainly	  supports	  heuristic	  search	  in	  some	  forms,	  it	  does	  so	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  dampening	  incentives	  that	  motivate	  and	  reward	  directional	  search	  and	  knowledge	  accumulation	  under	  OM.	  Within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  government,	  employees	  (or	  actors)	  grant	  managers	  (or	  decision	  makers)	  authority	  in	  exchange	  for	  wages.	  This	  contractual	  relationship,	  between	  labor	  and	  wages,	  has	  two	  distinct	  benefits.	  First,	  it	  severs	  the	  direct	  linkage	  between	  the	  knowledge	  employees	  accumulate	  and	  wage	  they	  receive,	  dampening	  the	  incentive	  to	  strategically	  accumulate	  knowledge.	  While	  employees	  can	  exit	  government	  and	  expropriate	  some	  of	  the	  accumulated	  knowledge,	  there	  is	  now	  an	  opportunity	  cost	  in	  terms	  of	  lost	  wages,	  creating	  a	  disincentive	  to	  walk	  away.	  Second,	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  government,	  and	  with	  this	  contractual	  relationship,	  the	  courts	  exercise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  265	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Canada,	  IWA	  would	  accurately	  describe	  the	  governance	  structure	  of	  most	  traditional	  line	  departments;	  for	  example,	  Health,	  Industry	  National	  Defence,	  etc.	  For	  more,	  see:	  Gregory	  Tardi,	  "Departments	  and	  Other	  Institutions	  of	  Government,"	  in	  The	  Handbook	  
of	  Canadian	  Public	  Administration,	  ed.	  Christopher	  Dunn	  (Toronto:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  Canada,	  2002),	  pp.	  281-­‐304.	  	  266	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  624.	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forbearance,	  refusing	  to	  hear	  internal	  organizational	  disputes.	  Forbearance	  grants	  decision-­‐makers	  authority	  within	  government,	  and	  thus	  employees	  have	  limited	  capacity	  and	  motivation	  to	  manipulate	  the	  path	  of	  search.	  As	  such,	  insource-­‐Weberian	  hierarchies	  are	  effective,	  to	  a	  significant	  degree,	  in	  minimizing	  knowledge	  hazards.267	  	  IWA	  is	  superior	  to	  OM	  in	  supporting	  heuristic	  search,	  but	  inferior	  in	  supporting	  directional	  search.	  The	  use	  of	  authority	  within	  hierarchies	  (IWA),	  therefore,	  is	  well	  suited	  to	  nearly	  decomposable,	  moderate-­‐interaction	  problems.	  As	  problems	  become	  less	  complex,	  and	  more	  decomposable,	  OM	  is	  preferable.	  Similarly,	  as	  problems	  become	  very	  complex,	  and	  nondecomposable,	  the	  authority	  mechanism	  within	  government	  fails	  to	  facilitate	  horizontal	  knowledge	  sharing,	  leading	  to	  sub-­‐optimal	  outcomes.	  With	  high-­‐interaction	  problems,	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  a	  manager	  has	  the	  requisite	  knowledge	  and	  cognitive	  capacity	  to	  exclusively	  define	  search	  and	  direct	  the	  action	  of	  subordinates.	  In	  this	  case,	  an	  optimal	  search	  heuristic	  requires	  horizontal	  communication,	  which	  IWA	  is	  designed	  to	  impede.268	  As	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  note:	  [IAW]	  provides	  an	  important	  advantage	  over	  [OM]	  in	  directing	  the	  search	  for	  solutions	  the	  more	  nondecomposable	  the	  problem.	  However,	  the	  limits	  to	  this	  governance	  solution	  are	  reached	  as	  the	  level	  of	  knowledge	  interactions	  escalate	  and	  the	  cognitive	  capacity	  of	  a	  single	  individual	  to	  assemble	  the	  required	  specialized	  knowledge	  reaches	  its	  limits.269	  	  	  When	  governments	  are	  faced	  with	  high-­‐interaction	  problems,	  and	  heuristic	  search	  strategies	  are	  required,	  an	  alternative	  form	  of	  governance,	  located	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  government,	  yet	  necessarily	  distinct	  from	  IWA,	  is	  called	  for.	  This	  form	  of	  governance	  must	  support	  heuristic	  search	  through	  horizontal	  communication	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  267	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  625.	  268	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  625.	  269	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  625.	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consensus	  decision-­‐making,	  necessitating	  the	  development	  of	  a	  unique	  organizational	  identity,	  or	  code.270	  	  The	  framework	  suggests	  that	  government	  can	  effectively	  undertake	  heuristic	  search	  by	  adopting	  the	  insource-­‐agency	  administration	  (IAA)	  form	  of	  governance.	  	  As	  the	  name	  implies,	  the	  IAA	  form	  of	  governance	  suggests	  that	  government	  establish	  a	  separate	  agency	  (hence,	  an	  organization)	  that	  has	  unique	  characteristics.	  The	  intellectual	  roots	  of	  IAA	  are	  found	  in	  Kogut	  and	  Zander’s	  research,271	  in	  which	  they	  describe	  the	  firm	  (or	  in	  our	  case,	  an	  agency)	  as	  a	  specialized	  social	  community	  that	  creates,	  shares	  and	  transfers	  knowledge	  more	  efficiently	  than	  markets.	  Here,	  the	  agency	  is	  a	  tool	  that	  supports	  horizontal	  knowledge	  transfer	  and	  advances	  shared	  heuristics	  that	  guide	  decision	  making	  within	  government.	  Critically,	  horizontal	  knowledge	  transfer	  facilitates	  a	  consensus	  reflection	  of	  specialized	  knowledge	  sets	  of	  individual	  actors,	  resulting	  in	  a	  collective,	  and	  consensus,	  decision	  making	  process	  that	  guides	  search.	  Obviously,	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  government,	  IAA	  type	  decision	  making	  is	  at	  the	  polar	  opposite	  of	  IWA	  type	  decision	  making.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  successful,	  IAA	  requires	  a	  number	  of	  distinct	  structures	  and	  incentives	  that	  can	  overcome	  knowledge	  exchange	  hazards,	  while	  ensuring	  that	  actors	  behave	  with	  a	  common	  sense	  of	  purpose.272	  	  Consensus	  requires	  knowledge	  sharing,	  and	  thus	  a	  commonly	  shared	  language	  and	  identity	  government.	  Agencies	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  develop	  information	  channels,	  and	  organizational	  codes,	  which	  fosters	  a	  government	  specific	  identity,	  and	  lowers	  the	  barriers	  and	  costs	  of	  communication	  coordination.273	  Developing	  and	  fostering	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  270	  ‘Increased	  likelihood’,	  in	  this	  context,	  suggests	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  finding	  a	  valuable	  solution	  is	  above	  what	  could	  be	  expected	  with	  the	  selection	  of	  random	  search	  trials.	  	  	  271	  See:	  Bruce	  Kogut	  and	  Udo	  Zander,	  "Knowledge	  of	  the	  Firm,	  Combinative	  Capabilities	  and	  the	  Replication	  of	  Technology,"	  Organization	  Science	  3,	  no.	  3	  (1992):	  pp.	  383-­‐397.	  and	  Kogut	  and	  Zander,	  
What	  Firms	  do:	  Coordination,	  Identity,	  and	  Learning,	  pp.	  502-­‐518.	  272	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  626.	  273	  For	  more	  on	  how	  ‘codes’	  socialize	  actors	  to	  employ	  similar	  language,	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  within	  organizations,	  see:	  James	  G.	  March,	  “Exploration	  and	  Exploitation	  in	  Organizational	  Learning,”	  
Organization	  Science	  2,	  no.	  1	  (1991),	  pp.	  71-­‐81.	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organizational	  code	  and	  identity	  is	  both	  an	  expensive	  and	  time-­‐consuming	  enterprise.	  As	  Kenneth	  Arrow	  noted,	  government274	  investments	  in	  channels	  and	  codes	  are	  not	  only	  actor	  specific,	  but	  when	  aggregated,	  represent	  invaluable	  social	  capital	  for	  the	  organization.	  Through	  this	  accumulated	  capital,	  manifested	  in	  an	  organizational	  identity,	  informal	  rules	  (norms)	  help	  coordinate	  the	  direction	  of	  search.	  With	  IAA,	  government	  will	  expend	  considerable	  resources	  to	  socially	  condition	  employees	  and	  develop	  relationships	  that	  ease	  knowledge	  transfer,	  facilitate	  agreement,	  and	  discourage	  internal	  exploitation	  of	  knowledge	  and	  search.275	  	  	  Within	  insource-­‐agency	  administration,	  incentives	  and	  dispute	  mechanism	  must	  necessarily	  be	  engineered	  to	  support	  knowledge	  transfer	  and	  consensus-­‐based	  decision	  making.	  Logically,	  low-­‐powered	  incentives	  for	  individual	  actors	  are	  essential	  for	  consensus	  decision	  making,	  because	  they	  encourage	  knowledge	  sharing	  (or	  do	  not	  encourage	  knowledge	  hoarding).	  As	  such,	  IAA	  requires	  government	  to	  pay	  substantially	  higher	  base	  wages,	  and	  provide	  employees	  with	  considerable	  job	  security,	  to	  ensure	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  collective	  enterprise.	  Similar	  to	  IWA,	  forbearance	  by	  the	  courts	  is	  central	  to	  IAA.	  However,	  dispute	  resolution	  with	  this	  form	  of	  governance	  is	  also	  mediated	  by	  the	  organizational	  code,	  which	  discourages	  exploitation	  and	  conflict	  by	  agents,	  and	  ensures	  individual	  actors	  come	  together	  and	  collectively	  decide	  the	  path	  of	  search.276	  	  	  While	  IAA	  appears	  preferably	  to	  IWA	  when	  conducting	  any	  type	  of	  heuristic	  search,	  it	  is	  only	  appropriate	  for	  highly	  complex	  problems.	  As	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger	  note,	  “the	  costs	  associated	  with	  supporting	  extreme	  levels	  of	  knowledge	  transfer	  are	  substantial	  and	  become	  unwarranted	  as	  problems	  diminish	  in	  their	  complexity.”277	  Simply	  put,	  the	  organizational	  costs	  for	  achieving	  consensus	  are	  high.	  As	  problems	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  274	  While	  Arrow	  was	  focused	  on	  firms,	  the	  same	  logic	  applies	  to	  government.	  275	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  626,	  627.	  276	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  627.	  277	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  627.	  
	   111	  
move	  from	  high-­‐interaction	  to	  moderate-­‐interaction,	  hence	  as	  they	  become	  less	  complex,	  less	  costly	  organizational	  forms	  are	  desirable.	  Moreover,	  as	  IAA	  requires	  low-­‐powered	  incentives	  to	  ensure	  knowledge	  transfer,	  the	  side	  effect	  is	  a	  natural	  constraint	  on	  the	  motivation	  of	  actors	  within	  the	  government	  to	  develop	  new	  knowledge,	  and	  search	  for	  solutions.	  Therefore,	  while	  IAA	  as	  an	  organizational	  form	  is	  highly	  appropriate	  for	  nondecomposable	  problems,	  their	  cost	  structures	  suggest	  they	  should	  only	  be	  adopted	  in	  highly	  appropriate	  situations.278	  	  
	  
THE	  FRAMEWORK	  AND	  ALIGNMENT	  –	  PROBLEMS,	  SEARCH	  AND	  
GOVERNANCE	  
	  It	  is	  useful	  to	  refer	  back	  to	  Figure	  6	  and	  explicitly	  review	  the	  discrete	  alignment	  between	  the	  search	  needs	  of	  problems,	  and	  search	  costs	  and	  performance	  of	  the	  different	  organizational	  forms.	  In	  the	  Figure,	  the	  stylized	  costs	  of	  the	  three	  organizational	  alternatives	  are	  matched	  over	  a	  range	  of	  problems	  that	  vary	  in	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  design	  choices	  interact.	  For	  sake	  of	  simplicity,	  the	  horizontal	  axis	  in	  Figure	  5	  is	  a	  continuous	  measure	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  design	  set	  interaction,	  holding	  the	  number	  of	  design	  elements	  constant.	  The	  vertical	  axis	  represents	  the	  expected	  cost	  to	  government	  of	  finding	  a	  valuable,	  or	  workable,	  solution.	  279	  	  	  As	  Figure	  6	  clearly	  illustrates,	  OM	  most	  efficiently	  governs	  low-­‐interaction	  problems,	  IWA	  most	  efficiently	  governs	  moderate-­‐interaction	  problems,	  and	  IAA	  most	  efficiently	  governs	  high-­‐interaction	  problems.	  Outsource-­‐markets	  effectively	  promotes	  knowledge	  specialization	  and	  directional	  search,	  which	  are	  highly	  suited	  to	  low-­‐interaction	  problems.	  However,	  knowledge	  accumulation	  and	  knowledge	  appropriation	  hazards	  ensure	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  OM	  governance	  (indicated	  in	  Figure	  6	  by	  OM(K))	  increases	  rapidly	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  design	  set	  interaction	  increases.	  For	  low-­‐interaction	  problems,	  the	  cost	  of	  insource-­‐Weberian	  administration	  (indicated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  278	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  627.	  279	  	  Ibid.,	  page	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in	  Figure	  6	  by	  IWA(K))	  is	  greater	  than	  markets,	  reflecting	  the	  inability	  of	  authority	  to	  efficiently	  incentivize	  directional	  search.	  As	  problem	  complexity	  increases,	  from	  low-­‐interaction	  to	  moderate-­‐interaction	  (indicated	  in	  Figure	  6,	  points	  between	  K1	  and	  K2)	  the	  relative	  cost	  of	  IWA	  decreases,	  suggesting	  that	  IWA	  is	  the	  most	  efficient	  organizational	  form	  to	  conduct	  search.280	  Similarly,	  as	  problems	  become	  ever	  more	  complex,	  the	  costs	  of	  IWA	  increase	  rapidly	  as	  managers	  lack	  the	  necessary	  knowledge	  and	  capacity	  to	  effectively	  guide	  search.	  Therefore,	  as	  problem	  complexity	  increases,	  from	  moderate-­‐interaction	  to	  high-­‐interaction,	  the	  relative	  cost	  of	  insource-­‐agency	  administration	  (indicated	  in	  Figure	  6	  by	  IAA(K))	  decreases.	  Therefore,	  IAA	  is	  the	  appropriate	  form	  of	  governance	  with	  levels	  of	  interaction	  greater	  than	  K2.281	  To	  summarize	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  problem,	  search,	  and	  governance	  type,	  refer	  to	  Table	  1	  (see	  following	  page).282	  	  	  
THE	  FRAMEWORK	  AND	  THE	  ERH	  PROJECT	  	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  chapter,	  we	  identified	  the	  need	  for	  a	  framework	  to	  help	  us	  think	  about	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  project.	  Recall	  that	  during	  this	  phase	  of	  the	  EHR	  initiative,	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  split	  the	  project	  into	  two	  distinct	  parts	  (or	  two	  problems	  that	  required	  attention).	  The	  SSHA,	  a	  newly	  established	  government	  agency,	  was	  tasked	  with	  developing	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  network	  infrastructure	  problem,	  while	  the	  MOHLTC,	  a	  traditional	  line	  department,	  was	  tasked	  with	  solving	  the	  software	  problem.	  Were	  these	  two	  styles	  of	  organization	  appropriate	  to	  solve	  these	  particular	  problems?	  If	  not,	  what	  were	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  ultimate	  success	  of	  the	  EHR	  project?	  With	  the	  framework	  now	  firmly	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  280	  The	  cost	  curves	  in	  Figure	  5	  are	  all	  upwards	  slopping,	  which	  intuitively	  suggests	  that	  OM	  is	  the	  most	  desirable	  (lowest	  cost)	  form	  of	  governance.	  However,	  recall	  that	  the	  highest	  peak	  of	  the	  solution	  landscape,	  hence	  the	  most	  valuable	  solution,	  increases	  with	  knowledge	  set	  interaction.	  Therefore,	  the	  relevant	  issue	  is	  finding	  the	  lowest	  governance	  cost	  for	  any	  given	  problem.	  For	  more,	  see:	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  p.	  627,	  628.	  281	  	  Nickerson	  and	  Zenger,	  A	  Knowledge-­Based	  Theory	  of	  the	  Firm	  -­	  the	  Problem-­Solving	  Perspective,	  pp.	  627,	  628.	  282	  	  Ibid.,	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place,	  we	  can	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  project,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  why	  this	  worthwhile	  initiative	  ended	  as	  project	  fiasco.	  	  
TABLE	  1	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  In	  chapter	  three	  we	  described	  the	  Ontario	  EHR	  initiative,	  one	  of	  the	  more	  interesting	  Canadian	  examples	  of	  a	  project	  fiasco.	  Despite	  the	  public	  nature	  of	  this	  fiasco,	  relatively	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  as	  to	  why	  the	  project	  failed	  to	  deliver	  on	  its	  promise.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  investigation	  by	  Ontario’s	  Auditor	  General,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  fiasco,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  exists,	  appears	  superficial.	  To	  facilitate	  a	  more	  nuanced	  analysis,	  the	  preceding	  chapters	  developed	  two	  frameworks	  to	  help	  us	  think	  about	  the	  design	  phase,	  and	  the	  implementation	  phase,	  of	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  project.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  apply	  these	  frameworks	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  more	  informed	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  project	  fiasco.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  begins	  by	  briefly	  reviewing	  the	  conventional	  explanations	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  fiasco,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  Auditor	  General’s	  report.	  The	  chapter	  then	  proceeds	  in	  the	  same	  fashion	  as	  this	  thesis.	  We	  begin	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  implementation	  issues	  facing	  the	  EHR	  project	  and	  apply	  the	  framework	  developed	  in	  chapter	  four.	  Through	  our	  analysis,	  we	  conclude	  that	  the	  decentralized	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  province	  resulted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  structural	  problems	  for	  the	  EHR	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project,	  and	  helped	  contribute	  to	  the	  fiasco.	  We	  then	  continue	  our	  analysis	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  applying	  the	  framework	  developed	  in	  chapter	  five,	  while	  paying	  specific	  attention	  to	  the	  EHR	  software	  problem.	  We	  argue	  that	  the	  government	  misdiagnosed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  software	  problem,	  and	  adopted	  an	  inappropriate	  strategy	  to	  search	  for	  a	  software	  solution,	  contributing	  to	  the	  fiasco.	  In	  the	  final	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter	  we	  summarize	  the	  critical	  error	  made	  during	  the	  EHR	  initiative,	  speculate	  on	  why	  decisions	  were	  made,	  and	  suggest	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  organizing	  such	  a	  project.	  	  	  
CONVENTIONAL	  EXPLANATIONS	  OF	  THE	  EHR	  PROJECT	  FIASCO	  	  In	  chapter	  two,	  we	  identified	  a	  number	  of	  challenges	  that	  jurisdictions	  outside	  of	  Ontario	  experienced	  when	  implementing	  ehealth	  systems.	  While	  each	  implementation	  experience	  is	  unique,	  a	  few	  themes	  emerged	  including	  user	  resistance,	  uneven	  adoption,	  lack	  of	  clinician	  buy-­‐in,	  and	  insufficient	  ICT	  literacy	  amongst	  system	  users.	  These	  ehealth	  system	  challenges,	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  require	  attention	  but	  are	  unlikely	  to	  lead	  directly	  to	  project	  failure,	  or	  worse,	  fiasco.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  these	  challenges	  emerged	  across	  Ontario	  as	  healthcare	  organizations	  tried	  to	  implement	  EHR	  and	  EMR	  systems.283	  Hence,	  notwithstanding	  the	  major	  issues	  identified	  below,	  Ontario	  experienced	  many	  of	  the	  same	  nuts	  and	  bolts	  problems	  that	  have	  beset	  other	  ehealth	  projects	  in	  similar	  jurisdictions.	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  For	  more,	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  Nancy	  Gill,	  Kevin	  Leonard	  and	  Anthony	  Jonker,	  "Does	  E-­‐Health	  Adoption	  Enable	  Improved	  Health	  Outcomes?	  Encouraging	  Evidence	  from	  Ontario	  Hospitals,"	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  Quarterly	  13,	  no.	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  (2010),	  pp.	  50-­‐56;	  Patrick	  Powers,	  "Canada's	  E-­‐Health	  Journey	  and	  HIMSS	  Analytics'	  Canada	  Information	  and	  Communications	  Technology	  Study,"	  Healthcare	  Quarterly	  12,	  no.	  1	  (2008),	  pp.	  120-­‐123;	  John	  Ronson,	  "Local	  Health	  Integration	  Networks:	  Will	  "made	  in	  Ontario"	  Work?"	  Healthcare	  
Quarterly	  9,	  no.	  1	  (2006),	  pp.	  46-­‐49.	  ;	  Sara	  Urowitz	  and	  others,	  "Is	  Canada	  Ready	  for	  Patient	  Accessible	  Electronic	  Heath	  Records?	  A	  National	  Scan,"	  BMC	  Medical	  Informatics	  and	  Decision	  Making	  8,	  no.	  33	  (2008).	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In	  October	  2009,	  the	  Auditor	  General	  of	  Ontario,	  Jim	  McCarter,	  released	  a	  special	  report	  outlining	  the	  systemic	  problems	  plaguing	  the	  EHR	  project.284	  This	  report	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  popular	  narrative	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  fiasco,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  why	  it	  occurred.	  In	  the	  report,	  the	  Auditor	  identified	  three	  critical	  issues:	  (1)	  improper	  contracting	  procedures,	  (2)	  a	  lack	  of	  project	  oversight,	  and	  (3)	  the	  failure	  to	  develop	  a	  strategic	  plan.	  	  	  The	  first	  issue	  involved	  the	  SSHA	  and	  the	  MOHLTC,	  and	  later	  eHealth	  Ontario,	  failing	  to	  follow	  established	  procedures	  for	  the	  procurement	  of	  goods	  and	  the	  contracting	  of	  services.	  As	  previously	  noted	  in	  chapter	  three,	  the	  EHR	  project	  relied	  heavily	  (at	  some	  points	  totally)	  on	  the	  use	  of	  outside	  consultants.	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  in	  2008,	  the	  MOHLTC	  was	  engaging	  more	  than	  300	  consultants,	  with	  fewer	  than	  30	  full-­‐time	  ministry	  employees	  working	  on	  the	  project.285	  While	  the	  technical	  nature	  of	  the	  project	  may	  have	  required	  some	  degree	  of	  specialized	  consulting	  advice,	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  consultants	  employed,	  and	  the	  remuneration	  they	  received,	  was	  a	  serious	  issue	  of	  concern.	  More	  importantly,	  as	  the	  Auditor	  noted,	  the	  hiring	  of	  consultants	  did	  follow	  established	  procedures,	  and	  value-­‐for-­‐money	  (VFM)	  was	  not	  realized.	  Much	  of	  the	  public	  backlash	  towards	  the	  project,	  captured	  by	  sensational	  media	  headlines,286	  was	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  hiring	  of	  preferred	  consultants,	  and	  the	  abuse	  of	  public	  dollars	  throughout	  the	  project.	  The	  circumvention	  of	  established	  protocols	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  hiring	  of	  consultants.	  As	  the	  Auditor	  noted,	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  (2009).	  285	  	  McCarter,	  Special	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  Electronic	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  "Health	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  a	  Day,	  Documents	  show;	  CEO	  of	  eHealth	  Ontario	  also	  Got	  Six-­‐Figure	  Bonus,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  06,	  May	  29,	  2009.;	  Tanya	  Talaga,	  "Critics	  Roast	  Government	  Over	  $647M	  Boondoggle;	  Ontario's	  Abandoned	  Medical	  e-­‐Records	  Plan	  Called	  a	  Waste	  of	  Cash,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  01,	  August	  8,	  2009.;	  Tanya	  Talaga,	  "1	  Speech	  5	  Consultants	  3,356	  Words	  the	  Cost	  to	  You	  $25,001;	  1	  Speech,	  6	  Consultants,	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  Words	  $24,675.28,"	  
Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  01,	  August	  8,	  2009.;	  Tanya	  Talaga,	  "Time	  to	  Move	  Beyond	  Scandal,	  Embattled	  Health	  Minister	  Says;	  as	  Controversy	  Rages	  Over	  eHealth	  Spending,	  'Ontario	  is	  Behind'	  on	  Meeting	  its	  Goals,"	  Toronto	  Star,	  sec.	  A	  21,	  August	  20,	  2009.	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the	  allegations	  that	  [procurement]	  contracts	  were	  awarded	  to	  certain	  vendors	  without	  giving	  other	  firms	  the	  chance	  to	  compete	  for	  the	  business	  were	  largely	  true.	  In	  fact,	  we	  estimate	  that	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  value…	  of	  all	  contracts	  was	  sole-­‐sourced.287	  	  The	  second	  critical	  issue	  identified	  by	  the	  Auditor	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  overall	  political	  oversight	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  from	  conceptualization	  to	  realization.	  The	  Auditor	  strongly	  questioned	  the	  political	  decision	  to	  have	  two	  entities	  at	  arms	  length	  from	  each	  other	  develop	  an	  EHR	  solution,	  with	  the	  SSHA	  working	  on	  the	  network	  problem,	  and	  the	  MOHLTC	  working	  on	  the	  software	  problem.	  In	  the	  Auditor’s	  view,	  this	  strategy	  was	  inherently	  problematic,	  because	  it	  depended	  on	  both	  entities	  cooperating	  and	  coordinating	  their	  activities.	  When	  this	  failed	  to	  materialize,	  political	  decision	  makers	  largely	  failed	  to	  act.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  2008,	  when	  serious	  problems	  emerged,	  that	  the	  project	  was	  completely	  reorganized,	  and	  all	  problem-­‐solving	  activities	  became	  the	  responsibility	  of	  one	  agency,	  eHealth	  Ontario.	  Much	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  failure,	  according	  to	  the	  Auditor,	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  oversight,	  with	  decision	  makers	  asleep	  at	  the	  switch	  while	  the	  project	  drifted	  and	  expended	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars.288	  	  	  The	  final	  major	  criticism	  identified	  by	  the	  Auditor	  involved	  a	  lack	  of	  strategic	  planning	  for	  the	  EHR	  project.	  While	  the	  project	  was	  formally	  launched	  in	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  government	  failed	  to	  develop	  an	  upfront	  strategic	  plan,	  leaving	  different	  units	  within	  the	  healthcare	  system	  to	  their	  own	  devices.	  For	  example,	  while	  the	  government	  established	  the	  SSHA	  to	  develop	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  network	  problem,	  it	  was	  never	  clear	  how	  this	  network	  ought	  to	  work	  with	  the	  MOHLTC’s	  software	  solution,	  or	  how	  healthcare	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  general	  public	  would	  be	  able	  to	  functionally	  use	  and	  access	  the	  network.	  The	  issues	  arising	  from	  not	  having	  an	  initial	  strategic	  plan	  were	  compounded	  by	  a	  failure	  to	  develop	  one	  in	  subsequent	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years.289	  It	  was	  not	  until	  2009	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  produced	  its	  first	  ever	  eHealth	  strategic	  plan,	  and	  as	  Auditor	  noted,	  “although	  we	  welcome	  the	  plan,	  it	  is	  an	  overall	  Health	  strategic	  plan,	  not	  an	  EHR	  plan.”290	  From	  2000	  to	  2010,	  the	  period	  under	  investigation,	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  government	  projects	  in	  Ontario,	  a	  billion	  dollar	  initiative,	  operated	  without	  a	  strategic	  plan.	  	  	  The	  three	  major	  issues	  identified	  by	  the	  Auditor	  General	  certainly	  help	  to	  shed	  light	  why	  the	  EHR	  initiative	  resulted	  in	  a	  project	  fiasco.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  a	  lack	  strategic	  planning,	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  oversight,	  and	  improper	  contracting	  procedures	  did	  not	  engender	  a	  climate	  conducive	  to	  fiasco.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  analysis	  and	  critique	  offered	  by	  the	  Auditor	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  superficial.	  Clearly,	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  strategic	  plan,	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  is	  a	  cause	  for	  concern.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  if	  a	  strategic	  plan	  had	  existed,	  the	  project	  would	  have	  succeeded.	  Hence,	  while	  the	  lack	  of	  strategic	  plan	  has	  been	  invoked	  as	  a	  rational	  to	  explain	  the	  fiasco,	  more	  important	  questions	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  answered:	  What	  would	  an	  effective	  strategic	  plan	  have	  looked	  like?	  How	  should	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  have	  approached	  the	  problem	  of	  managing	  the	  vast	  amounts	  of	  patient	  information	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system?	  What	  were	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  approaches	  undertaken	  by	  the	  SSHA,	  the	  MOHLTC,	  and	  eHealth	  Ontario?	  A	  similar	  logic	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  contracting	  procedures.	  Hence,	  notwithstanding	  improper	  procedures,	  was	  it	  appropriate,	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  use	  of	  outside	  consultants	  to	  help	  facilitate	  the	  search	  for	  an	  EHR	  solution?	  In	  what	  follows,	  we	  implicitly	  suggest	  that	  all	  of	  the	  issues	  raised	  by	  the	  Auditor	  can	  be	  addressed	  more	  thoroughly	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  implementation	  and	  design	  phases	  of	  the	  EHR	  project.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  289	  	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  pp.	  18-­‐20	  290	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  8.	  
	   121	  
THE	  IMPLEMENTATION	  PHASE	  AND	  THE	  DECENTRALIZED	  APPROACH	  	  In	  chapter	  four,	  we	  employed	  a	  game	  theoretic	  framework	  to	  examine	  two	  different	  types	  of	  solutions,	  independent	  and	  interdependent.	  We	  concluded	  that	  EHR	  solutions	  are	  interdependent,	  which	  suggests	  that	  actors	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system	  ought	  to	  cooperate	  and	  coordinate	  on	  one	  solution.	  By	  looking	  at	  implementation	  considerations	  first,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  should	  have	  focused	  all	  its	  energies	  on	  developing	  one	  interoperable	  EHR	  system	  for	  the	  province.	  	  One	  of	  the	  curious	  features	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  was	  the	  decentralized	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  province	  to	  develop	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  patient	  information	  management	  problem.	  As	  multiple	  commentators	  have	  demonstrated,	  the	  decentralized	  governance	  approach	  resulted	  in	  independent	  organizations	  each	  developing	  their	  own	  EHR	  systems,	  which	  although	  functional,	  are	  not	  interoperable.291	  As	  of	  2010,	  the	  Canadian	  Medical	  Association	  (CMA)	  notes	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  twenty	  (non-­‐interoperable)	  EHR	  systems	  operating	  across	  Ontario	  in	  different	  LHINs,	  specialized	  agencies,	  and	  hospital	  networks.292	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  chapter	  four,	  it	  is	  more	  beneficial,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  for	  the	  healthcare	  system	  as	  whole	  to	  operate	  with	  only	  one	  EHR	  system.	  The	  history	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  decentralized	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  province,	  raises	  three	  questions:	  (1)	  Why	  did	  independent	  healthcare	  organizations	  fail	  to	  cooperate	  and	  coordinate	  on	  one	  EHR	  system?	  (2)	  What	  were	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  decentralized	  approach?	  We	  address	  these	  questions	  in	  turn.	  The	  larger	  question	  (3),	  of	  why	  the	  government	  chose	  to	  adopt	  the	  decentralized	  approach,	  will	  be	  considered	  near	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter.	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  The	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  question	  is	  obvious:	  independent	  healthcare	  organizations	  failed	  to	  cooperate	  and	  coordinate	  because	  it	  was	  in	  their	  own	  self-­‐interest,	  and	  because	  the	  MOHLTC	  encouraged	  this	  behavior.	  In	  chapter	  four,	  we	  explored	  how	  government	  can	  exercise	  its	  authority	  to	  facilitate	  cooperation	  and	  coordination	  on	  interdependent	  solutions.	  We	  suggested	  that	  government	  could	  be	  proactive,	  and	  use	  either	  incentives	  or	  rules	  to	  facilitate	  the	  adoption	  of	  one	  EHR	  system.	  However,	  it	  also	  true	  that	  government	  can	  establish	  incentives	  that	  discourage	  cooperation	  and	  coordination.	  During	  the	  EHR	  project,	  the	  government	  provided	  a	  set	  of	  financial	  incentives	  to	  local	  healthcare	  organizations	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  EMR	  and	  EHR	  systems.	  Moreover,	  formal	  governance	  agreements,	  like	  the	  Hospital	  Accountability	  Agreements	  (HAA),	  specifically	  tied	  funding	  to	  the	  development	  and	  adoption	  of	  local	  EHR	  solutions.293	  Not	  surprisingly,	  self-­‐interested	  healthcare	  organizations	  developed	  EHR/EMR	  systems	  that	  suited	  their	  own	  unique	  needs,	  without	  consideration	  to	  what	  other	  healthcare	  organizations	  were	  doing.	  In	  effect,	  the	  government	  got	  the	  incentives	  backwards,	  encouraging	  (consciously	  or	  unconsciously)	  the	  development	  of	  independent	  EHR	  solutions.	  As	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapter	  four	  suggests,	  independent	  healthcare	  organizations,	  left	  to	  their	  own	  devices,	  will	  coordinate	  internally	  on	  one	  EHR	  system.	  However,	  once	  EHR	  systems	  are	  operational,	  independent	  organizations	  will	  fail	  to	  cooperate.	  What	  is	  surprising	  is	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  discouraged	  (consciously	  or	  unconsciously)	  independent	  healthcare	  organization	  from	  cooperating	  by	  actively	  supporting	  (with	  money)	  their	  independent	  EHR	  solutions.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  MOHLTC	  was	  not	  the	  only	  player	  encouraging	  (hence,	  incentivizing)	  this	  uncooperative	  behavior.	  Infoway,	  the	  federal	  agency	  responsible	  for	  ehealth,	  exacerbated	  the	  problem	  by	  funding	  independent	  EMR	  and	  EHR	  projects	  across	  the	  province.	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What	  were	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  decentralized	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  province?	  First,	  we	  can	  consider	  costs.	  Recall	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  was	  spending	  millions	  of	  dollars	  on	  its	  own	  central	  EHR	  solution,	  while	  simultaneously	  spending	  millions	  more	  on	  the	  systems	  of	  local	  (publically	  funded)	  healthcare	  organizations.	  As	  the	  CMA	  noted	  in	  2010,	  the	  cost	  of	  developing	  one	  these	  local	  systems	  is	  upwards	  of	  $100	  million.294	  With	  over	  twenty	  independent	  EHR	  systems	  now	  operating	  across	  Ontario,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  government	  of	  Ontario	  has	  effectively	  spent	  billions	  dollars	  trying	  to	  develop	  an	  EHR	  solution.295	  	  	  The	  second	  implication	  is	  that	  these	  twenty	  independent	  systems	  necessarily	  detract	  from	  each	  other.	  Recall	  our	  extended	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  four,	  which	  demonstrated	  that	  failure	  to	  cooperate	  on	  one	  EHR	  solution	  resulted	  in	  a	  significant	  loss	  of	  benefit	  to	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  By	  adopting	  a	  decentralized	  approach,	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  virtually	  ensured	  that	  multiple	  systems	  would	  be	  constructed,	  and	  that	  the	  potential	  value,	  or	  net	  benefit,	  of	  these	  systems	  would	  not	  be	  realized.	  The	  problematic	  nature	  of	  this	  decentralized	  approach	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  a	  simple	  example.	  Consider	  a	  person	  from	  Sudbury,	  who	  has	  an	  electronic	  patient	  record	  stored	  in	  the	  North	  East	  LHIN	  EHR	  system.	  This	  person	  uses	  the	  healthcare	  system	  regularly,	  and	  is	  allergic	  to	  number	  of	  drugs.	  While	  on	  vacation	  in	  Kingston,	  the	  person	  gets	  sick	  and	  arrives	  unconscious	  at	  the	  emergency	  department	  of	  the	  local	  hospital.	  The	  Kingston	  hospital,	  which	  uses	  the	  South	  East	  LHIN	  EHR	  system,	  cannot	  get	  access	  to	  the	  persons’	  medical	  record,	  because	  its	  system	  is	  not	  interoperable	  with	  the	  North	  East	  LHIN	  EHR	  system.	  The	  doctors	  treat	  the	  person	  using	  conventional	  methods,	  but	  a	  drug	  reaction	  occurs,	  resulting	  in	  anaphylactic	  shock	  and	  death.	  If	  the	  systems	  had	  been	  interoperable,	  the	  doctors	  would	  have	  treated	  the	  patient	  differently,	  preventing	  an	  unnecessary	  death.	  The	  implication	  of	  this	  example	  is	  that	  developing	  one	  EHR	  system,	  however	  imperfect,	  and	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  Says,	  pp.	  253-­‐254.	  295	  Employing	  the	  CMA	  estimate,	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  the	  net	  cost	  of	  these	  twenty	  systems	  was	  roughly	  $2	  billion.	  In	  additional,	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  spent	  roughly	  $1	  billion	  on	  the	  central	  EHR	  project.	  All	  things	  considered,	  between	  2000	  and	  2010,	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  the	  net	  cost	  to	  the	  public	  purse	  for	  the	  EHR	  project	  was	  roughly	  $3	  billion.	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aggregating	  all	  records	  into	  that	  system	  would	  ultimately	  be	  more	  effective	  for	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  by	  late	  2007,	  some	  policy	  analysts	  at	  the	  MOHLTC	  clearly	  realized	  the	  predicament	  they	  had	  created	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	  decentralized	  approach.	  A	  draft	  plan,	  created	  by	  the	  MOHLTC,	  was	  circulated	  to	  expand	  the	  EHR	  system	  used	  by	  the	  Hospital[s]	  for	  Sick	  Children,	  eCHN.	  Under	  that	  plan,	  the	  eCHN	  solution	  would	  have	  become	  the	  universal	  EHR	  system	  for	  the	  province,	  and	  all	  healthcare	  organizations	  would	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  adopt	  it.296	  Therefore,	  at	  some	  level,	  analysts	  were	  considering	  the	  long-­‐term	  EHR	  implementation	  problems	  plaguing	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  However,	  for	  reasons	  unexplained,	  this	  plan	  was	  never	  adopted.	  The	  government	  simply	  continued	  to	  encourage	  independent	  healthcare	  organizations	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  EHR	  solutions,	  and	  therefore	  discouraged	  (or	  did	  not	  actively	  encourage)	  these	  organizations	  to	  cooperate.	  	  By	  failing	  to	  fully	  consider	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  the	  project,	  and	  the	  interdependent	  nature	  of	  EHR	  solutions,	  the	  government	  generated	  a	  host	  a	  problems.	  With	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  strategic	  plan,	  which	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  would	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  government	  fund	  the	  development	  of	  only	  one	  system.	  Moreover,	  a	  prudent	  plan	  would	  have	  established	  a	  set	  of	  incentives	  to	  dissuade	  independent	  organizations	  from	  developing	  their	  own	  EHR	  solutions.	  Alternatively,	  the	  plan	  could	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  government	  simply	  legislate	  a	  solution,	  establishing	  a	  rule	  whereby	  publically	  funded	  healthcare	  organizations	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  ehealth	  systems.297	  In	  either	  case,	  an	  effective	  strategic	  plan	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  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  p.	  18.	  297	  While	  the	  rules	  based	  expression	  might	  appear	  draconian,	  it	  is	  the	  approach	  currently	  being	  advocated	  by	  Doug	  Tessier,	  the	  Senior	  VP	  of	  Development	  and	  Implementation	  at	  eHealth	  Ontario.	  Tessier	  argues	  that	  once	  a	  central	  system	  is	  fully	  operational,	  the	  government	  should	  legislated,	  or	  regulate,	  its	  compulsory	  use.	  For	  more,	  see:	  Ontario's	  Plan	  for	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  is	  at	  Risk,	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ought	  to	  consider,	  or	  ensure,	  that	  all	  actors	  in	  the	  healthcare	  system	  cooperate	  and	  coordinate	  on	  one	  EHR	  solution.	  	  	  With	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  complete,	  we	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  design	  phase,	  and	  the	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  the	  SSHA,	  the	  MOHLTC,	  and	  eHealth	  Ontario.	  Recall	  that	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  adopted	  a	  dual	  tract	  approach	  to	  the	  project,	  simultaneously	  funding	  the	  design	  of	  a	  central	  EHR	  system,	  and	  many	  independent	  EHR	  and	  EMR	  systems	  across	  the	  province.	  If	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  implementation	  phase	  is	  correct,	  and	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  an	  effective	  EHR	  solution	  is	  one	  system,	  then	  it	  is	  worth	  investigating	  how	  the	  government	  approached	  the	  centralized	  effort.	  Therefore,	  in	  what	  follows,	  we	  apply	  the	  framework	  developed	  in	  chapter	  five	  to	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  project.	  	  	  
THE	  DESIGN	  PHASE	  AND	  THE	  ELECTRONIC	  NETWORK	  PROBLEM	  	  During	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  project,	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  made	  an	  ostensibly	  reasonable	  decision	  to	  split	  the	  EHR	  project	  into	  two	  distinct	  parts:	  a	  network	  problem,	  and	  a	  software	  problem.	  In	  this	  section	  we	  apply	  the	  framework	  developed	  in	  chapter	  five	  to	  the	  network	  problem,	  leaving	  software	  problem	  consideration	  for	  later.	  	  In	  2002,	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  established	  a	  crown	  agency,	  the	  SSHA,	  to	  address	  two	  interrelated	  parts	  of	  the	  EHR	  project.	  As	  previously	  noted,	  the	  SSHA	  was	  given	  the	  task	  of	  developing	  a	  secure	  electronic	  network	  on	  which	  patient	  data	  (the	  software)	  could	  travel,	  and	  providing	  terminals	  (or	  access	  points)	  from	  which	  users	  could	  input	  and	  retrieve	  patient	  data.	  298	  The	  first	  step	  in	  applying	  the	  framework	  developed	  in	  chapter	  five	  is	  to	  diagnose	  the	  nature	  of	  network	  problem	  –	  i.e.,	  whether	  it	  was	  decomposable,	  nondecomposable,	  or	  nearly	  decomposable	  problem.	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  Acquiring,	  or	  developing,	  a	  new	  secure	  electronic	  network	  and	  the	  associated	  terminals,	  it	  can	  be	  argued,	  is	  a	  decomposable	  problem.	  The	  network	  component	  of	  the	  problem	  involved	  a	  set	  of	  interchangeable	  pieces,	  including	  fiber	  optic	  cables,	  network	  cards,	  hubs,	  bridges,	  circuits,	  switches	  and	  routers.	  Between	  2002	  and	  2004,	  the	  SSHA	  outsourced	  its	  responsibilities	  to	  a	  number	  of	  commercial	  providers,	  who	  facilitated	  procurement	  and	  operational	  considerations.	  During	  this	  period,	  the	  SSHA	  simply	  acted	  as	  a	  service	  coordinator.299	  Once	  the	  core	  pieces	  of	  the	  network	  were	  connected,	  a	  secure	  private	  network	  was	  established.300	  In	  the	  period	  after	  2004,	  the	  SSHA	  mission	  changed.	  In	  order	  to	  more	  successfully	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  broader	  healthcare	  community,	  the	  SSHA	  moved	  to	  an	  in-­‐house	  infrastructure	  development	  model,	  and	  took	  over	  responsibility	  for	  operating	  the	  network.301	  While	  this	  network	  problem	  is	  decomposable,	  it	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  the	  solution	  is	  necessarily	  cheap.	  Developing	  a	  private	  network	  is	  very	  expensive,	  particularly	  on	  the	  scale	  required	  for	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  healthcare	  systems.	  	  The	  framework	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  five	  suggests	  that	  when	  government	  tries	  to	  locate	  solutions	  to	  decomposable	  problems,	  they	  should	  adopt	  the	  outsource-­‐markets	  (OM)	  form	  of	  governance.	  In	  some	  ways,	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  adopted	  this	  approach,	  insofar	  as	  they	  contracted	  solutions	  for	  the	  various	  parts	  of	  this	  decomposable	  problem.	  However,	  the	  government	  initially	  chose	  to	  establish	  a	  separate	  crown	  agency,	  with	  its	  own	  bureaucracy,	  to	  facilitate	  the	  contracting.	  What	  is	  particularly	  curious	  about	  this	  decision	  was	  that	  the	  SSHA	  did	  not	  operate	  as	  a	  traditional	  independent	  agency.	  As	  the	  2006	  Operational	  Review	  noted,	  “the	  advantages	  offered	  by	  an	  agency	  construct	  have	  been	  diminished	  by	  the	  SSHA	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operating	  more	  as	  a	  Ministry	  division	  than	  an	  independent	  agency.”302	  It	  is	  unclear	  from	  the	  evidence	  why	  the	  government	  when	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  organization	  and	  bureaucracy	  (the	  SSHA)	  to	  effectively	  duplicate	  the	  work	  that	  could	  have	  been	  facilitated	  within	  the	  MOHLTC.	  	  While	  not	  specifically	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  five,	  we	  can	  infer	  from	  the	  framework	  that	  an	  independent	  agency	  form	  of	  governance	  would	  be	  able	  to	  locate	  solutions	  to	  decomposable	  problems,	  albeit	  at	  an	  inflated	  cost.	  Put	  another	  way,	  an	  agency	  form	  of	  governance	  is	  an	  expensive	  approach	  to	  undertake	  a	  search	  for	  solutions	  to	  this	  type	  of	  problem.	  In	  2009,	  the	  Auditor	  noted	  that	  the	  SSHA	  received	  an	  inordinate	  share	  of	  the	  blame	  for	  the	  EHR	  project	  fiasco,	  despite	  delivering	  on	  its	  promise	  (i.e.	  a	  functional	  network).303	  While	  the	  Auditor	  criticized	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  developing	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  network	  problem,	  a	  solution	  was	  delivered.	  With	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  the	  network	  problem	  should	  have	  been	  approached	  differently	  during	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  project.	  A	  coherent	  strategic	  plan	  would	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  OM	  form	  be	  employed	  to	  solve	  this	  problem.	  Therefore,	  the	  government	  should	  have	  contracted	  for	  the	  core	  components	  of	  the	  network	  as	  they	  did	  between	  2002-­‐2004,	  while	  leaving	  coordinative	  and	  operational	  aspects	  to	  the	  MOHLTC.	  Moreover,	  each	  independent	  healthcare	  organization	  should	  have	  contracted	  for	  their	  own	  terminals,	  acquiring	  solutions	  that	  best	  fit	  their	  internal	  needs.	  	  	  Our	  focus	  in	  this	  section	  has	  been	  on	  the	  network	  problem,	  and	  determining	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  establishing	  an	  independent	  agency	  to	  locate	  a	  solution.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  decisions	  taken	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  network	  problem	  generated	  two	  negative,	  and	  unintended,	  consequences.	  First,	  the	  SSHA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  302	  To	  be	  specific,	  the	  funding	  formula	  for	  the	  Agency	  was	  tied	  to	  the	  provincial	  Results	  Based	  Planning	  initiative,	  traditional	  used	  to	  allocate	  funds	  to	  line	  departments.	  The	  SSHA,	  therefore,	  did	  not	  have	  the	  room	  to	  truly	  operate	  independently,	  despite	  looking	  (and	  frequently	  acting)	  like	  an	  independent	  crown	  agency.	  For	  more,	  see:	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  Long	  Term	  Care,	  Government	  of	  Ontario,	  “Smart	  Systems	  for	  Health	  Agency,	  Operational	  Review,	  Final	  Report,”	  Toronto:	  Queen's	  Printer	  for	  Ontario,	  (2009),	  p.	  3.	  303	  	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  p.	  9.	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was	  tasked	  with	  developing	  an	  entirely	  new	  private	  network.	  Therefore,	  a	  decision	  was	  made	  to	  forgo	  using	  the	  Internet,	  a	  considerably	  cheaper	  alternative	  (virtually	  free),	  as	  it	  was	  deemed	  insufficiently	  secure	  to	  transmit	  private	  health	  records.	  The	  problem	  with	  developing	  a	  secure	  network	  is	  that	  only	  authorized	  healthcare	  providers	  would	  be	  connected.	  The	  implication,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  individual	  patients	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  access	  the	  network,	  or	  their	  records.	  Therefore,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  benefits	  of	  EHR	  systems	  in	  general,	  providing	  information	  directly	  to	  patients,304	  was	  lost	  by	  virtue	  of	  this	  decision.	  	  	  The	  second	  unintended	  consequence	  involved	  mission	  creep	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  SSHA.	  While	  the	  government	  viewed	  the	  SSHA	  as	  an	  IT	  infrastructure	  provider305	  the	  agency	  became	  actively	  involved	  in	  trying	  to	  facilitate	  the	  integration	  of	  evolving	  EHR	  systems	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  SSHA	  spawned	  its	  own	  Ontario	  Health	  Information	  Standards	  Committee	  (OHISC)	  and	  started	  working	  (unsuccessfully)	  with	  local	  healthcare	  organizations.306	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  system	  integration	  was	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  government,	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  SSHA	  simply	  complicated	  matters.	  Responsibility	  for	  coordinating	  system	  integration	  was	  ostensibly	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  MOHLTC,	  which	  had	  its	  own	  coordinative	  body,	  the	  Ontario	  e-­‐Health	  Council.	  Again,	  with	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  a	  coherent	  strategic	  plan	  that	  located	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  network	  problem	  from	  within	  the	  MOHLTC,	  would	  likely	  have	  prevented	  multiple	  integrative	  bodies	  (i.e.	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  Committee)	  from	  emerging	  within	  the	  center	  of	  government.	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  Paul	  C.	  Tang	  and	  others,	  "Personal	  Health	  Records:	  Definitions,	  Benefits,	  and	  Strategies	  for	  Overcoming	  Barriers	  to	  Adoption,"	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Informatics	  Association	  13,	  no.	  2	  (2006):	  121-­‐126.	  305	  	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  pp.	  21.	  306	  Jeffrey	  Roy,	  “E-­‐Health	  in	  Ontario:	  A	  Multi-­‐Dimensional	  Governance	  Transformation,”	  International	  
Journal	  of	  Healthcare	  Technology	  and	  Management	  8,	  no.	  1/2	  (2007),	  p.	  69.	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In	  this	  section,	  we	  apply	  the	  framework	  developed	  in	  chapter	  five	  to	  the	  second	  component	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  design	  phase,	  the	  software	  problem.	  We	  begin	  by	  examining	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  software	  problem,	  then	  review	  the	  organizational	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  to	  locate	  a	  solution(s),	  and	  finally	  apply	  the	  framework	  to	  analyze	  the	  approach.	  We	  conclude	  that	  the	  province	  misidentified	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  software	  problem,	  adopted	  an	  inappropriate	  organizational	  structure	  to	  search	  for	  a	  solution,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  problems	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  project	  fiasco.	  	  As	  described	  below,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  EHR	  software	  was	  a	  nondecomposable	  problem.	  The	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  involved	  creating	  a	  master	  patient	  index,	  and	  then	  aggregating	  all	  of	  the	  data	  produced	  by	  the	  healthcare	  system	  into	  this	  index.307	  Consider	  just	  one	  element	  of	  this	  problem:	  aggregating	  the	  12	  million	  diagnostic	  images	  produced	  every	  year	  by	  the	  Ontario	  healthcare	  system.	  One	  challenge	  is	  that	  different	  MRI	  machines	  produce	  scans	  in	  different	  formats.	  In	  chapter	  three	  we	  noted	  that	  hospital	  A	  might	  operate	  MRI	  machine	  B,	  which	  outputs	  scans	  in	  format	  C.	  Similarly,	  hospital	  X	  might	  operate	  MRI	  machine	  Y,	  which	  outputs	  scans	  in	  format	  Z.	  This	  same	  pattern	  plays	  out	  across	  Ontario	  with	  different	  types	  of	  MRI	  machines,	  and	  other	  diagnostic	  imaging	  tools.	  Developing	  one	  EHR	  system	  that	  can	  accept	  thousands	  of	  different	  input	  formats	  is	  exceedingly	  complicated.	  The	  software	  problem,	  therefore,	  had	  an	  extremely	  large	  number	  of	  design	  elements,	  which	  all	  interacted	  in	  a	  non-­‐simple	  way.308	  	  	  The	  EHR	  software	  problem,	  despite	  being	  a	  technically	  complicated	  undertaking,	  is	  also	  complex	  because	  presenting	  the	  aggregated	  data	  involves	  a	  series	  of	  design	  element	  tradeoffs	  that	  result	  from	  different	  individual	  user	  preference	  rankings.	  As	  Arrow’s	  impossibility	  theorem	  dictates,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  convert	  the	  ranked	  preferences	  (i.e.	  –	  data	  output	  preferences)	  of	  individuals	  into	  a	  universal	  ranking	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  307	  	  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  Initiative,	  pp.	  29,	  30.	  308	  	  Powers,	  Canada's	  E-­Health	  Journey	  and	  HIMSS	  Analytics'	  Canada	  Information	  and	  Communications	  
Technology	  Study,	  120-­‐123.	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preferences	  when	  there	  are	  three	  or	  more	  distinct	  alternatives.309	  Therefore,	  the	  complexity	  arises	  from	  the	  tradeoffs	  required	  when	  presenting	  the	  data	  through	  the	  software.	  In	  order	  to	  analyze	  the	  tradeoffs,	  and	  develop	  the	  best	  possible	  software	  to	  present	  that	  data	  (albeit,	  a	  Pareto	  suboptimal	  presentation),	  individuals	  with	  different	  knowledge	  sets	  are	  required	  to	  come	  together.	  Hence,	  searching	  for	  the	  (sub)optimal	  software	  solution	  requires	  a	  heuristic	  search	  strategy.	  	  	  The	  ideal	  solution	  to	  the	  technical	  nature	  of	  this	  nondecomposable	  problem	  would	  be	  the	  development	  of	  one	  tool,	  or	  piece	  of	  software,	  that	  could	  translate	  each	  of	  these	  different	  output	  formats	  into	  a	  universal,	  or	  standardized,	  format/code	  that	  could	  interact	  with	  the	  master	  patient	  index.	  The	  tool,	  therefore,	  becomes	  the	  mechanism	  through	  which	  all	  health	  information,	  in	  different	  formats,	  becomes	  interoperable.	  Developing	  such	  a	  tool	  is	  a	  highly	  complicated	  affair.	  It	  requires	  different	  software	  designers,	  with	  specialized	  knowledge	  sets,	  to	  come	  together	  and	  map	  the	  interaction	  amongst	  the	  differing	  formats	  and	  codes	  used	  in	  all	  legacy	  system.	  Given	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  legacy	  systems	  operating	  across	  Ontario,	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  any	  one	  designer	  would	  be	  able	  to	  single	  handily	  identify	  all	  of	  the	  software	  interactions.	  Put	  another	  way,	  given	  the	  complicated	  technical	  interactions	  of	  the	  software	  problem,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  a	  project	  manager	  would	  lack	  the	  necessary	  knowledge	  and	  capacity	  to	  effectively	  guide	  search.	  Therefore,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  developing	  such	  a	  tool	  (on	  its	  own)	  requires	  the	  collective	  knowledge	  of	  multiple	  independent	  actors,	  necessitating	  a	  (group)	  heuristic	  search	  strategy.	  Moreover,	  given	  the	  complexity	  arising	  from	  individual	  user	  preference	  rankings,	  the	  data	  presentation	  component	  of	  the	  software	  problem	  would	  certainly	  necessitate	  a	  heuristic	  search	  strategy.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  309	  To	  be	  more	  precise,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  convert	  the	  ranked	  preferences	  of	  individuals	  into	  a	  universal	  ranking	  that	  is	  complete	  and	  transitive,	  while	  also	  meeting	  a	  set	  of	  criteria	  that	  include	  unrestricted	  domain,	  Pareto	  efficiency,	  and	  the	  independence	  of	  irrelevant	  alternatives.	  For	  more,	  see:	  Kenneth	  Arrow,	  “A	  Difficulty	  in	  the	  Concept	  of	  Social	  Welfare,”	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Economy	  58,	  no.	  4	  (1950),	  pp.	  328-­‐346.	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While	  our	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  EHR	  software	  problem	  was	  nondecomposable,	  we	  can	  infer	  from	  the	  actions	  undertaken	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  that	  they	  considered	  it	  to	  be	  a	  decomposable	  problem.	  The	  province	  started	  with	  the	  premise	  that	  a	  master	  patient	  index,	  or	  ‘Client	  Registry’,	  was	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  EHR	  software	  solution,	  which	  would	  require	  various	  inputs.	  As	  opposed	  to	  creating	  one	  software	  tool	  to	  address	  the	  format	  input	  problem,	  the	  MOHLTC	  created	  a	  set	  of	  software	  pieces	  to	  deal	  with	  different	  elements	  of	  the	  problem.	  From	  2002-­‐2010,	  the	  MOHLTC	  worked	  separately	  on	  a	  Diagnostic	  Imaging	  System,	  a	  Laboratory	  Information	  System,	  a	  Drug	  Information	  System,	  and	  an	  Immunization	  System.	  In	  2008,	  the	  province	  also	  created	  a	  parallel	  Diabetes	  Registry,	  which	  would	  ostensibly	  work	  alongside	  the	  Client	  Registry	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  future.	  As	  the	  Auditor	  noted,	  creating	  a	  system	  of	  systems	  (Diagnostic,	  Laboratory,	  Drug,	  Immunization)	  required	  yet	  another	  piece	  of	  software	  to	  link	  each	  of	  these	  disparate	  components	  together.	  As	  of	  late	  2009,	  each	  of	  these	  systems	  could	  not	  communicate	  with	  each	  other,	  or	  with	  the	  Client	  Registry.	  The	  integrative	  piece	  of	  software,	  to	  be	  coupled	  with	  a	  portal	  (or	  viewer,	  to	  address	  the	  data	  presentation	  problem),	  is	  formally	  known	  as	  the	  “Health	  Information	  Access	  Layer”,	  however	  it	  does	  not	  yet	  exist.310	  	  	  By	  treating	  the	  software	  issue	  as	  a	  decomposable	  problem,	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  created	  new	  challenges	  for	  themselves.	  After	  years	  of	  development,	  the	  government	  has	  a	  set	  of	  systems	  that	  cannot	  communicate	  with	  each	  other.	  Each	  system,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  operational,	  functions	  independently.	  Moreover,	  each	  of	  these	  systems	  has	  their	  own	  unique	  standards	  and	  controls,	  making	  future	  integration	  exceedingly	  difficult.311	  It	  is	  worth	  recalling	  that	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  developing	  one	  EHR	  system	  was	  to	  ensure	  interoperability.	  Despite	  having	  this	  goal	  in	  mind,	  the	  provincial	  effort	  to	  create	  one	  EHR	  system	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  central	  EHR	  systems	  that	  are	  not	  interoperable.	  As	  the	  Auditor	  notes	  in	  his	  report,	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  McCarter,	  Special	  Report:	  Ontario's	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	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  p.	  34.	  311	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  24.	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[the]	  EHR	  project	  is	  behind	  schedule	  and	  struggling	  to	  deliver	  on	  its	  mandate…	  integrating	  [these	  systems]	  so	  that	  they	  work	  together	  to	  collectively	  deliver	  an	  EHR	  to	  the	  medical	  community	  and	  all	  Ontarians	  remains	  a	  challenge.312	  	  	  	  The	  framework	  developed	  in	  chapter	  five	  suggests	  that	  the	  search	  for	  solutions	  to	  nondecomposable	  problems	  is	  best	  achieved	  with	  the	  insource-­‐agency	  administration	  (IAA)	  form	  of	  governance.	  During	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  the	  government	  implicitly	  defined	  the	  software	  issue	  as	  a	  decomposable	  problem,	  and	  largely	  adopted	  an	  insource-­‐Weberian	  administration	  (IWA)	  form	  of	  governance	  to	  search	  for	  solutions.	  By	  misdiagnosing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  software	  problem,	  and	  applying	  the	  improper	  form	  of	  governance	  to	  find	  a	  solution(s),	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  government	  established	  conditions	  that	  would	  inevitably	  lead	  to	  failure.	  	  	  In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  government	  tasked	  the	  MOHLTC,	  a	  line	  department	  (hence	  an	  IWA	  type	  organization),313	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  developing	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  EHR	  software	  problem.	  Ostensibly	  dealing	  with	  a	  decomposable	  problem,	  the	  ministry	  approached	  the	  software	  issue	  from	  a	  number	  of	  different	  angles,	  and	  started	  developing	  a	  number	  of	  separate	  systems	  as	  solutions.	  To	  facilitate	  the	  solution	  search,	  the	  MOHLTC	  contracted	  a	  large	  number	  of	  consultants	  to	  work	  on	  these	  disparate	  systems.	  As	  the	  framework	  suggests,	  the	  hiring	  of	  short-­‐term	  consultants	  is	  an	  inappropriate	  strategy	  to	  work	  on	  nondecomposable	  problems,	  because	  locating	  a	  solution	  to	  these	  types	  of	  problems	  necessitates	  a	  heuristic	  search	  strategy.	  Developing	  an	  effective	  search	  heuristic	  is	  not	  an	  immediate	  process,	  it	  requires	  time	  for	  individuals	  to	  learn,	  share	  and	  process	  information	  and	  knowledge.	  Therefore,	  while	  the	  Auditor	  was	  correct	  in	  noting	  that	  the	  MOHLTC	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  In	  chapter	  five,	  we	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  line	  departments,	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  the	  MOHLTC,	  as	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  IWA	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was	  overly	  reliant	  on	  the	  use	  of	  short-­‐term	  consultants,	  his	  conclusion	  is	  correct	  because	  locating	  an	  effective	  software	  solution	  was	  not	  predicated	  on	  the	  hiring	  temporary	  consultants.	  Rather,	  an	  effective	  solution	  would	  be	  found	  through	  the	  addition	  and	  retention	  of	  long-­‐term	  core	  employees,	  who	  could	  develop	  an	  effective	  search	  heuristic	  for	  the	  software	  problem.	  	  	  	  From	  2002	  to	  2008,	  little	  progress	  was	  made	  on	  the	  central	  effort	  to	  locate	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  software	  problem.	  In	  2004,	  the	  project	  was	  reorganized,	  and	  an	  Office	  of	  E-­‐Health	  was	  created	  at	  the	  MOHLTC.	  In	  2006,	  the	  process	  repeated	  itself,	  with	  another	  reorganization	  at	  the	  MOHLTC.	  Finally,	  in	  2008,	  with	  no	  working	  software	  solution	  apparent,	  the	  government	  reorganized	  the	  project	  a	  third	  time,	  establishing	  a	  new	  crown	  agency,	  eHealth	  Ontario.	  Just	  one	  year	  later,	  eHealth	  Ontairo	  went	  through	  its	  own	  reorganization.314	  	  The	  reorganization	  of	  the	  project	  in	  2008	  is	  particularly	  significant	  because	  the	  government	  chose	  to	  locate	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  software	  problem	  through	  an	  entirely	  different	  type	  of	  organization.	  While	  the	  MOHLTC	  is	  certainly	  an	  IWA	  type	  organization,	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  eHealth	  Ontario	  was	  designed	  to	  mimic	  an	  IAA	  type	  organization.	  First,	  eHealth	  Ontario	  was	  established	  as	  independent	  agency,	  like	  all	  IAA	  type	  organizations.	  Second,	  senior	  decision	  makers	  at	  eHealth	  Ontario	  believed	  they	  had	  the	  implied	  authority	  to	  hire	  individuals	  with	  specialized	  knowledge	  sets	  to	  quickly	  locate	  a	  solution.	  eHealth	  Ontario	  refrained	  from	  hiring	  ministry	  or	  SSHA	  staff,	  which	  they	  believed	  did	  not	  posses	  the	  requisite	  knowledge	  for	  the	  project.	  In	  effect,	  it	  appears	  that	  eHealth	  Ontario	  was	  attempting	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  team,	  with	  specialized	  knowledge	  sets,	  capable	  of	  locating	  an	  EHR	  software	  solution.315	  Third,	  unlike	  the	  MOHLTC,	  eHealth	  Ontario	  was	  exempt	  from	  traditional	  procurement	  policies	  and	  wage/benefit	  restrictions.316	  Like	  a	  prototypical	  IAA	  type	  organization,	  eHealth	  Ontario	  established	  unique,	  or	  atypical,	  remuneration	  system	  for	  its	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employees.	  While	  is	  unclear	  whether	  the	  government	  was	  purposefully	  creating	  an	  IAA	  type	  organization	  to	  search	  for	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  software	  problem,	  all	  of	  the	  critical	  elements	  were	  present	  in	  eHealth	  Ontario.	  Unfortunately,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  chapter	  three,	  eHealth	  Ontario	  was	  beset	  by	  multiple	  scandals,	  and	  failed	  to	  deliver	  on	  its	  promise.	  	  The	  choice	  of	  governance	  forms	  to	  address	  the	  EHR	  software	  problem,	  coupled	  with	  the	  multiple	  reorganizations,	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  three	  knowledge	  hazards	  manifesting	  themselves	  during	  the	  project.	  From	  2002-­‐2008,	  when	  the	  IWA	  form	  of	  governance	  was	  employed,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  infer	  that	  the	  extensive	  use	  of	  outside	  consultants	  on	  short-­‐term	  contracts	  led	  these	  agents	  to	  both	  appropriate	  and	  accumulate	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  also	  reasonable	  to	  infer	  that	  the	  use	  of	  consultants,	  and	  the	  multiple	  project	  reorganizations,	  led	  to	  some	  embedded	  knowledge	  destruction.	  Moreover,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  group	  search	  heuristic	  ever	  started	  to	  emerge	  at	  the	  MOHLTC,	  it	  would	  likely	  have	  been	  destroyed	  by	  the	  high	  turnover	  rate.	  After	  the	  eHealth	  Ontario	  agency	  was	  established	  in	  2008,	  it	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  judge	  whether	  the	  knowledge	  appropriation	  and	  accumulation	  manifested	  themselves.	  Simply	  put,	  the	  organization	  went	  through	  a	  complete	  reorganization	  after	  only	  twelve	  months,	  and	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  progress	  was	  truly	  made.	  However,	  we	  can	  be	  relatively	  certain	  that	  the	  knowledge	  destruction	  hazard	  did	  emerge,	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  number	  of	  actors	  that	  exited	  the	  agency.	  	  In	  summary,	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  the	  government	  misdiagnosed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  software,	  and	  adopted	  a	  poorly	  suited	  organizational	  form	  to	  search	  for	  a	  solution,	  that	  helped	  contribute	  to	  policy	  fiasco.	  With	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  the	  software	  problem	  should	  have	  been	  approached	  differently	  during	  the	  design	  phase.	  A	  coherent	  strategic	  plan	  would	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  government	  begin	  the	  search	  for	  a	  software	  solution	  with	  an	  IAA	  type	  organization	  –i.e.	  something	  akin	  to	  eHealth	  Ontario.	  This	  organization	  would	  have	  been	  given	  sufficient	  times	  and	  resources	  to	  develop	  a	  software	  tool	  capable	  of	  translating	  all	  the	  format/codes	  into	  a	  universal	  format,	  thus	  facilitating	  a	  central,	  interoperable,	  EHR	  system	  for	  the	  province.	  While	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we	  can	  only	  speculate,	  it	  is	  certainly	  possible	  that	  senior	  decision	  makers	  in	  government	  came	  to	  the	  realization	  that	  an	  IAA	  type	  organization	  would	  best	  facilitate	  the	  development	  of	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  software	  problem.	  If	  this	  was	  the	  case,	  they	  were	  simply	  eight	  years	  too	  late.	  	  	  
SUMMARY	  OF	  THE	  DESIGN	  PHASE	  ANALYSIS	  –	  THE	  CRITICAL	  ERRORS	  	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  EHR	  project	  suggests	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  made	  three	  critical	  and	  related	  errors:	  	   (1)	  While	  government	  correctly	  diagnosed	  the	  network	  problem	  as	  decomposable,	  it	  adopted	  an	  inappropriate	  form	  of	  governance.	  By	  establishing	  a	  new	  agency,	  the	  SSHA,	  to	  coordinate	  the	  contracting,	  the	  government	  duplicated	  bureaucratic	  structures	  already	  present	  at	  the	  MOHLTC,	  which	  ultimately	  led	  to	  a	  higher	  cost	  solution.	  Moreover,	  establishing	  the	  SSHA,	  and	  allowing	  it	  to	  expand	  into	  the	  area	  of	  facilitating	  local	  EHR	  system	  integration,	  ensured	  that	  another	  unnecessary	  player	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  overall	  governance	  of	  the	  project.	  	  	   (2)	  The	  government	  misdiagnosed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  software	  problem	  as	  being	  decomposable,	  and	  largely	  adopted	  an	  inappropriate	  form	  of	  governance	  (IWA)	  to	  locate	  a	  solution.	  The	  failure	  to	  correctly	  diagnose	  the	  problem	  ensured	  that	  search	  costs	  would	  be	  high,	  and	  that	  valuable	  solutions	  were	  unlikely	  to	  be	  discovered.	  	   (3)	  Reorganizing	  (four	  times)	  the	  search	  for	  solutions	  to	  the	  software	  problem,	  combined	  with	  a	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  outside	  consultants,	  ensured	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that	  all	  three	  knowledge	  hazards	  would	  be	  present,	  further	  increasing	  costs.317	  	  Each	  of	  these	  critical	  errors	  helped	  contribute	  to	  project	  failure.	  The	  evidence	  clearly	  suggests	  that	  the	  government	  simply	  paid	  insufficient	  attention	  to	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  project.	  	  
SPECULATING	  ON	  THE	  DECENTRALIZED	  APPROACH	  	  Given	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  EHR	  project,	  one	  point	  has	  become	  obvious:	  the	  decision	  to	  design	  a	  central	  system	  was	  logically	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  independent	  implementation	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  province.	  Why	  then	  did	  government	  adopt	  a	  decentralized	  approach	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  	  	  While	  we	  can	  only	  engaged	  in	  informed	  speculation,	  one	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  government	  simply	  failed	  to	  consider	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  the	  project,	  and	  whether	  EHR	  solutions	  are	  independent	  or	  interdependent.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  government	  simply	  fashioned	  its	  strategy	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  decentralized	  nature	  of	  the	  healthcare	  system.	  The	  second	  possibility	  is	  that	  government	  misdiagnosed	  EHR	  solutions	  as	  independent,	  as	  opposed	  to	  interdependent.	  In	  this	  case,	  adopting	  the	  decentralized	  approach	  was	  a	  conscious	  choice.	  Hence,	  government	  believed	  that	  decentralization	  would	  ultimately	  deliver	  the	  best	  possible	  EHR	  solution.	  The	  third	  and	  final	  possibility	  is	  that	  elements	  within	  the	  government	  correctly	  diagnosed	  EHR	  solutions	  as	  interdependent,	  but	  failed	  to	  effectively	  transmit	  this	  knowledge.	  The	  government	  therefore	  adopted	  a	  dual	  tract	  approach,	  simultaneously	  encouraging	  a	  centralized	  and	  decentralized	  EHR	  solution.	  The	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  third	  scenario	  is	  most	  likely.	  The	  government	  ostensibly	  saw	  value	  in	  creating	  one	  interoperable	  EHR	  solution	  for	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  317	  While	  reorganizing	  the	  project	  was	  likely	  a	  symptom	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  progress	  towards	  a	  solution,	  it	  nonetheless	  ensured	  that	  the	  knowledge	  destruction	  hazard	  would	  manifest	  itself.	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province,	  given	  the	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  the	  SSHA	  and	  the	  MOHLTC	  to	  develop	  a	  central	  system.	  However,	  the	  MOHLTC	  (as	  well	  as	  Infoway)	  also	  funded	  independent	  healthcare	  organizations	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  unique	  solutions.	  This	  decision	  is	  curious,	  of	  course,	  because	  the	  MOHLTC	  and	  the	  SSHA	  simultaneously	  established	  formal	  bodies	  to	  ensure	  that	  these	  independent	  systems	  would	  somehow	  become	  interoperable	  in	  the	  future.	  Given	  the	  three	  possibilities	  highlighted	  above,	  the	  only	  thing	  we	  can	  say	  with	  certainty	  is	  that	  the	  government	  completely	  failed	  to	  coordinate	  internally.	  That	  failure,	  more	  than	  any	  other,	  ultimately	  led	  the	  project	  towards	  fiasco.	  	  	  
	  
SUMMARY	  –	  A	  COHERENT	  STRATEGIC	  PLAN	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CONCLUSION	  	  In	  2010,	  the	  government	  recommitted	  itself	  to	  developing	  a	  central	  EHR	  system	  that	  would	  connect	  all	  Ontarians	  by	  2015.318	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  problems	  of	  governance	  and	  technology	  choice	  have	  come	  full	  circle.	  Once	  again,	  the	  province	  is	  at	  a	  crossroad.	  Assuming	  the	  central	  effort	  is	  successful,	  the	  province	  will	  have	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  implement	  a	  rip-­‐and-­‐replace	  strategy,	  or	  continue	  operating	  in	  an	  uncoordinated	  manner.	  In	  2015,	  the	  province	  will	  face	  the	  same	  choices	  it	  faced	  in	  2000.	  Fifteen	  years	  later,	  very	  little	  will	  have	  changed.	  We	  can	  only	  hope	  that	  decision	  makers	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  their	  actions,	  and	  devise	  a	  solution	  that	  ultimately	  delivers	  on	  the	  promise	  of	  EHRs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  318	  	  Ontario's	  Plan	  for	  Electronic	  Health	  Records	  is	  at	  Risk,	  Official	  Says,	  pp.	  253-­‐254.	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  In	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	  we	  applied	  the	  frameworks	  developed	  in	  chapters	  four	  and	  five	  to	  analyze	  the	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  project.	  We	  concluded	  that	  the	  EHR	  initiative	  suffered	  from	  a	  number	  of	  interrelated	  problems,	  at	  both	  the	  design	  phase,	  and	  the	  implementation	  phase,	  of	  the	  project.	  In	  this	  concluding	  chapter,	  we	  briefly	  review	  the	  key	  components	  of	  this	  study,	  and	  add	  a	  few	  final	  thoughts	  to	  the	  analysis,	  while	  suggesting	  some	  potential	  research	  extensions.	  We	  then	  return	  to	  some	  of	  the	  themes	  raised	  earlier	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  study,	  and	  highlight	  a	  few	  key	  lessons	  that	  might	  help	  reduce	  the	  frequency	  of	  government	  ICT	  project	  failure.	  	  	  
SUMMARY	  AND	  FUTURE	  RESEARCH	  DIRECTIONS	  	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  project	  had	  two	  main	  phases.	  A	  design	  phase,	  in	  which	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  system	  was	  determined,	  and	  an	  implementation	  phase,	  in	  which	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  system	  was	  carried	  out.	  Our	  study	  had	  two	  broad	  objectives:	  first,	  to	  develop	  a	  set	  of	  frameworks	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  the	  phases;	  and	  second,	  to	  use	  these	  frameworks	  to	  describe	  why	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  initiative	  was	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so	  unsuccessful.	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  introduced	  the	  ehealth	  topic	  in	  chapter	  two,	  and	  reviewed	  the	  EHR	  project	  story	  in	  chapter	  three.	  In	  chapters	  four	  and	  five,	  we	  developed	  two	  frameworks	  to	  help	  us	  theorize	  about	  technology	  projects	  in	  governments;	  chapter	  four	  focused	  on	  implementation	  considerations,	  and	  chapter	  five	  focused	  on	  design	  considerations.	  In	  chapter	  six,	  we	  applied	  these	  frameworks	  to	  analyze	  the	  EHR	  project.	  	  The	  thesis	  begins	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  project	  was	  a	  fiasco.	  After	  ten	  years,	  and	  over	  a	  billion	  dollars	  expended,	  the	  government	  of	  Ontario	  failed	  to	  realize	  its	  central	  objective:	  a	  fully	  functional	  and	  interoperable	  EHR	  system	  for	  the	  province.	  The	  key	  question	  addressed	  in	  the	  thesis	  is	  why	  this	  failure	  occurred.	  	  	  The	  analysis	  undertaken	  in	  chapter	  six	  certainly	  helps	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  this	  particular	  story	  of	  fiasco,	  and	  the	  critical	  problems	  facing	  the	  project.	  We	  concluded	  that	  decision	  makers	  failed	  to	  consider	  the	  interdependent	  nature	  of	  EHR	  solutions.	  Moreover,	  decision	  makers	  encouraged	  independent	  actors	  to	  develop	  their	  ehealth	  solutions,	  effectively	  undermining	  the	  provincial	  goal	  of	  an	  interoperable	  system.	  We	  also	  concluded	  that	  decision	  makers	  misdiagnosed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  EHR	  software	  problem,	  resulting	  in	  an	  infective	  search	  procedure	  to	  locate	  on	  EHR	  software	  solution.	  These	  two	  errors	  resulted	  in	  a	  policy	  fiasco	  that	  was	  manifested	  in	  almost	  total	  project	  failure.	  However,	  what	  is	  missing	  from	  this	  analysis	  is	  the	  “why”.	  Why	  did	  decision	  makers	  define	  the	  software	  problem	  as	  decomposable?	  Why	  did	  decision	  makers	  adopt	  a	  decentralized	  approach?	  What	  led	  decision	  makers	  to	  conclude	  that	  EHR	  systems	  might	  be	  independent	  solutions?	  	  In	  chapter	  six,	  we	  briefly	  speculated	  on	  a	  few	  of	  the	  “why”	  questions.	  However,	  more	  research	  and	  analysis	  is	  clearly	  called	  for.	  In	  the	  opinion	  of	  this	  author,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  intriguing	  lines	  of	  inquiry	  that	  could	  be	  explored.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  promising	  involves	  the	  application	  of	  insights	  from	  behavioral	  economics	  and	  psychology	  to	  explain	  the	  behavior	  and	  actions	  of	  senior	  decision	  makers	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  project.	  Increasing	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  human	  behavior	  in	  the	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literature	  on	  project	  management,	  focusing	  on	  issues	  of	  strategic	  misrepresentation,	  overconfidence,	  anchoring,	  cognitive	  dissonance,	  and	  application	  of	  prospect	  theory	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  sunk	  costs.	  While	  this	  applied	  research	  is	  still	  in	  its	  infancy,	  it	  shows	  considerable	  promise	  to	  help	  answer	  the	  “why”	  questions	  previously	  identified.	  	  	  
GOVERNMENT	  ICT	  PROJECTS	  AND	  PUBLIC	  POLICY	  
	  In	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  thesis,	  we	  noted	  that	  government	  ICT	  projects	  are	  notorious	  for	  succumbing	  to	  policy	  failure.	  The	  general	  public	  has	  become	  rightly	  concerned	  that	  government	  can	  simply	  not	  get	  these	  projects	  right.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  study,	  it	  has	  become	  apparent	  that	  much	  of	  literature	  on	  ICT	  projects	  (and	  in	  particular,	  on	  ehealth	  projects)	  is	  focused	  small,	  nuts	  and	  bolts,	  issues.	  By	  way	  of	  example,	  in	  chapter	  two	  we	  identified	  the	  key	  criteria	  cited	  in	  the	  literature	  for	  successful	  ehealth	  system	  implementation;	  these	  criteria	  included	  ‘providing	  targeted	  training	  to	  relevant	  users’,	  and	  ‘allowing	  users	  space	  for	  technology	  feedback	  and	  improvement.’319	  While	  these	  issues	  are	  undoubtedly	  important	  at	  some	  level,	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  an	  ehealth	  projects’	  ultimate	  success	  rests	  on	  these	  types	  of	  criteria.	  Put	  another	  way,	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  is	  failing	  to	  see	  the	  forest	  for	  the	  trees.	  	  	  If	  the	  problems	  apparent	  in	  Ontario’s	  EHR	  project	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  experienced	  in	  other	  government	  ICT	  projects,	  then	  the	  following	  interrelated	  recommendations	  may	  be	  useful:	  	  (1)	  When	  considering	  a	  strategic	  plan	  for	  an	  ICT	  project,	  it	  is	  useful	  for	  decision	  makers	  to	  employ	  backwards	  induction	  (or	  back	  solving).	  The	  process	  of	  back	  solving	  for	  a	  solution	  often	  reveals	  challenges	  that	  are	  not	  readily	  apparent	  when	  traditional	  linear	  problem	  solving	  technique	  are	  employed.	  By	  reasoning	  backwards	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  319	  For	  more,	  refer	  back	  to	  chapter	  2,	  page	  26.	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from	  a	  solution,	  decision	  makers	  can	  likely	  ascertain	  how	  particular	  forms	  of	  implementation	  affect	  design	  issues	  (certain	  design	  problems	  might	  be	  eliminated	  by	  an	  implementation	  choice,	  while	  other	  design	  problem	  might	  be	  exacerbated).	  Hence,	  by	  thinking	  about	  the	  ‘implementation	  phase’	  of	  a	  project	  first,	  decision	  makers	  can	  make	  appropriate	  and	  informed	  decisions	  during	  ‘design	  phase’.	  	  (2)	  It	  is	  critical	  for	  decision	  makers	  to	  consider	  whether	  their	  ICT	  solutions	  are	  independent	  or	  interdependent.	  When	  solutions	  are	  interdependent,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  for	  government	  to	  exert	  its	  authority	  to	  facilitate	  cooperation	  and	  coordination;	  absent	  government	  intervention,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  ICT	  projects	  will	  fail	  to	  deliver	  on	  their	  promise.	  	  	  	  (3)	  Attention	  must	  be	  given	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ICT	  problem,	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  decomposable,	  nondecomposable	  or	  nearly	  decomposable.	  Different	  types	  of	  problems	  require	  different	  search	  strategies,	  and	  organizational	  forms,	  to	  effectively	  discover	  solutions.	  By	  implication,	  governments	  must	  not	  be	  wedded	  to	  one	  form,	  or	  style,	  of	  governance	  without	  first	  considering	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ICT	  problem	  they	  are	  facing.	  	  	  These	  three	  points	  are	  purposefully	  broad.	  They	  are	  designed	  to	  get	  theorists	  and	  practitioners	  thinking	  about	  the	  building	  blocks	  of	  any	  successful	  ICT	  project.	  All	  to	  frequently	  in	  government,	  ostensibly	  good	  ideas,	  like	  the	  development	  of	  an	  EHR	  system,	  turn	  bad.	  Decision	  makers	  get	  enamored	  with	  an	  idea,	  become	  engrossed	  in	  the	  details,	  and	  fail	  to	  consider	  implications	  of	  their	  actions.	  By	  encouraging	  decision	  makers	  to	  look	  at	  the	  big	  picture,	  we	  can	  take	  one	  step	  towards	  ensuring	  project	  viability,	  and	  one	  step	  away	  from	  ultimate	  project	  failure.	  	  	  
